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Show i .'; i 1 "N. llL p f The tumult and the houtlng diet sii i v . " V ifi I V (- ' . j Th ceptalrm and the kings departj f , S f MY W I V " 'l III i Still stands thine ancient aacrlflce, V f ""Afirf- miKtW rSI I y .X' ''- ' Vil- I I . An humble and a contrite heart. . . . ? fV ' P OlKft K VXl l ;v Lord God of hosta, be with ua ytt, V A .' i-'' I I Lcat we forKet!-Lt we foreetl - " jjLp? I fi II I TX fK 0 M - I Rudyard Klpllng'i "lUcesslonat." CrVsL irMMZSJ?? ' I By ELMO 8COTT WATSON J) (7 t' I) I jpe-ps EN years aso, on November 11, 1918, CtVJ -VTC Jf (fl T3 y 1" J ZN the greatest war in history came '(kPMIUy fihoo to an end. Ten years ago the can- ' f ' ( Kw( 1 1 . 'T f non which had thundered on- , , ' SJeMz(o . w w . . . . rensliiL'lv for more than four years i-iifCi " bvQTI' A Foch developed a deeper tnalght Into human , censintiy ior more uiuu umr jjra 'fL?.' t V"ft VL nature and the nature of a national war, no he fep fmm were suddenly Still and the dead f, ,'. V,. Wtb sained a clearer vision of the goal of the war Ivm t Wl silence which followed was more 1$ -V 1rK? nd " knew when t0 "top- ThUB- " he w,n r,nk I M 1 awe-lnsulrlna than had been the fl3y- l.. ' t Spf below Napoleon as a atrateg-lut, he may be placed 0 If VI s Ton f ';" if fi " X. 4fTlS higher ax a grand strategist, for of auch the aecur- R TXT' n nil8h,y tfnpason of the guns. Ten AH 0J Ity and prosperity of the nation after the war are U yii V years ago men looked at encn L A , I AN better test than brilliancy of maneuver. In hla 1 I Other In unbelieving WOllder they If ' ' Jv . "n'enary oration on Napoleon, Foch hlmi-elf fore- v l 1,t .i h. u wnr una . ' 1 - 5 - , ' tv If (r shadowed this verdict: "He forgot that a man can- W tou,d "ot rfcalI,7f tt,hat tl,e, V 8 U S4 - -K J "41 A C; that beyond the Individual there la the over. Nor could they realize then .w'f. r?w nation; that beyond man there Is morale; and that what their accomplishment hud been nor what Uj- x t ",ir5l i "fyC T war la not the supreme goal, for beyond that there new page they bad wrltter In history. They were C Ai , , VO-ll la peace" . . . , ... i n v S.. , VV ' ? I" It may be true that Napoleon forgot more than tOO Dear to tt to see the meaning Of It all Clearly. Nj f;;': ,S? . .tJfll I Foch ever knew. But Napoleon forgot. Foch All tha they knew then or cared to know V . -V; 'k. , II learned, was that the armistice was signed It was over V ;N,. 'f W J I "le guerre est finl 1" . - - - f'rN'' In one ' the ,ea(Jers ' the enemyi the military And now. a decade later, they know but little ' scomuw. Little. t.T"1 T 'nt,,er nffv f ,D ore than they did one minute after 11 o'clock . "i Co. this case he was a -Robot Napoleon." That figure on November 11, 1018. ren years Is too short rSSBT XlT K a Ume to give the mind of man a proper perspec- under HJndenburg. of whom he writes: '' Ml, '.-.-T As Foch developed a deeper Insight Into human nature and the nature of a national war, so he gained a clearer vision of the goal of the war and he knew when to stop. Thus, If he will rank below Napoleon as a strategist, he may be placed higher as a grand strategist, for of such the security secur-ity and prosperity of the nation after the war are a better test than brilliancy of maneuver. In hla centenary oration on Napoleon, Foch himself foreshadowed fore-shadowed this verdict: "He forgot that a man cannot can-not be God; that beyond the Individual there la the nation; that beyond man there Is morale; and that war la not tha supreme goal, for beyond that there la peace " . . It may be true that Napoleon forgot more than Foch ever knew. But Napoleon forgot. Foch learned. In one o' the loaders of the enemy, the military expert sees another Napoleonic figure, but In this case he was a "Robot Napoleon." That figure Is Erich Ludendorff, the Ger.nan chief of staff under HIndenburg, of whom he writes: . . . If It la still too early to estimate Luden-dorff's Luden-dorff's stature In world history. It Is possible through the thinning mists to perceive the outline of a figure molded on a great acale, perhapa the greatest of all among the leaders of the war of 1914-1918, and with the attributes, save of personal per-sonal magnetism, which may even Inspire a second sec-ond Napoleonic legend. Should this legendary magnification mag-nification come to pass, tha verdict of today may be a true mean between the nadir of 1919 (when Ludendorff waa "the acapegoat of defeat, aa execrated exe-crated by the mass of his countrymen and aa belittled be-littled by the mats of his victorious foes aa Napoleon Napo-leon on the morrow of Waterloo") and the senlth of tomorrow. ... He waa essentially the product of hla country and of bla age, which had been molded by the Industrial revolution and Nineteenth century philosophy. For half a century Germany had been converting herself Into a gigantic war machine and in Ludendorff she at least found the one mechanised brain capable of controlling this scientific master, which in else alone was too vast to be human. . . . Most of the leaders were swept up by the - machine and carried helplessly away, but Luden-dorff Luden-dorff mastered It for long enough to Impress a Napoleonic stamp on the otherwise Incoherent process of mechanical slaughter politely termed "attrition." On Ludendorff the verdict of history