Show beneral ings story stort of the A E fill V 1931 in all countries cou atries by the north norm all allenc Alln nc world hll y Cie rights rever reversed ved including the th la in whole or in a put prohibited john joclyn J 4 pershing i inq demce I 1 CHAPTER every one in authority realized that all resources the allies could muster would be required to meet successfully the great offensive of 0 the central powers expected in the spring but to use them effectively close operation cooperation co among commanders would be imperative with tills this in a mind I 1 proposed to premier clemenceau that the commanders in chief and chiefs of staff get together to examine the situation and if possible determine a general program of combined action W il clemenceau Clemenc cau at once approved the suggestion it was also favorably received by general foch who it will be recalled was chief of the french general staff I 1 proposed that the meeting be held fit at my headquarters but the french selected Petal detains Pet ains ns a IL Q at the meeting january 34 24 1918 robertson Rober lson for the british spoke first and suggested a general statement as to 1 mutual support between allied armies 2 situation as to reserves 3 question of troops in italy 4 situation as to the transportation of 0 the amerlean american army and facilities given it in france petain favored defensive general petain thought that for the present the allies would be forced to remain on the defensive because of lack of men ile he said the french army had 07 divisions with an infantry strength of from to men each some thirty odd of these divisions being in reserve and the rest in the trenches besides eight cavalry divisions two of which were dismounted and six mounted all divisions he thought could be kept up until april if there should be no fighting but later on even without a battle he be would have to break up five div divisions to maintain the others the six mounted cavalry divisions would have to be reduced to four and before the end of the year the total force would have to be reduced by 20 divisions foch was for counteroffensive general foeh foch declared that the best means of halting pt a strong and persistent offensive offen she was a powerful counteroffensive the german offensive at verdun was stopped not by our re resistance sistan c e there but by our offensive on oil the somme in 1916 said general foch such an operation Is possible only when foreseen forese eu and prepared beforehand in planning the counteroffensive I 1 think that the entire front must be considered as a whole and not the french as one part and the british as another r the plan must envisage them together preparing for offensive action on a common battle field with fill all the forces at their disposal general robertson It expressed accord with ith roch foch but he did not see where or with what means such an offensive could be executed and stated that the war could not b be e won by remaining on the defensive give us back the troops from kalonika Sal and we will commence offensives said general genera haig we were not speaking of offen gives but of counter counteroffensives offensives general foch replied general robertson remarked that of course the french and british could reinforce each other and make count counterattacks counter aratta attacks acks and then asked could they do more than that thail not without the Arner americans icam 51 general genera retain petain answered ans vered him dependent upon U S general robertson bertson no then said 1 I 1 think our only hope lies in american re reserves senes and lie wanted to hear from me I 1 stated that but few of the allied authorities seemed to realize that american participation would depend upon the amount of shipping aval available lable for the transportation of our troops and that the time when they would be needed was near at hand As there had been some reference to amalgamation I 1 also took oc occasion easlon to emphasize the point that we expected as a matter of course that the american army would have its own front as an in rde A epen pendent dent force and not be used merely as a reserve to be sent here jand and there one insuperable realon loon I 1 said why we could not amalgamate with the lie french was the lite 1 difference in language and I 1 added jabat that we would not use our troops jin in that way at all unless it became I 1 absolutely necessary N I 1 then discussed our problems problem calling attention to the delays at the ithe french ports and our shortage fida of rall rail transportation and touched on the backward state of procurement tent of equipment munitions and they all appeared surprised sed to learn of our difficulties general roch foch although even as chief of the general staff ayen he apparently aly could not interfere 01 in n matters matter handled directly by the Int try it was waa astonishing to igind find how little comprehension any bof of them had of the enormous task IF abat lat confronted the americans foch said none of these ques tons lons has been referred to me IV 1 hereupon petain retorted that one should not wait until such buell copings thinks are brought to bin big attention but should look around find and find them em petain added at oner once that iha e would send an to study 0 t ur situation