Show beneral pershing inq qs I 1 s astorg of the A E P F 1951 in all 11 countries by br th it cju Cle north amo Ameri cao bews alliance world 1 rights reserved roer ved include rn all reproduction in whole is I 1 put prohibited john 1 1 J 1 11 pershing 1 I inq service r CHAPTER continued replying april 3 to tile the departments cable I 1 emphasized that it was not intended that our units should replace the losses of british or french organizations and therefore our artillery should be held in readiness nes to follow when vi hen called for although it was possible that the situation night might become so serious that some of our infantry units will be forced to serve with british temporarily my intentions were further indolent ed by saying americans must nut not lose sight of the purpose to build up divisions and corps of their own nuil bud also we must avoid the tendency to incorporate our infantry into british divisions abera it will be used up and never relieved my cable recommended that the infantry of two divisions be sent by british shipping and two by our own but that present plans should go no further than tills this it was my purpose not to become too deeply involved lu in an agreement that would make it impossible later to form our own independent force under our own off officers leers CHAPTER secretary baker and I 1 had frequently discussed the question of a supreme allied commander and we were both ready to accept it in principle when proposed in response to a notice from premier clemenceau I 1 went april 3 to beauvalis Beau Beati vals to meet with the su supreme prenie war council ahrling Arr ling early colonel boyd and I 1 had to wait an hour at the hotel de ville before II 11 clemenceau and lloyd george came into the con faience room marshal llala general foch petain sir henry wilson bliss and myself were tile the others participating brigadier general spiers acted as interpreter and aleut col sir maurice hankey who usually accompanied mr lloyd george as recorder the meeting was finally called to order by AL clemenceau who stated its purpose saying in substance we have come together to settle a very simple question regarding tile the functions of general foch I 1 think we are all to in agreement as to the coordination of allied action hut but there la in some difference in the understanding of general fochs powers as conferred upon him at the doullens Doul lens con ference of march 26 general foch will explain his difficulties foch calls call for action general foch then set forth briefly his situation as follows the powers conferred by the doul lens conference were limited to the ordination coordination co of action between the allies they were conferred while the action was on the power to co erdl date bate has been construed to be limited to the time the allies were in action that was march 26 at doullens Doul lens leas now we are at april 3 now that the two opposing armies are no longer in action but have stopped and are facing each other there Is nothing to ordinate coordinate co there should be authority to prepare tor for action and direct IL it so we are right back where we were and nothing can be done until an action starts again lloyd george pleads for unity mr lloyd george then entered the discussion saying substantially we have had more than three years of this war and we have not had unity of action during that time during SEA nieuport ai PO ghent t dun irk laja YS N kemmel hill hazebrouck Maze brouCk aulle mons 0 ground gained German Offensive april 9 9 25 last year we have had bad two kinds i of strategy one by haig and another by petain Iet aln both different and nothing has been gained the only thing ahn that was accomplished was wag by general nivelle when he was in supreme command general foch la Is now empowered to ordinate coordinate co the action 0 of the allied armalea but this does not go far as he has no authority to control except by conferring with the respective spec tive commanders tn in chief ue ie wants authority to prepare for action I 1 think the resolution made at doul lens should be modified modi bed so that we may have a better understanding I 1 should like to bear want general bliss and general Iler shing have to say gay pershing perching gives give his views I 1 then gave eve my view which was set forth in a brief memorandum prepared lu in pencil after the discussion began as follows the principle of unity of command Is undoubtedly the abe correct one tor for the allies to follow I 1 do not believe it Is possible to have bare unity of action without a supreme commander wit bt already had bad experience I 1 enough in trying to ordinate coordinate co the operations erat ions of the allied armies Br inies without success there has never been real unity of action such ordination coordination co between two or three armies Is impossible no M matter atter who the commander in chief may inny be each commander in chief Is interested in his own army and cannot get the other commanders point of view nor grap graap the problem leru as ai a whole I 1 am in favor of a supreme commander and believe that the success of the allied cause depends upon it 1 I think the necessary action should be taken by this council at once I 1 am in favor of conferring the supreme command upon general foch when I 1 had finished mr air lloyd george came over to whore where I 1 sat took me by the hand and said 1 I agree fully with general pershing lne this Is well put after some further informal discussion a draft of the resolution waa submitted which omitted reference to the american army whereupon I 1 called attention to the oversight say ing 1 I think this resolution shout should d in elude clude the american army the arrangement Is to be in force Rs as I 1 understand it from now on and the american army will soon be ready to function as such and should be included as nn an entity city like the british and french armies there Is no american army yet ns as such general petain interjected as its units are either in training or are amalgamated with the british anil and french pershing has U S included there may not be an american army in force functioning now I 1 re tilled plied but there soon will be and I 1 want this resolution to apply to it when it becomes a fact the american government Is represented here at this conference and in the war and any action as to the supreme com mand that includes the british and french armies should also include the american army the foregoing recount account of the conference may not be an exact record of the language used but it Is given as my aid took it down the following resolution was wag then read and adopted general foch Is charged by the british french and american governments with the ordination coordination co of the action of the allied armies on the western front to this end there la Is conferred on him all the power necessary for its effective realization to the same end the british french and american governments confide in gen eral foch the strategic direction of military operations the commanders in chief of the british french and american armies will exercise to the fullest extent the tactical direction of their armies each commander in chief will have the right to appeal to bis big government it if in his big opinion his bis army Is placed in danger by the instructions recel recessed sed from general foch allied commander in chief the idea of an allied commander to in chief had been suggested and discussed many times unofficially but for various reasons political and otherwise it had never been definitely adopted by the supreme war council with the distrust that existed among amon the allies it was not easy to bring about the decision in favor of a preme commander and it was made possible only by the extreme emergency of the situation the designation of general foch as commander in chief of the allied armies in france was proposed by the french april received a letter from II al