| Show 1 I I I 1 The Principles W War at IBY I I BY FIELD FJELD MARSHAL l 1 C Commandant o of the Allied Armies and the thc Greatest Strategist in Europe I I THE ECONOMY IY OF FORCES I The The rhe of in forces than tho the art war consists having having- always more marc opt op- op p t with an nn army weaker than limn his at the point where one attacks or where one is attacked by him Napoleon I As 3 hits has been seen previously plc modern war os knows only of one argument the tactical fact faeL tho battle for which it requires all nil the thc forces relying rely rely- relying ing on oil strategy to bring them there and engaging all these forces with tactical tactical tactical tact tact- ical impulsion to arrive url to shock That theory compels movements and maneuvering U cring But nut at the same time as ns it aims at battle it recognizes the necessity of detaching troops to lo discover the enemy ascertain his strength immobilize him cover and protect the concentration of oL its Us own side maintain the dispersion dispersion dis dis- isI is- is of the enemy an and prevent his concentration I In opposition opposition- therefore fore to tho the theory which prescribes concentration arises the execution which prescribes dispersion of or at least much detaching detaching detaching detach detach- ing of troops Docs Does not that show the he theory to be he inapplicable I ing of troops Docs Does not that show the thc theor theory to be inapplicable 1 l The theory appears much moro more inapplicable still if wo we remember the forces that are arc moved i I I One readily conceives how flow could be bc brou brought ht to tho the same same battle buttle on the same ame spot at the same time an arm army like Bice that of or Turenne or of or Frederick provided with tents tenta and stores which D advanced as ns a whole whose every component part and part and they were werl com com- ely el lived few few lived d. d marched and ar arrived ar- ar rived e easily together In sight of oC an en enemy enemy en- en emy holding certain positions position whose Immobility was an element of at strength who therefore allowed time tima to assemble assemble assem assem- ble Llo the thc troops and lo to deploy them with proper method But toda today with numbers numbers numbers num num- bers running Into Inlo the millions the armies ar ar- ar- ar mies ml's arc are compelled to stretch out In n or order order or- or der to advance to live ll to camp They The ore ro ro divided Into n a number of or columns The space and each column Is Is- lengthy is o occupied In width and depth Is Im Im- mense Play of Forces Studied Two of oC our French arm army army corps mar on the samo same road one be behind behind behind be- be hind the other with only their fighting fighting fight fight- ing elements occupy approximately forty tort miles To concentrate them at nt atthe tho the head read of ot the tho column would take nearly three days lays The same applies to the tho extent of oC front fron which can cnn extend conceivably over a hundred miles Is there there- therean an any way of ot conducting an action which entails such forces which I is carried on over such spaces Our lecture of ot today toda seeks to show tho the existence of oC a dominating principle which enables us to carry out that theoretical play play- of ot forces Corcos even e with considerable numbers even against an enemy who vho maneu to spread them therm In time and In In space in-space space and to employ them In two different manners so as 15 to finally apply them as aR desired strategically strategically strates- strates and tactically concentration at atone ono one point In unity of oC time and unity of at space This dominating principle as ns the principle of oC tho the economy of oC forces Corces sprang from Crom the revolutionary period like mec the difficulties which it overcame I What hat I. I the principle of oC the the economy of at forces I A mere definition would be Insufficient Insufficient clent to explain It It Is partly stated state In tho the proverb I that one must not hunt two hares haTes at It atone atone one time one would catch neither I I It Is stated In the old principle of at the tile theRoman I Roman senate enate Ono does not wage wa e two wars at one time must be bo concentrated It Is the rule rulo which h Frederick un urged ell when he wrote One must know how to accept a loss when i advisable ad how how to sacrifice a province pro he Che who tries lo to defend deren l cser even thing saves nothing and to meanwhile with all ones one's forces a against tae fie teother other forces of oC the enemy compel compol them to battle hattie spare no effort eUort for their their- destruction de- de de destruction and turn then against t tho the thoo o others thes Advantage d e From Prom But that Is not all I If you