Show 0 0 0 dm dilill am pith pea 0 xa 0 twy S f them ae A E M a copyright 1931 in by the north amerl by jbf if general 1 l 0 allene All lne world rights roser vedo N Nw ca CB including piper the th scandinavian S i fica I 1 in wh whole 10 john J W S pershing CI emht Is S ff 0 NU or lo in part ML CHAPTER continued it seemed to me then that if this picture of civilization engaged in the persecution of innocent and unarmed non noncombatants combatants mostly women and children could he brought home hoine to all peoples reason would be fored fon ed upon rulers and governments where tou too often their passions and ambiL ambitions lons assume control As A a result of the german successes against the french something akin to la Is panic prevailed in paris probably a million people left during the spring and there was gruve grave apprehension among the officials lest the city be taken plans were made to remove the government to bordeaux and we ourselves were prepared to remove our oHl of flees ces CHAPTER the second division assumed the of 0 june 6 1018 nod and began a series of attacks which culminated some three weeks later in the capture of 0 the last german positions in the bols bois de bolleau belleau by its marine brigade and of lavaux avaux by its regular brigade the fighting during most of this period was of peculiar intensity the german lines were favorably located ion on commanding ground and were made more formidable by the extensive use of lot machine guns espe especial cIaNy y in belleau wood in the initial advance harbordt Har Harb birds marine brigade captured Boures clies and lewis regular brigade took triangle farm farin and bols bois de la Is barette durins during the next few days our troops progressed piecemeal june 15 the seventh infantry third division arrived to reinforce the marine brigade engaged in the wood this regiment relieved the brigade on that date and the marines were rested tor for a week when they again entered the line flue against stubborn resistance they drove the enemy from the wood june 25 regulars capture vaux meanwhile the regular lir brigade continued its attacks intermittently and july 1 with great dash captured vaux and the bols bois de la roche the operations of the division in this vicinity were practically at ao an end when the new lines were stabilized on the high ground captured from the enemy the casualties in the division were about more than 1000 1400 prisoners were captured from the enemy the gains by the second division were won with little aid on either hank flank by the french units which were still in poor shape arld and were made against an enemy determined to crush this early american effort the success of this division and of 0 the first at and the third on the marne SI arne following as they did the crisis of slay may 27 were loudly acclaimed by the french and for the time being had a very stimulating effect upon french morale with the transfer of activities to the french front northeast of paris our plan to build up an american corps near allens akiens had bi come impracticable ti and as I 1 had bad offered general petain the services of our divisions wherever they might be needed it now appeared possible to form at least a corps and possibly an army somewhere along the marne salient j U S divisions relieve french I 1 had suggested that we should I 1 bring other divisions to join the second and third for that purpose and accordingly the twenty sixth and forty second were relieved tram from the inactive front and five american divisions from the british area were designated to be sent to that quiet sector to relieve rench french F divi the assembly of four american divisions in aid of the french on that front would more than offset their recent losses general retain petain in his letter accepting my offer said in part 1 I must express my deep gratitude for the prompt and very important aid you are bringing in the present crisis the american troops already engaged in the battle are the unanimous admiration of the whole french army the power of the effort which your country Is 13 at present showing as well as the resolute and generous spirit with which you enter the struggle Is for the allies and above all tor for france a comfort to la the grave times through which we are passing and a pledge of hope for the future what if paris should fall leaving the suggestion with general petain without further discussion I 1 returned to paris arching june 8 the next morning I 1 culled called on premier clemenceau CIemence au and on that morning the fourth phase of the great german offensive started between montdidier Mont didier and the olse oise reports indicated that tant it was meeting considerable success mentioning this to M clemenceau CIemence au I 1 ask aphea ct him what he thought would be the result it if paris uld fall al clemenceau CIemence au replied that he ano ann mr lloyd george had considered that possibility and had readied reached the cou con cluston they would do everything in their power to save paris but it ll it should be lost they ouia woula go on oil light lag ing above paris Is france be added and above france Is As I 1 was leaving he came to the door with nie me and I 1 said it may not look encouraging just now but we are certain to win in the end he be clung to my hand