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Show ALLIES INSIST GEI1S NEED MDHESOLDIEHS Terrible Wastage of Human War Material Forecasts Ending of Conflict Within Year OFFICIAL ANALYSIS OF FORCES GIVEN French Estimate That the Kaiser Has Lost More Than 1,800,000 of His Best Troops LONDON Apr 1 6 Further in Etallments of the French of he al reiew of the French army after six months of Tvarbe been obta ned by the Asso c ated Pres The sixth installment deals w th mater al artillery transport and supplies and the seventh nstall ment takes up the s tuat on of the Ger man army and makes an analys s of the German forces m the field and avail able Beg nn ng tv th the field gun the fan ous se enty fi e the comp ler of the report after rehears ng the plen did qual t es of th s weapon its power its rapid ty of act on and its precis on points out that it possesses a degree of strength and endurance wh ch make it an implement of war of the first order It may be stated w thout hesita t on says the review that our e enty five guns are m as perfect cond t on today as they were on the first day of the war although the use made of them has exceeded all calcula t ons The consumpt on of projectiles was in fact so enormous as to cause for a moment an ammun tion en s wh ch however was completely over come several weeks ago The method cal and complete ex plo tation of all the resources of -the country cont nues the review or ganized s nee the beginning of the war has enabled us to accumulate a con s derable stock of fresh murut ons and an increas ng rate of product on is henceforth assured We are thus sure of be ng able to provide w thout par ticular effort for all the needs of the campa gn present and future however long the war may last, and t is this certa nty which has enabled us to sup ply project les to several of the albed arm es among others to the Serbian and Belgian arm es From the state ments of German prisoners we have learned that the effectiveness of our new project les is super or to that of the old ones Heavy Guns Excel Our heavy art llery was n process of reoran zatlon when the war broke out w th the result that we were indlsput ably In position o Inferiority in respect to this arm during the first batt es But today the ro es ha e Deen changed and our adversar es themselves acknowledge the super ority of our heavy art ery The change has been brought about in arious ways partly by the Intense act v Hy of the cannon foundries n new pro duct on pa t y by he emp oyment at the f ont of the enormous reserves of ar lery preserved In the fortresses The ery la ge number of heavy guns at tho front represents only a part of the total number available for use There Is an abundant stock of projectl es for the heavy art 1 ery wh ch as in the asu of the fed gun ammunition is da y growing In importance The same s rue of the reserves of powder and other ex P oslves and of a 1 mate als needed for the manufacture of shells With regard to sma 1 arms hand g en ades bomtjs all the devices for fe tak ing which the trench warfare at short d stan e has brou0 t nto se the pos on of the Fren oops s n e e Ta favorab e T ere fo o vs a pas ase on t e de e opment of the ma h ne gun n th s kinu of wa fa e Many Machine Guns Ow ng o e e tended u e of h s weapon t e numbe of em supp ed to he a ous u as heen app ec ab y n eased sa s e e ev, Not on s each un possess on of s ful egu a on comp en en of ma hine gun bu the n n be of he e guns a tacked o ea h un t has been ncreased nee Feb ua lb one h d T e epo t ex passes o he t ansport ser e vh t says as wo ked w t ema kab e pre s on s n e t e beginn ng of e wa Th s sec on of he re ew oses by efe ng to food supp es fa the a m wh ch are described as abun dan In the e enth seo on the off c a e v ew tu ns to a d scuss on of e s ua on of he Ge man a rry I s f st chap e T e German Effo ope s w h a s a ement as o the German forces a e ommencen ent of the campa an The v, ter sa s The m tary effo t of Ge many at the ou set of the campa gn ex eeded a an t c pa ons He des n was o c ush the Frenc army n a few weeks under a t emendou mass of oops Ivoth ng was ne e ted o b ng t at n ass to gethe German Organization T e numbe of Ge n a am o ps n t me of peace s went f b W en wa began e Ce n a gene a staff p n e f eld on he two hea e s of ope a t ons (1 as to f g ng t oops (ac ve reserve E a z o Landweh s xty one arm Co ps as t oops to guard con n un cat o and ter tory fo mat ons of the Landstu n In Oc ober s x and a a f new arn j co ps made he r appearance plus a d v s on of sa ors n a 1 seven co ps Fron he end of November to t e end of De cen ber the e was on y an ns gn f cant nc ease cons s ng of one d v s on or sa o s In Januarj 1915 t e number of f s-ht nQ fo mat ons put no ne b the German a my was the efo e s xty n no arm corps d ided as fol o s Act ve corps Twentj f ve and one a f Reserve corps Twenty one and one ha f Ersatz S x bi gades and one I a f Reserve corps of new forn at on Se ei(i and one ha f Corps of Landwehr E ght and one half Attempt to Crush France The immen e effo t thus made by Germans- explains it e f ery wel sass the wrter f ha ng regard to the position of German at the open ng of the war one con de s hat of the al es Germany de ed o ake ad an age of the c rcums ances wh ch enab ed her to make a m taneo s n ob 1 zat on of a 1 her fo es a mob za on -wh ch the h ee a ed arm es cou d not car v out as ap dly Ge n ans w shed with the ma s of t oops to crush f st of a 1 the I ad e sarv who appeared to her the mo t immed a e y oangerous Th s eort broken for the f rst time on the Marne at a ned ts maximum at the moment of the ba e of F anders in which more than f fty a mj. corps out of sixty n ne were P t ed again t the French B tish and Be ian arm es He e a so the method tfo lowed bv German s eas ly con prehens b e At the end of October the Russ an danger was beginn n0 to be ome pre s ng and