Show Cile beneral Se qs sto stora L V J Is 0 of the A E if V 11 II countr lf by th north amblod aliann world MM Cie general lh t hlll la or in pt i i n T jolln john J sace t pershing inq CHAPTER continued replying april 3 to the departments cable I 1 emphasized that it was not intended that our units should replace the losses of british or french organizations i and therefore our artillery should be held in readiness to fol ul low when called for although it was possible that the situation might become com e so serious that some of our infantry units will be forced to serve with will british temporarily my bly intentions were further indicated by saying americans americana must not loss lose sight of the purpose to build up divisions and corps of their own and also we must avoid the tendency to incorporate our infantry into british divisions where it will be used up and never relieved my bly cable recommended that the infantry of two divisions be sent seat by british shipping and two by our own but that present plans should go no further than tills this it was my purpose riot not to become too deeply involved lit in nn an agreement that would make it impossible later to form our own inde pendent force under our own officers CHAPTER secretary baker and I 1 had frequently discussed the question of a supreme allied commander and we were both ready to accept it in principle when proposed in response to a notice from premier clemenceau I 1 went april 3 to beauvais Beau vals to meet with the supreme war council arriving early colonel boyd and I 1 had to wait an hour at the hotel tie de ville before BI and lloyd george came into the conference feren ce room marshal halg haig general foch Iet flet aln sir henry wilson bliss and myself were the others participating brigadier general spiers acted as interpreter and aleut col sir maurice hankey Han licy who usually accompanied mr air lloyd george as recorder the meeting was finally called to order by NI clemenceau Clemenc enu who stated its purpose saying in substance we have come together to settle a very simple question regarding the functions of general foch I 1 think we tire are all it in agreement as to the coordination of allied action hut but there in ig some borne difference in the understanding of general fochs powers as aa conferred upon him at the doullens Doul lens cun con ference of march 20 26 general foch will explain his difficulties foch calls call for action general foch then set forth briefly ills his situation as follows the powers conferred by the doul lens conference were limited to the ordination coordination co of action between the allies they were conferred while the action was on the power to co erdl ardi nate late has been construed to be limited to the time the allies were in action that was march 20 at doullens Doul lens now we are at april 3 now that the two opposing armies are re no longer in action but have topped stepped and are facing each other there Is nothing to ordinate coordinate co there should be authority to prepare for action and direct it so we are right back bach where we were and nothing can be done until an action starts again lloyd george plead for unity mr lloyd george then entered the discussion saying substantially we have had more than three years of tills this war and we have not had unity of action during that time during enough in trying to ordinate coordinate co the 0 op P orations erat lons ions of the allied armies without success there tills has never been bee real unity of action such ordination coordination co beaw between een two or three armies Is impossible no matter who the commander in chief may be each bach commander in chleele chief Is interested in his own army and cannot get the other commanders point of view nor grasp tile the problem as a whole I 1 am in favor of a supreme commander and believe that the success of the allied cause depends upon it 1 I think the necessary action should be taken by tills this council at once I 1 am in favor of conferring tile the supreme command upon general when I 1 had finished mr air lloyd george came over to where I 1 sat took me by the hand and said 1 I agree fully with general pershing tills this la Is well put after some further informal discus sion a draft of the resolution was submitted which omitted reference to the american army whereupon I 1 called attention to the oversight say ing 1 I think this resolution should in clude the american army the arrangement Is to be in force as I 1 understand it from now on and the Am american erivan army will soon be ready to function ah such and should be included as tin nn en city like the british and french ar armies niles there Is iii no american army yet as such general petain interjected as its units are either in mining or fire are amalgamated with the british onn ana F reach french pershing has I 1 S included there may not be an american army in force functioning now I 1 re plied piled but there soon will he be and I 1 want this resolution to apply OP ay to 11 ll when it becomes a fact the amerl can government Is represented here fit al tills this conference and in tile the war find any action as to the supreme coin mand that includes the british and french armies should also include the american army the foregoing account of tile the