OU said that It Is the art of not spending ones one's forces Corces of or not dispersing dispersing ing ones one's forces Corces you OU would only sa say saya a part of oC the truth You might ml ht come nearer to It if IC you defined it as theart tho the art of oC knowing how to spend o spend ot-spend- pendIng pend- pend I Ing InS to good purpose of ot drawing all i possible advantage from tom rom tho the resources I at hand It Is easier casler to understand what tho the principle is not Suppose says sas Rustow a man who divided his income Into four Cour equal parts one for Cor his lodging lods-in one for Cor his clothes one for his food tood one for Cor his j pleasures lie He would alwa always s 's have too much for tor one ono and especially too little for Cor another I That theory of fixed invariable In di division division division di- di vision will always s 's bo be defeated by the theor theory of or the reserve eser on hand The principle of at econom economy of oC forces Corces consists In throwing all ones one's forces Corces at a given Iven time on ono one point In using there all ones one's troops and in order to ren render er such a thing possible having havIng having hav hav- 1 ing them always In communication among themselves Instead of oC Sp splitting I them than and of oC giving to each a fixed and unchangeable purpose I IThe The necessity of oC this principle became bo- bo j came apparent from Cram the very outbreak i of at the wars of oC the revolution national I wars dealing with large t umbers numbers But Dut I we must not think that It sprang suddenly suddenly sud Bud denly and by b magic from Crom the needs of oC I tho the circumstances or that It t has ever since been trul truly understood and nd followed fol fol- i lowed 10 As a matter maher of at fact when the convention convention con con- con I n or ordered n. n 1 r 1 th the general riso to v v. v n u n arms It Jt brou brought ht at first anI only chaos in I ever every shape and the Impossibility of at conducting operations of oC wn waging war I To create creato a n. new order of or things does doce riot mean that ono one can from tho the start I obtain obtain results nor even cven assure its ex exIstence ex- ex I Just as tho the political revolution rec rec re- re c accomplished hed might have havo ended after an ephemeral eo existence If It Napoleon Napoleon lapoleon Napo Napo- leon had not shown the possibility of ot I organizing b by new new- methods n a lasting power so all also o without tho the higher minds of oC Hoche Carnot Bonaparte and other generals of or the revolution the Idea Mea of oc tho the general rise 1136 to arm arms of ot war with unlimited resources resource ml might ht havo have remained a chimera a utopia de destroyed do- do b by the armies and theories of oC the eighteenth century Old Method Methods Used lined The first generals of oC the revolution left left leCt t themselves and although wasIng wagIng waging wag wag- Ing n national t onal war continued to apply appl the war methods of or the el eighteenth cen cen- tury For a Ion long time timo l t the e remedy remedy remedy rem rem- edy was not discovered dl covered by the average mind Let us remember Moreau himself who four tour years after aCter 1796 enters Ger- Ger with an arm army consisting of oC and rigid rl ld organization of oC a center center center cen cen- ter two wings a reserve each of or these parts like each of or the early earh armies of the republic having Its own distinct And when he enters Germany German what do we wo see That Thai bod body made up of at chan changeable parts having an nn composition advances retires takes up positions without seeking battles Such are arc the operations of oC 1800 around Ulm the retreat of ot the Black l Forest etc The new principles remain unknown to Moreau ns as to the earl early generals of oC the revolution ris as to the tho French generals gens gen gen- brals of the restoration These new principles b by which we e must be bo Inspired Imbued whose Importance Im Im- 1 and novelty we wo I shall understand understand understand under under- stand vv when en we see with what difficulty the they arc understood and practiced mean 1 Instead of oC th the lines tines of ot the eighteenth century of ot the th processional formations Into wings winS's center and rc reserve er e of ot 1800 and of ot our re regulations until recently recently- The application of the whole on one pO and for Cor that purpose the tho organization organization organ oran of or the mass Into a system of attack Joined as Interchangeable parts operating separately but but aim aiming Ins Ins- al always always al- al ways as at the 6 same came me positive result at a asame asame asame same objective to be mastered red b by different dif dlf- ferent means Continued t tomorrow morrow I |
