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Show j IOtaryIen to f FIX THE TERMS Task of Arranging Armistice and Meeting the Allied Gov-$rt Gov-$rt : ernments, Requirements. ton. 8r' U-BOATS MUST QUIT X j Allied Chiefs Will Propose Definite Plans for Outflank-'('&;; Outflank-'('&;; ing German Armies. ''.i"u!i ' WASHINGTON. Oct. 2-i. Discus-'Mj Discus-'Mj slon centcrotl here today on the proh-tj proh-tj ' able terms of armistice which may be "joS : formulated by the allied and American 'Mi military advisers after- the allied gov-iiKfe gov-iiKfe I prnments have considered the propo; Jki Pals transmitted by President Wilson. MjfB It was generally assumed by military raJ officers here that the president had al- ( . ready secured the consent of the allied lyJH governments to submit the matter to ' orjlf the military men. Mil "icn t0 trnns't general principles into ! Wj concrete terms of forts to be occupied, i rtflJ submarine bases to be placed under) J punrd, munition plants to be disman-j (fed and strategic rail lines to be se- ' cured against German use. Since an armistice on allied terms means an eiif lI of the war, attention also must be Hfl Riven to demobilization of the German (111 army, in itself a long process since the llll great force could not be turned back to e 1 civil life over nighl. i fljl The machinery for formulation of: ellf tho terms already exists. The military! jl snd naval boards of (he supreme war j council al Versailles furnish the nat- 1 I ural avenue for the assessing of the , 11 views of the military leaders and j I bring them into harmony. Marshal ! r Foch, as supreme commander, and I Generals Petaln. Ha'g, Pershing and, fi Gilian. the Belgian chief of staff, are I . cx-ofilclo members of the army board I and the admirals commanding the four I great navies, British. French and Jtal-11 Jtal-11 lan are ex -officio members of the naval II board. ( The president proposes that the! I terms to be drawn up by these military and naval agents are to be submitted t to the governments associated against j Germany for ratification. The supreme I j war council, composed of the premiers if of the allies and President Wilson ( would pass upon the program. I To make certain that the U-boat i fleets are put out of action by any ; terms except by the surrender of the j ; submarines themselves appears diffi-1 cult. Occupation of Helgoland might bottle up both tho submarines and the , German high seas fleet so far as the North sea outlet is concerned but there Is another gateway via the Kiel canal and the Skagerak. passing between I nrutral waters. I I Achnrr U is ropnrrlpfl as nhvious that i occupation of the Metz-Thionville fortress for-tress would be essential. It is regarded as probable that the Germans would ; stipulate that American trops take over tho fortress until final disposition of Alsace -Lorraine Is determined. I - Holding the Metz-Thionville gate-1 way, supplemented possibly by the oc-1 I cupation of tho fortress of Strassburg, r would enable the allied forces not only i to dominate the German forces on this front, but would give an open road Into . Germany should a resumption of hos- tllities be threatened. It is believed the allied chiefs will ' propose a definite plan for the rear- j ward movement of the German forces I ) on this front, but would give an open road into Germany should a rcsump-i rcsump-i tion of hostilities be threatened, i It is believed the allied chiefs will propose a definite plan for tho rearward rear-ward movement of the German forces under which the enemy's armies would successively retire. The plan marked out, it is thought, would provide for exposure of the German forces to flanking operations that would cut them to pieces should any treachery be revealed. What fortresses on the Germnn-Bel-jt gian frontier might later be required for occupation is not so clear. Other obvious requirements would be, it is thought, surrender by Austria to the Italians of fortresses in the Alps that guard the Austrian border and the road to Vienna; probable evacuation of the whole east coast of the Adriatic and the occupation of such bases as would bottle up Austrian naval power complptely. To safeguard Rumania and enforce ' peace conditions in Russia, it was said, I ' the road to the Black sea must be i cleared which would require surrender surren-der by the Turks of the fortresses of the Dardanelles. Surrender also of I Russian battleships and destroyers in the Black sea, seized by the Germans, would be demanded, It was thought, and possibly the surrender of Turkish war craft as well. oo |