conference may not be an in exact record of the language used but it Is given as my aid took it down the following resolution was then read and adopted general foch Is charged by the british french and american governments with the ordination coordination co of the action of the allied armies on the western front to this end there Is co con n berred on him all the power necessary for its effective realization to the same end the british french and american governments confide in oen gen eral foch the strategic direction of military operations the commanders in chief of the british french and american armies will exercise to the fullest extent the tactical direction of their armies E each ach commander in chief will have the right to appeal to his government if in ila his opinion his army Is placed in danger by the instructions received from general foch allied commander in chief the idea of an allied commander in chief had been suggested and discussed many times unofficially but for various reasons political find and otherwise it had never been definitely adopted by the supreme war council with the distrust that existed among the allies it was not easy to bring about the decision in favor of a su aga nieuport avi pa ghent 6 N YS elala pre kep I 1 el hazebrouck aulle mom 0 ground gained by german of Offensive april V 9 9 2 aa comiles the last year lear we ne have had two kinds of strategy one by hall halg and another by retain both different and nothing has been gained the only thing ahn was accomplished was BBS by general when he was in supreme coin coill mand general foch I 1 oali Is now empowered to coordinate the action of tile allied armalea but this does not go far enough as lie he has no authority to con arol except by conferring with tile the re clive commanders in chief lie ile wants authority to prepare for action I 1 think tile the resolution made at doul lens should be modified so that we ve may have a better understanding I 1 should like to hear what general blis s and general pershing have to suy pershing gives hla his views 1 I then gave gaie my view lew which was set forth in a brief memorandum prepared in pencil after the discussion began as follows fol lofta the principle of unity of corn coin maud mand Is undoubted undoubtedly li the correct one for the allies to follow I 1 do pot pet belleve it la Is possible sible to have unity of action without a supreme commander wl wit heye already bad experience exper lente prenie preme commander and it wits made possible only by the extreme emergency of the situation tile designation of general foch as commander in chief of the allied armies in france was proposed by the french april 15 1 I received a letter front from at Clemen clemenceau centi advising me that mr lloyd george had approved up proved the suggestion and asked if I 1 agreed I 1 replied lit in it personal note expressing my agreement subject to the confirma tion of president wilson which came april 17 once the question of supreme command was settled the coordinated co en argles of the allied armies could be directed with maximum effect toward a common end while dark days were still attend ahead we were spared the ella cha grin of inefficiency through lack of teamwork CHAPTER now that the alie supreme effort must be made on our part and when units were sorely needed for immediate a at tive service it was found much to my surprise that although the divisions then coming to france had been under training for six month mont lisor sor even more they 1111 contained a large per percentage of untrained men As already pointed out the general staff when called upon to provide men for special services had relied upon 18 king them from combat divisions instead of anticipating g such requirements find and segregating these specialists from the start and training them as such T this its was a most vicious in time of war of a very objectionable practice that had grown up in our army in time of pence peace it appears that during the preparation of our armies in the world war no other plan was followed and tile the practice was carried to such tin an extent that divisions with sa say y men which should have been held intact and each one perfected its as an organized team were constantly called upon to send large groups of their trained to other duties c a inspects available divisions division in view of their possible early employment I 1 wanted especially to look into the general state of efficiency of our available divisions and give some per personal sonnI Instruct instructions lons about training going the rounds I 1 met general ulf bauer sc who was one of the able french generals and found him very enthusiastic about the second which had been in line at under his command confirming my own ion formed from observation and re I 1 W x A the red cross was wa on the job ports ne ile said that without doubt it 11 was then as efficient as any of bis bill french divisions the first was further advanced than any of the others and its morale was high at the prospect of going into the battle line recent developments had and brought the question of the employment of american troops into immediate consideration the presidents qualified approval of the recommendation of the supreme war kounellas cou council nellas as embodied in joint note no 