Show Gre gelmer countries north copyright american Amerl by caa ta 41 lit 1 newspaper New ne clisper paper A alliance 11 lane tory afi K e ao eo IF fo 0 scandinavian production arved world served including rights in whole hol re R re r the or la part prohibited i y gen john 10 Reve shing service 1 CHAPTER continued it was wag a source of real regret to m we not to command the first division 1 person and this coupled with tin the fact that its entry into the battle was vai of considerable moment led nit me to speak a word of confidence and encouragement when the officers bout about in all 11 II were assembled la in the grounds of the chateau occupied Is s division headquarters they formed ft 11 rare group these splendid looking men hardened by the strenuous work of the fall and by two months in winter trenches fairly radiated the spirit of courage and gave promise that americas effort would prove her sons the equals of their forefathers the first division saw its first major offensive some six weeks later a brilliant counterattack at Canti guy in the allens amiens sector wanted the th A E F united that afternoon I 1 motored to burcus to see general foch and sound film out regarding the prospects of uniting our divisions in a sector of our own I 1 told him that the secretary of war when in france bad expressed an tamest desire to hasten the formation of an american army and that this was also the wish of the president it was my opinion I 1 said that early action would be of great importance in stimulating the morale of our troops and of our people now that the first division was to go into line the people at home would expect oon moon to bear that an american army was wag eng engaged liged on its own front I 1 suggested the possibility that the corps might be assembled near the first division as a beginning general foci foch agreed in principle to the suggestion but was uncertain when the other divisions could be spared which 1 I of course fully appreciated precia prec ted ile he pointed out that the enemy was very aggressive and referred to the severe attack against the british on the lys between lens and cypres ypres which began on the oth and was still in progress but looking beyond I 1 insisted that the awen ty sixth and forty second divisions might be withdrawn at soy any time from quiet sectors to be followed by the second and the thirty second and also the third a few days later I 1 pointed out that this force of six divi divisions including the first would equal twelve french elisions and gave it as my opinion that it would be better to use tills this american group for active operations than to detain the units in quiet sectors and send french divisions to the battle front my understanding after this discus slon was wag very definite that the plan would soon be carried outs out leaving the exact time and place to be determined it was immaterial to nie me just where it should occur the point being to get it done hard fighting on the lys the german offensive on the lys was another formidable effort to break the british line the attack was made to the north and south of Arment Armenti leres eres on a front of 24 miles by 27 german divisions the exhausted british though they fought mith most commendable courage and skill were forced again to with heavy losses to themselves and the portuguese consisting of two to divisions who were with them several french divisions diNi were mere hurried to the lys front but it was a week after the attack attach began before they were put into the line they then relieved british divisions at the famous kemmel hill only to be surprised and defeated themselves april 25 much to their chagrin the battle was practically ended by the last of the month with kith a gait gain by tile the germans of ten or eleven miles and the capture of important territory from the british but with failure to take hazebrouck CHAPTER it was always stimulating to ones morale to visit the headquarters of the canadians where one soon caught the fine spirit of that superb body I 1 made such a visit in the spring of 1918 and talked with their corps corpa commander gen sir arthur currle currie bis big chief of staff major general weber his chief of engineers general lindsay and others and nd had bad ten tea with them the alertness and confidence of these neighbors of ours and the excellent record they had made and were still making gave us as much gratification as though they had been our cur own I 1 remember this visit with ciuch pleasure and recall the prediction of the canadians that americans would soon play an important part in the war general currle currie deplored the hie tact fact that the british bad so easily given up daele ridge which the year before he be had been told must be taken at all costs and tor for which tile canadians made the tremendous sacrifice of 1600 casualties calls call at british G H Q at the invitation of sir douglas haig rai british commander lo in alef I 1 went to the british general april 20 to discuss the training of our nur iab with trie british and study ins in progress we were always made welcome nt at british headquarters it so go happened that on the day of our arrival lord derby who had just been relieved as minister of war by lord milner was there en route to parts paris its as british ambassador during dinner the conversation vers atlon ran along freely as though we were members member of the official family at length lord derby and sir douglas drifted to the subject of british politician it would betray no confidence to say that there was wag considerable criticism of some who held prominent places the coalition government came in for its share because of its attitude toward the military high command I 1 took advantage of the opportunity while on the british front to visit the ques area to inspect tile lie advance elements of the seventy sev anth division one of the divisions selected for training ith the british we took luncheon with ith brig gen evan M johnson then temporarily in command and his staff officers he praised the soldierly qualities of the men but said they were very much behind in their training makes make agreement with halg haig at sir douglas headquarters be und and I 1 reached an understanding as to the training and administration of our troops that were to be temporarily with the british in the first place they were to be allocated by regiments to british skeleton divisions under such a schedule as might be agreed upon the training staffs of british divisions were to be at the disposal of these regiments especially for instruction in the use of the rifle and machine gun and the handling of gas after that and with the approval of their american division commander mander the regiments were mere to be attached to a british division in line so each of the three battalions of the regiment would have the opportunity to serve with one of the three brigades in each british division these battalions were to be commanded by their own officers as a part of the british brigade while abde the staff of the american regiment was to be attached to that of the bri brigade gride in tile the next stage the american regiments with their three battalions united under the regiments regimental commander tn mander ander were to act as a brigade in a british division the final stage would find the tour four american regiments of each division united as such under its own officers the artillery being british until the arrival of its own artillery brigade in carrying out this scheme the tendency at first was for british officers actually to assume command of our units in training our officers in most tasos cases permitted this to be done until it was checked by my orders that american units must be commanded in training by the officers and noncommissioned officers who are to command them in battle and that american troops would mould in all cases be commanded lo in battle only by americans talks shipping in