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Show Sort of Attack Japanese Are Making Was Long. Expected There. WELLINGTON, N. Z While the rest of the British empire is still adjusting itself to the fact that Australia Aus-tralia faces a threat of invasion, Anlipodeans have long realized that the thousands of miles of ocean which separate them from Japan offer no decisive protection against direct attack. Moreover. Australians foresaw the sort of attack which the Japanese Japa-nese have been making, an invasion inva-sion by stages ultimately directed at the industrial regions which nourish nour-ish Australian resistance. Years before be-fore the attack on Poland an examination exam-ination of the Antipodean country's defense needs led to the conclusion that assault by sea and air would precede attack by land, and that the probable first move of the Japanese Japa-nese would be to attempt to knock out Australian air power. Command of the Air. Thus it was declared by military-chiefs military-chiefs that "aircraft carriers, convoyed con-voyed by other warshps, could reach Australia perhaps six weeks before the invader's army" (this point of view was advanced by those who thought that even without the fully expected move to seize the Philippines Philip-pines and the Netherlands East Indies In-dies an attack on Australia was possible) pos-sible) and that "this would enable the battle for command of the air to be fought before the attacker was embarrassed by a Beet of transports" trans-ports" while at the same time the attacking warships clamped down a blockade. The first need of Japan was seen as an advanced base where airfields could be established. Even if this were established in a non-vital area it would help, for it would serve as a distribution to the defense and would give alternative, lines of attack at-tack if a more' direct approach to the main goal failed. The main goal, in terms of geography, geog-raphy, was set down as the narrow coastal strip between Newcastle and Port Kembla, New South Wales.. It was thought that the desire to conquer con-quer territory and net the doctrine of attacking the enemy's main forces would mold the Japanese strategy. The Unguarded North. It was realized by Australians themselves long before World War II that the center of gravity of their defense system was too far to the southeast. Hence, the progressive plans revealed to extend the defense de-fense industrial set-up to other states. This diminished the demands on the far-reaching Australian transportation trans-portation system and advanced toward to-ward the goal of regional protection. protec-tion. Defensively, Australians are not so interested in their unguarded north as might be expected, for the reason that since the Japanese have moved so close the once-feared foothold foot-hold on the northern shores has ceased to have its old meaning. Years ago it was held that an invading force would be limited by available tonnage to a maximum of 60,000 men. That was when invaders in-vaders would have had' to come from distant Formosa and when South China was still free of Japanese. Japa-nese. Today, with the Nipponese established nearer, a larger force could be moved would have to be moved. 3ut the key to the whole situation is still seen as tonnage, and the hooe of Australians continues to be that any attack would be beaten off with such heavy losses of ships that it would permanently impair Japan's Ja-pan's war-making capacity, especially espe-cially since the Coral sea and Midway Mid-way battles. |