band and to a tone that showed the utmost solicitude solli tude he re plied piled do you really think that I 1 am glad to hear you say it this was the first and only time that I 1 ever sensed any misgiving in the mind of this resolute man notwithstanding our occasional rather heated discussions on the abe use to be made of american troops I 1 admired him greatly it always seemed to me he represented the true spirit of confidence and courage of the french people I 1 then motored to general F focha 0 c big headquarters at bombok Bom boti we cousin ered my proposal to t form an american corps near chateau Th thierry lerry to which he be readily agreed ile he spoke especially of the fine work of our troops I 1 asked how a german drive which threatened or perhaps captured paris would affect the armies and the people ills his reply was almost word for or word like SI Clemence aus they had evidently discussed the possibility of losing paris lie too was certain the armies would go on with the war foch spoke so positively and with such evident fe elliis that I 1 was moved to get up and shake his hand band concentrate west of marne meanwhile the fourth and twenty eighth divisions en route from the british front to the northeast of france were stopped at general fochs focha request to in the vicinity of villers Cott erets the object being to concentrate cen several of our divisions on the west of the marne salient marily as a precaution against adoth er german offensive there but uld for possible use on the offensive the second third twenty sixth and forty second were in that area and with the fourth and twenty eighth there was a force equivalent to twelve french divisions although some of these units were without artillery an encouraging circumstance at the moment was the success of thi the french to in holding von attack on the boyon noyon front this fourth phase of the german offensive was an 1111 effort not only to widen iden the able marne pocket but to secure the railway between Com and soissons and open the way to paris the anniversary of the arrival ot of our advance contingent in france wap wa the occasion of many congratulations on the part of the freach CHAPTER the demands for american divisions were pressing the second and third had already become actively engaged the first firs being 91 d led to go to the reserve near the chateau thierry salient when relieved f real Cant cantieny cantigny igny the second was still in line at belleau wood and the third south of the marne lame general foch had asked tor for five of the divisions recently arrived that were training with the british of these the fourth and twenty eighth while en route to the quiet quel sector to relieve french divisions had been diverted to the reserve near the western face of the marne salient the thirty fifth moved to the vicinity of depinal and the seventy seventh was about to enter the fren trenches frenchies clies la in the baccarat sector to replace the hie forty second which was to reinforce gou army east the eighty second bad started tor for the toul sec tor to relieve the sixth in turn was soon to relieve the second thus there were three american oll di visions in quiet sectors and seven elther in the battle line or held in readiness to meet any eventuality which might result from further activity of the germans in ID the grent great wedge they had driven toward parts carls british displeased Dil pleased the british were displeased at the transfer of our divisions from their area claiming priority to retain theta them by reason of having brought them over when general foch inquired of the conditions under which these troops were serving with the british my reply made it clear that he had entire authority to direct where they should po go in the emergency as without it the theory of a supreme command would tall fall the rapid succession of german offensives had seriously crippled the allies and not only materially reduced their powers of resistance but had depressed their morale and caused the darkest misgivings among them they grew more and more fearful lest the enemy might still have untold reserves ready to swell his forces thit the morale of the allies wits low was shown by the conclusions of many of their soldiers returning from the front to the rest reit areas reports from the british front were no better their troops continuously told our men who were with them for training that we had come too late and that our entry into the battle would only POSt postpone PODe allied defeat defea this attitude seemed so alarming that thai I 1 took steps to prevent such a spirit from affecting our army by promptly reporting the facts to allied authora ties the presence of such sentiments was another important reason for opposing any form of nf amalgamation vastness of request unrealized far short had we fallen of the ex of the preceding november when foch general robertson of the british and I 1 had colnel in an urgent appeal for twenty four trained american divisions by the following june it Is small wonder that the allies were now so insistent in urging in creased and continuous shipments of met men trained or untrained so serious was the situation re carded that it was no longer a demand for or twenty four divi division slone but for one hundred it Is probable that