t was neces ary to win a decisive vie torv n the western theater of war It was imperat e to give International oo n on t e mpress on that Germany re ma ned n that quarter mistress of the ope at ons Final y it behooved her b th s ctorv to gain the f eedom tu t anspo t a la ge number of army corps to Poland We ha e seen that the bat t e of F anders Instead of be ng a sue cess for Germany was a marked defeat Th s defeat was fraught with results and t dom nates the present pos tion of the German army The plans above described of the German mob 1 zatlon which had the r just f cat on n view of a prompt v cto y were calcu ated to become e treme j per ous from the moment that ctory fa led to be ga ned Loses Advantage From that moment In fact Germany lo t the In tlatl e and the direction of the war And furthermore she was con demned to suffer the counter effects of the enormous and prec pltate effort wh ch she had made In an From the point of v ew of her effectiveness and her regl mental cad es (bas c o ganizat on) she had suffered a wastage which her adver sarles on the other hand had been able to save themselves She had in the words of the prove b put all her eggs In one basket and In spite of her large populat on she cou d no onger ow ng to the immediate and sterl e abuse which she had made of her resources pretend to rega n the superiority of numbers She was reduced to fac ng as best she could on both war fronts the unceas Ing y Increas ng forces of the a 1 es She had atta ned the max mum of tens on and had secu ed a m nlmum of resu ts She had thus anded herse f in a difficulty which wll henceforward go on Increas Ing and which is made clear when the wastage which her army has suffered is closely studied Chapter two of th s section of the re view bears the headl ne Wastage of German Eflecti es Enormous Los of Men The wastage of effectives Is easy to establish it says We have for the purpose two sources the official 1 sts of losses publ shed by the German genersl staff and the note books letters and archives of so d ers and officers kl led and taken prisoners These defin te docu ments s ow that by the midd e of Jan uary the German losses on the two fronts were 1 800 000 men These flg res are certain y less than the rea y because for one thing the s k a e not comprised and for another he losses In the last battle n Poland are not nc uded Let us accept them however let us accept a so that out of these 1 800 000 men 600 000 th s the norn a p oport on ba e been ab e to re 30 n after be g cured T us the final loss for five mont s of the campa gn has been 1 300 000 men or 60 000 men per mon h These flgu es ag ee e act y wl h what can be ascer a ned when the ari at pns of effec ves in certain regin en s are e am ned It Is ce an tat the major ty of the German reg ments have ad to be com P ete enewed What hen is the st ua on c eated by these enormous losses The ques on s answe ed by a s ate ment headed German Troops A a able fol- 1915 Available German Troops The total of German format ons known at t e be0 nning of January ates the e ew represented n round numbe s 4 000 000 men Accord ng to the offlc al reports on German recru t ng the ent re resources of Germany in men amount to J9 000 000 But f om these 9 000 000 ha e to be deducted men em plojed on railways in the pol ce and in certa n admin s rations and Indus r es a together 500 000 men The total re sources ava lable for the war were there fore 8 500 000 Out of these about one ha f saj 4 000 000 are now at the f ont The definitive losses represent at least 1 300 000 men The ava ab e resources amounted then at the beginning of Jan uary to 3 "00 000 men Of w hat are these resources com posd Ch efly of men who were un trained in t me of peace the untrained resen sts having almost all left the de pots for the front It has moreover to be noted that out of these 3 200 000 men the e are according to the statist cs 800 000 who are mo e than 39 years of age and are therefore of only medl ocre ml 1 ary abl Ity There remain 2 400 000 Finally the category of the un tra ned n peace compr ses. according to . the estimates of German mil tan au t orltles themsel es one quarter of in efficients Two Mihon Left The realty a allable resources capable of campa gnlng are therefore Just 2 000 000 These men comprising the 191o 1916 and 1917 classes called out in anticipation constitute and this po nt cannot be too strongly Ins sted upon the total of a a able esources for the oper at ons during the twelve months of 1916 As to what tl e mil tary va ue of these troops w 11 be considering the haste with which they have been tra ned the for mldable losses susta ned In the battle of Flanders by the newly formed corps show -very clearly Their military value wl 1 be l(mited When It s remembered that accord ng to the re-man documents themselves the deflniti e oss each month lfl 260 000 men It s manifest that the avallab e resources for the 5 ear 1915 wll not suf flee to fill the gaps of a war of ten months It is then superabundantly established that In the matter of effectiveness Ger many has reached t e maximum of pos she effort If with the men at present available she creates aj It Is certain that she s preparing to do at this moment, fresh formations she wll be preventing herself If tl e war lasts another ten months as is admissible from being able to complete afres her old formations. If she creates no new formations she will ha e In 1915 exact y what Is necessary and no more to complete the existing units afresh Bea ing In m nd the ways of t e Ger man general staff one may suppose that dls egardlng the eventual impossibility of recomputing t Is st u address ng Itself to creating new fo mat ons The weakness to wh ch German wl expose herself In the matter of effe es has Just been set fortl and It s eas to show that this weakness w be st 11 further aggravated by the wastage n the reg menta cadres |