and haig later sent 00 ne me of ME hit officers ullo ho offered nany ny out of his bis own re A ermence I 1 I 1 1 bliss biles favors favor british plan f conversations with general rob atson ason continued the next day at al the crillon brillon hotel in paris with general bliss present the same arguments were vere repeated in favor of incorporating american units into british divisions and general bliss expressed himself in favor of the robertson plan I 1 was wag forced to declare myself then and there my stand was not quite what general robertson no bertson had expected and the meeting adjourned with the position of all concerned no longer in doubt general bliss and I 1 met later by appointment to talk the matter over between ourselves and it if possible come to un tin understanding after some discussion he suggested that each of us cable his views to washington and ask for a decision it was not dot my policy then or at any other time to put anything up to washington that I 1 could possibly decide myself this would have been the last thing to do in this case especially as the secretary had left in my hands the determination as to how our troops should be employed for two men in our positions to have appealed in this way would have indicated a clash and washington had enough trouble besides the secretary could not possibly have been sufficiently in touch with the undercurrent of these negotiations to make a wise decision so I 1 said well bliss do you know what nhat would happen it if we should do that we would both be rell relieved eved from further duty in france and that Is exactly what we should deserve we then spent some time examining the question from all angles until finally he came around to my view and said 1 I think you are right and I 1 back you up in the position you have taken CHAPTER once general bliss and I 1 had reached an understanding ns as to our attitude toward amalgamation of our troops A with ith the british he gave me his support in later conferences when we saw the british the british nad and american corn manders ln in alef 17 7 that question of arms and equipment be settled la in similar ma manner war council meets again the supreme war council began its third session january 30 at the opening session mr air lloyd george made a statement in some soine detail of the situation on the allied fronts he then spoke of the large number of casualties the allies had bad suffered during 1917 and in a very pointed manner declared that the costly offensives had produced no tangible results but instead lie he said the allies now found themselves short of man power at a critical period of the war ills his sharp criticism was eviden evidently tl directed at sir douglas halg aud general robertson hut but neither was given an opportunity to reply the military representatives presented a joint note with reference to military policy as directed at the december meeting and the opinion given was identical with that of the conference at com bieg plagne ne january 24 14 and also in august at the meeting in paris except that the campaign under general allenby then in progress in ra palestine lestIne should continue the joint note was approved as the decision of the council with the understanding as suggested by the french that no white troops should be sent from france to palestine it was decidedly the opinion oi of al clemenceau and of all others present who expressed themselves that the war could not be ended until 1919 when the american army it was thought would reach its maximum strength the allied forces at the moment were superior in all active fronts except in the balkans but the greek mobilization when completed would add sufficient strength to give the allies tile the advantage there also tile the american strength wits was then neall negligible ible but the prospect was that we should have a few more divisions ready for service by june and by september possibly 17 or the equivalent of 34 french divisions the danger on the western front lay in the continuous increase of the lie german forces and in their ability to concentrate in turn against the french and british and as neither had sufficient reserves of their own it was clear that unless some arrangement could be made between them for better ordination coordination co and support the war might easily be lost before the americans should arrive plan allied reserve the study of this problem hy by the military representatives led to an L 14 pijo D G N ir aa rig e aivre onne Z V r n PARIS tou 0 t eau V le marlis 11 Is sur ill 8 if rt st d urs clevres djon D jon I 1 ante bourges ourges ilce s cr A la pallice N 0 V rochefort 07 1 I A fauilla basse lyon deaux r rama PA 04 IN SEA Z ax towns and railroads used by the american army A amy general headquarters aest aea H belgian sector D headquarters SOS Batt BS leLine ne R sector 0 ports french sector n railroads fi f r t i maint ines 0 important towns secondary lines boundary international 0 pao 00 oo miles 6 forest representative for further talks at versailles january 20 1918 all their arguments were met frankly and squarely after they had presented their case prime minister lloyd george asked bliss for his views to which he replied ilIg will speak for us and whatever lie ile says with regard to the lie disposition of the american