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Show THE HABEAS CORPUS. Chief Justice White Delivers His Opinion. And Discharges President Brigham Brig-ham Young From the Custody of the U. S. Marshal. - -. TEXT OF TUB OPINION. Torr;t-rv of Utah, City or Suit Lake, County ot i-'alc Lnko. J .Nov. IT. 1875. Biuhain You- g, -, At Chamberi before vs I Atcx. Wbite.Coiel' George It. Maxwell, f Jusiicoof Supremo 3 Court of Utah. This case comes before the court 'upon a writ of habeas corpus, sued out upon the petition of Brigham Young, claiming that he is unjustly imprisoned impri-soned and deprived of his liberty in said county and territory, by George R. Maxwell, United States marshal for said territory, on the charge of a contempt of court, by a warrant of commitment, a copy of which ia attached to the petition, as exhibit A. Th nptilin.i iii.-ir in prhihit.q attached to the pleadings, an order ot iho district court of the Third judicial ! district of the territory of Utah, in a j wwe ol bill for divorce by Ann Eliza I Young vs. Brigham Youug, as the j authority under which petitioner is imprisoned and held by said United States marshal. The' marshal returns to the writ of habeas corpus that he holds the defendant in custody by virtue .and authority of an order of Baid court, in slid cause, a copy of which is attiehed to exhibit A, to ;the petition, and is dated ihe 29th of October, 1875. Among other grounds on which the petitioner prays to be released from said imprisonment, it is alleged that the order of commitment of the 29th of October, 1875, is void; because the district court of the Third judicial district had no jurisdiction pver the subject matter at the time the order was made, for the reason that the same matters bad been duly presenteu uy me panies, auu buuhhi-ted buuhhi-ted to the court, at a former term of Ithe court, and thereupon, that the 1 court had rendered a decree, at said I former term, refusing the motion for 'an attachment and discharging the I rule to show cause why the defendant should not be committed for a contempt con-tempt of court, in having disregarded the order and decree of the court, to pay $9,500 alimony pendente lite, to the plaintiff, Ann Eliza Young. A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, when collaterally assailed, can only be impeached for a want oi power in the court to render the judgment. judg-ment. The record may abound in irregularities and errors, yet if the court had jurisdiction, the judgment ia valid and binding, until by some direct proceeding, by appeal or otherwise, other-wise, instituted for the purpose, the judgment is brought before some revisory re-visory tribunal and, by the judgment of such revising court, is revised, set aside or annulled. The propriety of the decree and order of the district court, of the 29th of October, 1875, cannot be questioned ques-tioned or considered by this court further then to investigate and determine de-termine whether the court had jurisdiction jur-isdiction over the subject and the parties, so far as relates to the subject matter; in other words over the case, then presented to and adjudicated by it. The jurisdiction must be over both the person and the subject matter; if either of these jurisdictional facts is wanting, then the sentence or decree is void. In such case the whole proceeding is coram nonjudice, and -it may be successfully resisted in that or in any other court by either direct or collateral proceeding. Campbell Camp-bell and others vs. McCshan, 41 III., -19. Elliott vs. Pearson, 1 Peters, 328. During the term, a court has power over its own proceedings, and can alter, modify or even annul its judgments, orders and decrees, as, in its judicial discretion, is consistent with the law and the advancement of justice. But when, by order of court or operation of law, the term of i a court is closed, the court has no further power over its proceedings. They can only be reached or disturbed by an appellate or revising court, or : perhaps, in rare cases, impeached, by bill in chancery, for fraud. 1 It is insisted by the counsel for the petitioner that this question of con-j tempt on his part, for disobedience to the order of the court, decreeing the paying of $9,500 alimony pendente lite, to the plaintiff, Ann Eliza Young, made on the 2(5 th of February, Febru-ary, 1875, has been passed upon and adjudicated by the court in the decree of 10th of Mny, 1875, and that, the term of court having elapsed, tne ais-, ais-, trict court had no power to re-adjudi-' icate that question. I I On the part of the defendant it is purged that the order of the 10th of ' May was a mere interlocutory order, and one tha might be reviewed bo long as the decree granting alimony .pendente lite and ordering its pay-: pay-: ment remained uncoroplied with, whenever, upon proper predictate it was pressed upon the consideration of the court. It is further urged by the defendant that the matters adjudicated adjudi-cated on tne 10th of May and those adjudicated by the court on the 29th of October were not the same, but different, and that the judgment of the court on the 10th of May did not preclude the court on the 29th of October from adjudicating upon the1 matters then passed uponoy it. The order of the 10th of May was an order in the cause, made after the filing of the bill, and before final decree, de-cree, and in that view it was an interlocutory in-terlocutory ord-T, in the common acceptation of the term. Interlocutory Interlocu-tory orders usually are mere orders in advancement of the cause and necessary neces-sary in the preparation of it for a final hearing and decree, but tbero are interlocutory orders which are final in their character and which settle rights as conclusively