may well be that he waa the Robot Napoleon. By ELMO SCOTT WATSON piin en years ago, on November 11, 1918, l the greatest war in history came to an end. Ten years ago the cannon can-non which had thundered un-" un-" censlugly for more than four years Tfw rWf were 8utltlen,y 8tUI and tlie d,'ad &' w silence which followed was more I Jr K awe-inspiring than had been the jj S mighty diapason of the guns. Ten Q y V years ago men looked at each . I other in unbelieving wonder they jr l eould not realize that the war was over. Nor could they realize then what their accomplishment had been nor what new page they bad wrltter In history. They were too near to tt to see the meaning of It all clearly. All tha they knew then or cared to know-was know-was that the armistice was signed it was over "le guerre est finll" And now, a decade later, they know but little lore than they did one minute after 11 o'clock on November 11, 1018. en years Is too short a time to give the mind of man a proper perspective perspec-tive on as mighty an event as the World war. It " may be done after ten times ten years, although, ' as a popular American novelist has said In one of his romances of the Revolutionary war: "After a hundred years the history of a great war waged by a successful nation Is commonly reviewed by .that nation with retrospective complacency. Distance Dis-tance dims the panorama; baze objures the ragged gaps In the pageant until the long lines of victorious armies move smoothly across the horizon, with never an abyss to check their triumph." But even though the meaning of that conflict rannot yet be written down, because the reverberations reverber-ations of the pistol shot fired by a madman In Sarajevo In the summer of 1914 are still being heard In various parts of the world, there Is one chapter In the history of the World war that can be written with at least a fair degree of accuracy. What of the "captains and the kings" In whose hands lay the destiny of nations In those years and In whose minds momentous decisions deci-sions had to be made not once but repeatedly? It was the common soldier, of course, the pollu, the Tommy, the Anzac, the Canuck and the Tank, who fought the war, and there Is no need to, examine Into how well he did his Job. The results speak for that They won the war. But what of the men who had the say as to how they should , fight It, these "captains" who had to decide how much "cannon fodder" they could afford to spend In winning an essential victory? Did they In their planning and directing the fighting do their Job as well as did the men who had to do the fight lug? Is it yet too early to adjudge them fairly and say what their place In history as war leaders Bhnll be? Let an English officer who Is generally accepted as a military critic of the first rank answer that. He Is Capt a H. Llddell Hart, surssor to Colonel Repington as military critic of the London Lon-don Daily Telegraph and military adviser of the Encyclopedia Brlttanlca. and In a book "Reputa tions Ten Tears After," published by Little. J?rown and Compnny, he evaluates the "captains" f the World war. The preface to the book states" his method of doing so as follows: These studies have been approached essentially tn the spirit of an historian. They have been treated In the manner of a portrait painter. The moment for them haa been chosen In order to achieve the closest possible reconciliation between be-tween the advantage of contemporary experience f events and personalities on the one hand, and. on the other, the evidence of the documentary records rec-ords which are now available to throw light on the critical actions and discussions which influenced the course of tlM World war. Thus may history approximate the most nearly to truth. After this Introduction, the "portrait painter" proceeds to depict Marshal Joffre, "The Modern Delpblc Oracle"; Erich Von Falkenhayn, "The Extravagance of Prudence"; Marshal GalllenI, "The Real Victor of the Murne"; Halg of Ber-niersyde, Ber-niersyde, "The Essence of Britain"; Ferdinand Foch, "The Symbol of the Victorious Will"; Erich Ludendoiff, "The Robot Napoleon"; I'etaln, "Military. Economist"; Allenby of Meglddo, "The Evolution of a Leader"; Hunter Liggett. "A Pro fessor of War nnd Human Nature"; and "Black Jiirk" Pershing. "The '100-Per-Ceiit American. " To Americans, no doubt, the opinion expressed by this British military expert of the man who was chosen to lead their sons nnd brothers In battle will be more Interesting than his "portraits" "por-traits" of any of the other "captains." Here Is hla summary of Pershing: The phrase "100-per-cent American" has become both a dlscrlptlon and a motto alnce the war. If General Pershing waa not the prototype, he deserves de-serves to be for It fits aptly both aa a description descrip-tion of him and aa a motto for him . . . In the atudv of Pershing's uncompromising advance ad-vance toward hla own goal (I. e. that American troopa should be under American command and not divided up among the allies) lies the main historical Interest ef his first year In France. Grant la held up aa history's great example of a man who, having fixed hla goal In hla mind, pursued It unswervingly and with almost unique pertinacity despite all obstacles and without hesitating over the coBt Pershing, who had other points of resemblance re-semblance to