clemenceau advising me that mr lloyd george had approved the suggestion and asked if I 1 agreed I 1 replied to in a personal note expressing my agreement subject to the eon confirma tirma tion of president wilson which came april 17 once the question of supreme command was wag settled the co en ergisa of the allied armies could be directed with maximum effe effect c t I 1 toward ow a rd a common end while dark days were still ahead we were spared the cha grin of inefficiency through lack of teamwork CHAPTER now that the supreme effort must be made on our part and when units were sorely needed tor for immediate active service it was waa found much to my surprise that although the divisions then coming to france had been under training for six months or even more they still contained a large percentage of untrained men As AI already pointed out the general staff when called upon to provide men for or special services had relied upon taking them from combat divisions instead of anticipating such requirements and segregating these specialists from the start and training them as such this was a most vicious application in time of 0 war of a very objectionable practice that had grown up in our army in time of pence it appears that during the he preparation of our armies in the world war no other plan was wa followed and the practice was carried to such an extent that divisions with say men which should have been held intact and each one perfected as oil an organized team were constantly called upon to send large groups of their trained to other duties inspects available divisions in view of their possible early employment I 1 wanted especially to look into the general state of efficiency of our available divisions find and give some personal instructions about training going the rounds I 1 met general gilr clr who was one of the able french generals and found him very enthusiastic about the second which had been in line at under his command confirming my own ton ion formed from observation and re i ports he said that without doubt it was then as efficient as any of bis big french divisions the first was further advanced than any of the others and its morale was high at the prospect of going into the battle line recent developments tied had brought the question of the employment of american troops into immediate consideration the presidents qualified approval of the recommendation of the supreme war council as embodied in joint note no 18 was seized upon by the allies and construed as a concession for the unlimited absorption of our troops in their armies no doubt my offer to general foch lent encouragement to the allied view on the day of secretary bakers departure general Whig whigham harn and general hutchinson came over from the british war office to discuss arrangements for transportation of american troops in III accordance with the provisions provis lons of joint note no 18 the conversation indicated that the british understood we were to send men per month to train with them and that they were bringing over the sume same number making a total of per month beginning with april they held that tile the approval of note no IS 18 had superseded agreements previously made including the six division plan baker speaks plainly the british conferees entirely ignored tile the specific condition that the final arrangements as to training and disposition of all our units were to be left in my hands their error was pointed out and mr baker then said whitt what Is pertinent to the present discussion Is that american troops are going to the british for training I 1 dont want th british public or army or the french public or army to get an exaggerated iden idea that this scheme provides or will provide a means by which their losses will be made up in the future 1 I want no feeling of disillusionment when general pershing liing calls tor for the troops In trusted to them for training air bakers visit to our armies during this critical period was fortuitous as aa like problems that confronted us could then be seen in n their true perspective spec tive ile he had an opportunity to meet the allied leaders both civil and military and get in touch with conditions in the different co countries of still greater greate r importance he be saw with his own eyes the building of our organization lie he was a keen observer with clear understanding and a logical mind and obtained in a short time un an accurate conception of our task and its difficulties As to our relations he gave me from the start that tant strong and sympathetic support which means so much to a military commander in the field feared british were lagging before mr baker called for home I 1 had bad sent seat him he letter quoted below and although we later discussed its contents briefly it Is given as showing the reaction of at least part of the british press at the time april 5 1918 dear mr secretary I 1 noticed the other day that one of the british papers in referring to the fact that plans plane hau hail been made to send american troops to the assistance of the allies stated that this would r re bileve the british of the necessity of depleting the strength of the forces kept at home for defensive purposes this suggests to my mind a certain political phase of the british situation which may inny give us additional explanation as to rhy mr air lloyd george and british representatives are 96 f urgent la in their appeals for assistance from america following this further may I 1 suggest vint you give the matter serious thought there Is so very much at stake for us that it seems to me very frank representations should be made to the british government as to the urgency of their putting into the army every possible man that can be mustered to meet the immediate emergency it may be that you would think it advis advisable tible to go to london or else to intimate to the president by cable the urgency of great britaina Brit ains putting into the ranks every possible man to withstand the present german onslaught even it if they have to promise to withdraw them in six months and of their theirl doing so without waiting on us or counting on us in the slightest degree there will be few enough men eien een with the best we all can do it will be time enough for great britain to consider the defense of england after she has bus put forth every possible energy on the continent here Is the place to beat germany and not on british soil in writing V c 6 44 W 4 vb Z 16 the red cross was on the job tills this I 1 have in mind what you told me regarding available men in england CHAPTER on april 12 1918 washington reported a increase in cargo tonnage by the use of 0 dutch ships infantry and machine gun personnel of 0 four dINIs divisions lons were promised for that month the allies were at last thoroughly alive to the necessity of an extraordinary effort to provide tonnage for transporting our troops after mouths months of delay and discussion they realized fully that the superiority of forces vitally necessary to avert defeat must come from across the atlantic A america had bad become their sole reliance not only for the forces necessary to sane sae them from defeat but for unlimited financial aid as well mr bakers firsthand first hand knowledge of the situation in france enabled him to give a fresh impetus to the efforts of the war department with gen peyton C march as chief of staff the general staff and the supply departments began to exert more energy the war industries hoard board reorganized under the leadership of B al baruch had taken dennite definite control and direction of the nations industries with the sole aim of riding aiding us to win in the war in tile the face of the crisis activity at home had bad at last replaced the apparent deliberation of our first year in the war our hope for an improvement in methods and a more competent ordination coordination co of effort seemed about to be realized first division moves up |