as the final judgment and decree. The order of tho court of 20th of February, 1875, settling the right of plaintifl to alimony pendente liletand the amount of that alimony, was a judgment of the court upon both of those questions, and was final and conclusive upon the district court after the adjournment adjourn-ment of the term of court. The court had decided the question and given judgment, and what more could it do? Would it be contended that it could decide the question and give judgment again? If so, when would the repetiliou end? It would give no additional force to its mandate to render the same judgment a second time or often er; or if it rendored different dif-ferent judgments at different times, in reference to the same Buhjcct mat-' ter, the question would then be, which was the judgment of tho court? j There cannot be a question, but that that order of the 2Gth ol February, 1875, was an order setiling rights, consummating the end proposed, closing the controversy, as to the subject sub-ject mattor and that, no far as the district court was concerned, it was final and conclusive. That the order of the 10th of May is not equally clear as a final order grows rather out of the indefiniteness of the subject matter than any inherent inhe-rent uncertainty or want ol binding force in the order. The rule to show cause why an attachment at-tachment should not issue and why ! the defendant should not be coin m it- ted for a contempt, for disibedionco of the order of court, is the mode provided pro-vided by law to the court, for the enforcement en-forcement of its decree. The decree could not be enforced by execution, because the case was in Jitri, and no execution could issue until final judgment. judg-ment. But the law, in providing this extreme and summary mode in enforcing obedience to the mandate of the court, gives to thedolendant an opportunity to show cause why the motion prayed tor should not be granted, ami upon his answer an issue is made up and presented to the court lor its decision, and tho judgment judg-ment of the court on the issue thus presented has the binding force and conclusiveness of any other judgment. judg-ment. Tho court tries the issue, determines de-termines the facts, applies tho law, and renders judgment. The charge which is alleged usually in such cases is thai the defendant has been guilty ot contempt of court. This is the only issuable matter presented. pre-sented. The issuance ot an attachment attach-ment or commitment for a coutempt . is a summary mode of punishment, adopted by the court for the contempt, j and as the means employed for the enforcement of its interlocutory de- iimj uu uvi in oiiy atruse ur degree constitute or enter into the issue is-sue which is tried by the court upon a rule to the defendant to show cause why an attachment should not issue, or why he should not be committed for contempt. If in such a case the defendant shows goid cause, then the judgment of the court is that he be discharged, and in the language of the old books, that he go hence without day; if he fail to show caupo, then the judgment of the court is that he be attached or committed, as to the court seems meet, until he comply with the order ol the court, or otherwise purge himself of the contempt. In this view of the quwstion it will be readily Been that the issue which was presented to and determined by the court on the 10th day of May, 1875, and the issue which was presented to and determined by the court on the 29th day ol October, 1875, was the Bame. If there were room for doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion, it is put to rest by the record offered in evidence by both parties. In both motions the parties are the same, and the subject matter is the same. In both, the affidavits are made by the same person acting in the same capacity, and the affidavits and motions are substantially the same. Both charge a contempt of court, consisting of a disobedience of the same order, and both seek a commitment com-mitment of the defendant for such contempt.- The judgment of the 10th of May, 1875, discharges thedetend-ant thedetend-ant from the alleged contempt in disobedience dis-obedience to the order of the 2iith of February, 1S75, requiring him to pay-to pay-to the plaintiff $9,500 alimony pendente pen-dente lite, and the judgment of the 29th of October commits him to prison for contempt of court in failing to pay the identical $9,500 alimony pendente lite. It is not possible, legitimately and logically, to come to any other conclusion con-clusion than that the issue which was presented and passed upon by the court on the 10th of May, and the issue presented and passed upon by the court on the 29th of October, were identical, and that the subject matter ol both decisions was the Bame. A motion is refused when the effect of the motion moved for to vacate a foreclosure sale would have been to review a judgment on motion after the term, making the motion perform the office of an appeal Hartshorn vs. Milwaukee R. R. Co., 23 Wis., 692. , The conclusion of the court is, that the judgment of the court of the 10th of May, 1875, was final and conclusive conclu-sive upon the question of the right of the plaintifl to a commitment of the defendant Brigham Young, for a contempt of court in failing to comply com-ply with the order of court of 26th of February, 1875, to pay the plaintifl $9,500 alimony pendente lite, and that, upon the adjournment of the term of court, it became res adjudicate, adjudi-cate, beyond the power ol the district court. From this .it follows that the order of the district court of the 29th of October, 1875, was coram nonjudice and void, and that the petitioner is wrongfully imprisoned and should be discharged. |