Grant, maintained hla purpose wtth determination at least equal to that of Grant, and under difficulties greater In an respects save only that Grant had to drive a tired, Pershing a fresh, steed. Where Grant had a Lincoln behind him, Pershing bad far less resolute and clear-sighted support And Grant had no allies to complicate his problem. A cynic might even say that the war for Pershing consisted of fifteen months' fighting at the rear and two months' fighting at the front ... Reviewing the course of the war's last phase. It would seem beyond doubt that Pershing was unfairly un-fairly tried, that an exploitation of the St. Mlhiel stroke by an advance toward Meti, with the "blooded" divisions and long-standing prepare- tlons, which he used at St. Mlhiel, would have made better progress than the Meuse-Argonne advance. ad-vance. Even so, however, it could hardly have made the rapid penetration which was essential to fulfill hla strategic aim. Thus the ultimate verdict on hla strategy, aa on hla training doctrine, must be that It waa more Idealistic than realistic. Like the French, In the early phase of the war. It foundered on the rock of the machine guns. He thought that he waa apreading a new gospel of faith when actually It was an old faith exploded This waa the one flaw In the great structure be built It may even be aald that he omitted but. one factor from hla calculations German machine guns and was right In all hla calculations but one their effect. It waa the abrupt discovery by hla troopa of this omission which shook their Initial trust In him, and led to some of the sweeping sweep-ing unjust post-war criticisms. This change of attitude was typified in a story which waa widely told. In a column of American troops on the march a voice waa heard saying, "Pershing says he'll take Meti If It costs a hundred thousand lives." Silence for a moment. Then another voice: "Ain't he a d d generous guy!" Yet even this remark has an undercurrent ot chastened yet grudging admiration which Is a tribute trib-ute to the driving force of Pershing and to the fortitude of his men. He lacked the personal magnetism mag-netism which c.-n make men lay down their lives gladly He was far from a Robert E. Lee. But he had the character which compelled men not only to die, but to work cursing him, perhaps, but respecting him. He was bard, but life had tried him hardly, and if he gate a,Tectlon to few It was generous when given to tfcope who had shown themselves MEN by his high standard. When he visited the battlefields after the war he stood silent awhile befpre the monument on the mound at Montdldler dedicated to the First American division At length, n a voice husky with emotion, he aald. "That was the best d d division In ANY army." It was a tribute from the heart. As for his achievement, it is sufficient to say that there was perhaps no other man who would or could have built the structure of the American army on the scale he planned. And without that army the war could hardly have been sav?d and could not have been won. As for the allied generalissimo, Marshall Ferdinand Fer-dinand Foch, Ciiptuiii Hart compares biui to Napoleon and says: Of the other "portraits' which are presented to aid In appraisal of theso "captains" of the World war there Is that uf "etaln who "has been reproached for excessive caution. It would be more true to say that he-vus excessively careful of lives. While the mottr of a brillUiPt nghtlti leader like Mangln was 'victory at miy price.' I'etain's motto was 'vtctorj at the smallest price.' . . . It Is almost certain thut the French army would never have recovered If i'ettiin hud not been called to command In 11)17. He inmie victory possible. . . . Thus the verdict of history his-tory on Petaln Is likely to read: 'The man who, like Fablus, saved his country by avoiding battle, . and who, like Carnot, was the organizer of victory. vic-tory. " Then there Is the British general who, "As a gentleman and as a pattern of noble character, Haig will stand out In the rolls of history, chevalier sans peur et suns reproclie, more spotless spot-less by far than most of Britain's nationul heroes. Most ef all, perhaps, because In his qualities qual-ities and defects he wa.-. tin very embodiment of the nationul character anti the army tradition." Two others, whose "portraits" are presented In ; this book should be noted together since their ' names urv likely to go d wn In history together, j One la Marshal Joffre who, "f his brain whs as solid as his appearance, lacking In flexibility and Imagination, his external effect ou the minds ot others enabled him to become the rock on which France held and Oermany foundered" And of this man, popularly known hs the ' Mero of the Mnnie," Captain Hart declares, "Joffre was not a general, hut a nationnl nerve sedative." Although at a dark hour In the war when It was necessury to maintain French monile JolTre was held up to the world as "the symbol of France triumphant," Captain Hurt declares that. "Today, when this need has passed with the emergency, Justice nnd gratitude demand that the world should recognize GalllenI. rnther than JofTre, as the victor of the Mnrne, For It was Joseph Simon GalllenI, mar shal of France, who "in the dark days of early September. 1!)14, wived France and changed Die face of the World war by bringing ahem the 'miracle of the Marne.'" |