troops will have my approval an agreement was then signed by mr air lloyd george general matrice lla urlce and myself as set fa forth rth in the following copy of the memorandum submitted and later cabled to washington in order to meet the situation as presented by sir william robertson and hasten the arrival and training of troops it Is proposed that the british government use the lie available sea transportation in question for bringing over the personnel of entire divisions under the following conditions 1 I 1 that the infantry and auxiliary troops of these divisions be trained with british divisions by battalions under such plan as may be agreed upon 2 that the artillery be trained under american direction in the use of french material as at present 3 that the higher commanders and staff officers be assli assigned tied tor for training and experience with corresponding units of the british army 4 that when sufficiently tr trained allied these battalions be reformed into regiments and that when the artillery Is fully trained all the units comprising each divi division blon he united under their own officers for korv lee 65 6 5 that the above plan be carried out without interference etli with the plans now in operation for bringing over american forces C G that question of supply be arrange d by agree agreement lent et other joint note which proposed a plan tor for the organization of a general allied reserve it provided that tile the british french and italian armies each sot set apart a certain number of dil divisions to constitute this reserve which would be culled called into action only in a great emergency the discussion fit this question became acrimonious haig and petain both pointed out that they would be short of divisions very soon in case of severe lighting and presented figures on the subject that were ere very disturbing but tile the councils scheme was cut and dried the recommendations set forth in the note were adopted then and there by the council the general reserve wits was created and its control was placed under an executive war board to consist of generals foch representing the french chairman bliss the americans cadorna the italians und and a british general officer to be name named at this meeting mr SIrA lloyd Joyd george designated gen sir henry wilson as british representative to the very cry evident disappointment of general robertson Koh ertson who was present at the session the selection of wilson was regarded by the british high command and the war office as open disapproval of their conduct of f the war it has been said that the winter R inter of 0 1917 18 was the most severe of tile the war the cold was nas at times so intense as to make the generally unheated houses barni and in lofts ats used as billets nearly uninhabitable the gloom of short days and long nights in the isolated slid and largely dai iu french villages can hardly be described then as we have seen been there was also a shortage of helly winter clothing although frequent cables early in tile the fill fall lind had railed called attention to the probability of a 11 deficiency d e fici ency so no doubt the demands were greater than man the quart ermas ter department could meet but the relatively small number of troops in france going through the winter under actual war conditions should have been given first eon con much of the clothing that we re celled for our troops looked to bs be shoddy and being light and thin of course offered insufficient protection tec tion the deficiencies were met in part by purchases from the british although our men did not take kindly to the idea of wearing the uni form of another nation and it was with considerable protest and chagrin that they did so until our own could be supplied to the credit of our officers and men be it said that they generally ignored adverse conditions and barring some irritation at french methods and occasionally nt at our own they kept at their tasks with commendable determination looking back over the different phases phase of the war I 1 regard that winter with its difficulties anxieties and apprehension for the future ns the most trying period of them all CHAPTER at the ports in france the amount of freight discharged in january 1918 was more encouraging being about two fifths as much as during the preceding seven months the rate of discharge was accelerated to some gome extent by the better distribution of our transports by the navy more afore construction material was being delivered where it was needed for port works and the future was somewhat clarified in this respect by the arrival of additional logging machinery during the month there was also an increase in troop shipments including some elements of the thir ty second baans Ha ans division with men for the service of sup ply by the end of january ap proximately combat troops engineer troops and others tor for the service of supply were in france although promising this was only the merest start as we were still tar far behind our oui schedule it must be added however that the increase in the arrivals of men and materials remained haphazard and not dot at all in the proportions needed it continued apparent that my recommendations were not accepted in an altogether unhesitating spirit of helpfulness and that the serious |