18 was seized upon by the allies and construed as a concession for the unlimited absorption of our troops in their armies no doubt my offer to general foch lent encouragement to the allied vie view w on the day of secretary bakers bakeri departure general and general hutchinson came over from the british war office to discuss for transportation of american troops in accor accordance dance with the provisions of joint note no 18 the conversation indicated that the british understood we were to send men per month to train with them and that they were bringing over the same number making a total of per month beginning with april they held that tile the approval of note no 18 had superseded agreements previously made including tile the six division plan baker speaks plainly the british conferees entirely ignored the alie specific condition that tile lie final arrangements as to training and disposition of all our units were to be left in my hands their error was pointed out and mr baker then suld said what Is pertinent to the present discussion Is that american troops are going to the british for training I 1 dont wart won t th british public or army or the french public or army to get nn an exaggerated idea that this scheme provides or will provide a means by which their losses will be ninde up in the future 1 I 1 want no feeling of disillusionment men t when ge general y 1 eral pershing calls for ro tile the t troops In trusted u sted to them for train mr air bakers visit to our armies dur ing this critical period was fortuitous ns as the problems that confronted us could then he be seen in their true perspective spec tive edve lie ile had an opportunity to meet the allied leaders both civil and military and get in touch with conditions lit in the different II Terent countries of still greater importance he saw with tt III his own eyes cea file lie building of our organization ue he was a keen observer with clear understanding and it logical mind and obtained in a short time tin an accurate conception of our task and its As to our relations ile be gave me froni the start that strong and sympathetic support which means so much to a military commander in the held field feared british were lagging defore before mr baker sailed for home ahad I 1 had sent him the letter quoted below and altho ligh we later discussed its contents briefly hr lelly it Is given ns As show ing the reaction of at least part of lilt british at the time april 5 1018 dear mr secretary I 1 noticed notley the tip other day that one of nf the british papers in referring to td the lilt fiut fact that plans had been made to send bend american limps crimlis to ohp tane of the allies stated that tills would r fr lieve the british of the necessity of depleting the strength of tile lie forces kept at home for defensive purposes this suggests to my mind a certain political phase of tile the british situation which may give us additional explanation as to why mr lloyd george and british representatives are as f urgent in their appeals for assistance from america FOl following loIng this further may I 1 suggest tint that you give the matter serious thought there Is so very much at stoke stake for us that it seems to me very trunk frank representations should be made to the british government as to the urgency of their putting into the army every possible man that can be mus mua to meet the immediate emergency it may be that you would think it advisable to go to london or else t to intimate to the president by bablo cable the urgency of great britaina Brit ains putting into tile the ranks every possible man to withstand the present german onslaught even it if they have to promise to withdraw then them in six months and of their doing so without waiting on us or counting on us in tile the slightest degree there will be few enough men even bilth the best we all can do it wilt will be time enough for great britain to consider the lie defense of england after she has put forth every possible energy on tile the continent here Is the place to bent germany and not on british soil in writing tills this I 1 lime have in mind what you yon told me regarding available men in england CHAPTER on april 12 1918 washington reported a n increase in cargo tonnage by the use of dutch ships infantry find and machine pin gun personnel of four divisions were promised for that month T th the 0 a illes allies were at t last thoroughly alive to the necessity of an extraordinary effort to provide tonnage for transporting our troops after months of 0 f delay and discussion they realized fully that tile the superiority of forces vitally necessary to avert defeat must come from across the atlantic america had become their sole reliance not only for tile the forces necessary to save sae them from defeat but for unlimited financial aid as well mr bakers firsthand first hand knowledge of the situation in france enabled him to give ghe afresh a fresh impetus to the efforts of if the war department with gen fleeton C march as chief of staff the general staff and the supply departments ments began to exert more energy the war industries board reorganized under the leadership of 0 U B al baruch had taken definite control and direction of the nations industries with the sole alin of aiding us to win the war I 1 in 13 |