the vastness of this request was not fully realized or else the allic had greatly exaggerated ideas of our power of ac surprising as it actu ally proved to be A brief calculation of these demands of the prime ministers showed that they were asking more than combatant troops by the following spring which augmented by those required for or the services of supply conservatively ively calculated for or a well bal alced force situated in 1 i foreign country under the circumstances that hut sur rounded us would amouak at least to lOU OOOO men luen the american Am ericon combatant force would thus have equaled X divisions of the allies and their apprehension may be imagined inagi ned arthen hen e realize that this was greater by ono one fourth than the um blued allied armies of divisions then on the western front froat saw as limit although nu no such number nu oilier as this could have been considered feasible as it Is unlikely that li 11 could have been either transported transport eil equipped or supplied it was necessary in view of the situation to lay plans for bringing over all we could after giving the question careful study it seemed to me that men would be the limit we could hope to reach by the spring of 1919 this roughly would provide at least sixty six or possibly over seventy coin balant divisions the rest being meceo sary bury tor for the noncombatant service A we had hitherto made estimates basc based il upon a total force of men it ii was quite imperative that should be made ou on the increased li I 1 i and that work everywhere in the A B F should now have hare that end in view A cable I 1 sent june 21 set forth the reasons for or fixing the program for the future definitely deOnI tely at men as a minimum and ur urged ged upon the war department the utmost effort to meet our immediate requirements Is for or the expansion of port facilities and I 1 railroads rall ronda A detailed study of the troop shipments and tonnage requal required red was included my cable closed there Is nothing so dreadfully important as winning this war and every possible resource should be made im med mediately lately available mr secretary the question Is so vital to our country and the necessity of winning the war Is so great that there la is no limit to which we should not go to carry out the plan I 1 have outlined tor for the next ten months and we must be prepared to carry it on still further after that thai at the same rate or maybe taster faster CHAPTER the thirty second thirty fifth forty second and seventy seventh divisions were ere now in training under the hie recently organized third corps especial effort was being made to hasten their preparation in both staff and line in anticipation of an early call for more serious service I 1 inspected these troops june 1922 19 22 1918 1913 and my impressions were favorable although a number of officers were found unfamiliar with the pran principles of tactical leadership in such hastily trained units chii was hardly surprising especially in view of the known defects of the instruction at home many were found with but slight appreciation of the natural defensive possibilities of a given position some battalion and even regimental corn coin manders had not thought to ascertain the exact location of their front lines and of course had tailed failed to work out the details of preparation against a possible attack my lly predilection for detailed del ailed instruction in minor tactics growing out of my personal supervision of training in both small and large units led me quickly to discover deficiencies my ily diary notes the est establishment blish ment of the military board of all ed supply at this time june 22 1913 tt it was expected to study questions of supply and adopt proper measures tor for the coordination ot of allied resources and utilities col charles G dawes rho had charge in a more limited sphere of the ordination coordination co of our own supply departments was detailed as the american member of the board lauds courage of negro troops cables from the war department juno june 22 stated that the tolfred people at home were being told that degro soldiers in france were always placed in the most dangerous positions being sacrifice cT to save white troops and were often left on the field to die without medical attention it was not difficult to guess the oreg arizu u of this sort ENGLAND LOCATION AMERICAN DIVISIONS 30 JULY pres 0 baite ae Intern international abonal tidy bruxelles numerals indicate divisions i 0 circled numerals those not in line 0 so 50 M MILES I 1 LES 0 SO kilometers c A as 33 M amien G 9 sedan 4 J 1 1 az i sons 2 0 rei S 9 2 P GERMANY 4 az ri metz za eldun meau 28 CUIA nai lof 81 par is arie ar ie UC az 0 nanc baag 77 IN e u hateau E n colmar 6 i 0 co E MUG 1 aa is az tours f c v of propaganda As a matter of fact act noue none of these troops had been lii in line except to in quiet sectors those I 1 had recently seen were in floe fine spirits spirit aud and seemed leen for or active service the only colored combat troops in france were those of 0 the ninety sec ond division then in 10 a quiet sector in the and the four our infantry ln antry regiments 0 of the ninety third each attached to a french division several individuals serving 1 alth I h the french had already received |