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Show TWO SCHOOLS OF STRATEGY CLASH ! French and German Methods Put to Test. THEORIES EXACTLY OPPOSITE Outflanking Qf Enemy Chief Feature of German Tactics French System Is More Varied and Less Simple. The clash between the armies of the French republic and the German empire em-pire will prove of extraordinary lu terest to military tacticians for many reasons. Results should settle, for some time to come, conflicting principles princi-ples of strategy which at present are somewhat of a puzzle. Tiere is only one element capable of confusing the Issue, namely, the totally different racial characteristics and temperaments, in so far as they interfere with the practical application applica-tion of. the tactical theories which have been worked out by the ablest minds of the two great military organizations or-ganizations of these powers. As far as can be learned, little fault can be found with the condition of preparedness of both armies of the Franco-German frontier. The German forces, if anything, outnumber those of France, but whi. one is dealing in millions the difference, proportionately proportionate-ly considered, is really not so great as it seems at a glance. Even a slight superiority in maneuvering the huge army corps, and a little greater ability to have them in the right place at the right time, may more than overbalance overbal-ance any discrepancy in the total number num-ber of men in the field. The German organization is the older. old-er. Its present system is built on the foundation supplied by the victorious armies of the Franco-Prussian war. In discipline, training, mobilization and principles of moving large bodies of troops, it is the logical successor that one would expect to find, making allowance al-lowance for the development of modern mod-ern weapons, transportation facilities and equipment. Both nations have efficient aviation corps. . Germany has the advantage in the number of dirigibles, while France las some 750 aeroplanes already in commission, against about 400 of the Germans. French Artillery Superior. In the artillery arm it is generally admitted that the French are superior. supe-rior. The gunners are faultlessly trained, and the guns themselves are of a more modern, powerful and efficient effi-cient type. To sum up, Germany outnumbers France approximately 5,000,000 to 4,-000,000 4,-000,000 In total war strength. She is supposed to be slightly superior in general discipline and trailing, while in two special arms, aviation division and artillery, France has a noticeable dvantage. This is how the materials with which the rival tacticians will have to work, compare. Strangely enough, the underlying principle or spirit of the military organization or-ganization of each nation would seem . to fit the other better. It is the French who have given the greater emphasis to complex dispositions of troops for purposes of security and sureness, and the Germans who permeate themselves with the idea that simplicity of tactics, coupled with energy and fierceness of attack, brings success. Col. de Grandmaison', a French tactical authority, lecturing to a class In a school of military instruction recently, re-cently, drew a sharp distinction he-tween he-tween the two systems, pointing out the strength and weakness of the practical application of the German 6 at the Bame tln'6 Vh t, ., "g Cert,Uu ' the Frenc tatticu system which, he said, tend toward confusion and lack of dec. tve action on the field of battle Outflanking Paramount. The single thought embodied in the t'l-man tactics is the outllanking o( he enemy. It is more than a thought; t Is a rule. The German company, brigade or corps commander, never stops to consider what he will do It Boos without saying that he will attempt at-tempt to outflank his adversary The only question he has to decide Is how he will do It. Eternal, energetic offense Is his other rule. Once he has laid his plans lor the attack, and made his disposition disposi-tion of troops, he gives the final order or-der for the advance. The thing is settled. set-tled. The various units of his command com-mand go forward, either to victory or cimplete repulse. There is no withdrawing with-drawing or rearrangement of troops during the progress of the fight, no change in plans. Everything is supposed sup-posed to have been provided for before be-fore the engagement. The units of his command are to receive no further fur-ther orders which would cause the slightest hesitation in their methodical method-ical and complete carrying out of the prearranged plan. One cannot help but admire the spirit of determination and confidence necessary to the successful carrying , out of such a system. The German troops have been trained with this idea specially in view, and they are permeated with a Bpirit of self-confidence and fierce contempt for their adversaries. The morale of the German Ger-man soldier is wonderful. No matter mat-ter what he brought to face with, he will fight unflaggingly until he drops. French School of Tactics. The French tactics, on the other hand, are considerably more varied and less Bimple. The maneuvers of the French commander depend largely on the formation of the enemy. Greater Great-er stress is laid on finding out the exact disposition of his troops before formulating the battle plans, and the officer in command retains his troops subject to his control throughout the engagement. While frontal attacks are admittedly dangerous, the French theories provide for their use in certain cer-tain contingencies, and the commander command-er is not tied down to the use of flanking flank-ing movements exclusively. Then, too, the rules laid down elaborate elab-orate formations of outposts, advance guards, supports and reserves for protection pro-tection against surprise. The only criticism made by Col. de Grandmaison Grand-maison is that the system, while theoretically theo-retically perfect, has become so elaborate elab-orate as to be somewhat difficult to handle in the field, and that the officer of-ficer who follows their spirit to the logical limit will be likely to find his troops so dispersed in small parties as to be scattered over as large a front as the Germans, an extreme tendency ten-dency which Is somewhat to be deplored de-plored In the light of the lessons of the Russo-Japanese war, fn which engagement en-gagement after engagement was won by both the Russians and the Japanese, Japan-ese, traceable directly to the employment employ-ment of desperate frontal attack and bayonet charge, notwithstanding the terrific efficiency of fire or the modern mod-ern rifle. However, it would seem that the advantage lies with France, for they control their system, and are not controlled by It, as are the Germans. The first moves of the German campaign, cam-paign, the invasion through Luxemburg, Luxem-burg, the crossing of the frontier at Qirey where, by the way, the German machine seems to have encountered a snag in the preliminary engagement indicate that an attempt will be made to duplicate the campaigns of former years, but it is an entirely different dif-ferent French organization which will have to be overcome if Germany is to avoid a crushing defeat in which the life of the empire may be ground out between the upper and nether millstone. |