london following a suggestion by I lord ord alliner I 1 went to london april 22 1918 to consider further the shipment of american troopers at our first conference there were mere present lord milner allner and gen sir henry witson who had succeeded general robertson as the chief of the general staff narford and myself the main point of difference Terence lif that had developed in pevious conferences as to just how far the americans should he be commit ted to i serve to in active operations was again considered I 1 stated that the main thing was to get our units trained and that while I 1 was opposed to amalgamation yet if during the period of instruction the units with which they were ere serving should be attacked or if another great emergency should arise of course our men would go in naturally the brit lab ish wanted unlimited infantry and machine gun units but I 1 would con older aider nothing further than a limited extension of the six division plan during the conference a cable from lord rending reading to the prime minister was wag brought forth which stated that thai the president had agreed to the amalgamation ga mation of americans americana with the british I 1 bad nothing off official lelal at hand later than the presidents President 8 conditional approval of joint note no IS 18 of the gu prenie lne war council as g suggested by secretary baker so I 1 promptly said that it could not be possible that any such concession had been made and that the classes of our troops to be shipped oer 01 er and their disposition must be left to me agree on an troop shipments shipment As a result of these discussions we reached an agreement which provided for the shipment in may by british and american tonnage of the infantry machine gun engineer and signal troops to together ether with the various unit headquarters of six divisions for training with tile the british army it was provided that any shipping in excess of the amount required for this number dumber of troops should be utilized to transport the artillery of these divisions also that such personnel as might be required to build up corps organizations should then follow it being understood that the artillery regiments would train with the french and join their proper divisions when this was completed to meet any emergency that might require an excess of infantry after the completion of this program it was agreed that all the american and british shipping available for the transportation of troops was to be used under such arrangement as would insure immediate aid to the allies and thereafter as far as possible provide other units necessary to complete the organization of our divisions and corps it was further agreed that the combatant troops mentioned in connection with may shipments should be followed by such services of supply and other contingents as we ourselves might consider necessary the shipment of a large number of these troops should be utilized at my discretion except that the six divisions which the british wore to transport would be trained with then them washington makes concession reaching chaumont Chau mout I 1 found that a cablegram dated april 26 had been received transmitting a memorandum dated april 19 that had been sent by direction of the president to the british ambassador at washington in conformity with mith his approval of note no 18 in this memorandum t lie shipment of infantry and machine gun units per month for four months was conceded with the understand understanding ini that their assignment for training and use should he be left to my discretion it went on to say that the unit united ed states until the situation changed had no intention of departing from as full compliance with the recommendation men dation lation of the permanent military representatives so as the nature of the case would permit tills this was the first off lelal information I 1 had received that the administration had agreed to send any specific numbers of infantry and mach machine lne gu gun units to france this concession went further than it was necessary to go and much further than I 1 had expected realizing the complications that might arise from commitments so far in the future and the delay in forming an american army that would follow I 1 did not agree in later discussions at the supreme war council with all that the allies now felt justified in demanding I 1 was as opposed to the action of the supreme war council in assuming aing the power under any circumstances to dis pose of american troops it was not in any sense a prerogative of the supreme war council there can be b little doubt that lord reading received the distinct slon blon from president wilson that infantry and machine gun units would be sent to franco france at the rate of men per month for four months beginning with april that the president agreed to this in principle la is practically certain it need not be further emphasized that such a concession even though prompted by the most generous impulse could only add to the difficulties of our task of building up on an army of our own it Is probable that lord reading heading skilled id advocate that he was did more while blie ambassador at washington to influence the administration to grant allied requests than any other individual CHAPTER I 1 left london april 25 1918 and crossed to france in a british destroyer colonel mott molt was at boulogne with a request for me from general foch to come to sarcus I 1 learned then that the twenty second division at had repulsed a severe trench raid on the night of april 2021 20 21 and had suffered considerable loss lose arriving at general fochs headquarters I 1 found generals bliss harbord and already there and after dinner we entered into a general discussion about american troop shipments the conversation ran an a follows foch on march 28 you came to offer the services of american troops I 1 have a vivid recollection of the occasion As to the american divisions in what order do you think they should be employed employ edl pershing the order would be the twenty sixth forty second second the first had bad already been sent to an active front near allens amiens the regiments of the thirty second will be ready by may 1 foch I 1 do not think they can be used before may 5 but bat the more we put into the line the better it will be your seventy seventh division has arrived I 1 see what about the third and fifth pershing the infantry of theT the third bIrd has arrived and that of the fifth will soon follow pershing penning stands firm foch what we need now to Is infantry especially the british on account of the present crisis that la Is why by the supreme war council at versailles recommended that all tonnage be devoted to that purpose for the time being I 1 hope that america may send over oner as much infantry as possible during the next three months the other arms to complete your divisions can come coine afterward what do you think of that plan pershing I 1 cannot commit myself to such a proposition if nothing but infantry and machine gunners are brought over ever to the total of it will be october or november before the artillery rind and auxiliary troops could arrive and we could not foresee the formation of an american army until next spring foch 1 I think your calculation Is rather pessimistic for we could begin bringing your other troops in august but without considering that flint point we can furnish you with a artillery roii and its personnel and you can have your divisions reconstituted beginning with october Oct olier what would you propose in this connection pershing I 1 think we should limit the transportation of infantry to may and that the artillery and auxiliary troops should come in june they should not arrive more than a month later than the infantry under what conditions would you employ the american infantry units TO BE BB CONTINUED ENGLAND LOCATION AMERICAN DIVISIONS MAY 0 pres 0 battle international bruxelles N numerals |