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Show .Qeneral Pershing's Storq of the A. E. F. IfConrriikt. 1911, U all eaaatrlaa fcr id Nona Aawicaa Nawapapar Alliaaca. World TU, !-, a-.l rlthi raaarvad. tadodin. the Scaadloaviaa. U4 HGneral , rUprod actio ! whole or to pin prehlUiod.) - , -wNU6wk John J. Perstunq vaneed at once to meet the attack In open combat This defeat of the French furnished fur-nished the second striking confirmation confir-mation of the wisdom of training troops for open warfare. Replies to- French Criticism. After the success of our troops we were in no mood to listen to self-appointed critics. M. Andre Tardleu called on me upon my return re-turn to Paris and undertook to point out that our staff was Inefficient Ineffi-cient and offered criticisms of our organization. As this was something some-thing be could not possibly know about, I replied that be had got an entirely erroneous Impression and that our staff was second to none In either ability or efficiency. 1 advised lilm that we bad quite enough of this sort of thing from the French, either military or civilian, civil-ian, and suggested that If his people peo-ple would cease troubling themselves them-selves so much about our affairs and attend more strictly to their own we should all get along much better. I did not fall to appreciate M. Tardleu's ability and his helpfulness helpful-ness on many occasions, but this constant Inclination on the part ol a certain element among the French to assume a superiority that did not exist then or at any later period, added to the attempts ol some of them to dictate, had reached the limit CHAPTER XLIII The sixth session of the supreme war council was convened June 1, 1918. The Important matter of furnishing fur-nishing shipment of American troops was taken up. As already Indicated, It was my opinion that neither the character of the troops to be sent over nor their disposition was within the province of the council to decide, but that these niiPRtlnns nhnnlrl ho Ing my Judgment In this matter. As nothing was being accomplished, and hoping the uuruber of participants partici-pants In the discussion might be limited, 1 proposed we adjourn until the following day. CHAPTPER XLIV. Further conversation at the session ses-sion of the supreme war ceundl showed the uncertainty In tbe minds of the allies. I'rlme Minister Minis-ter Lloyd George, reverting to losses, snld that before the great German attack In May he had been Informed positively the Germans had only 400,000 replacements left, and that now, after the most violent vio-lent fighting. In which It was reported re-ported the Germans had suffered very heavy losses, they still bad more than 300.000 replacements. Tbe allies also had 300.000, but It was now contended, he said, that the British army was on the decline de-cline while that of the enemy was not. Mr. Lloyd George asked If that could be cleared up, to which General Gen-eral Foch replied thot It was because be-cause the enemy managed better, and he went on to say that Germany, Ger-many, with a population of 68.000,-000,- could maintain 204 divisions, while Great Britain, with 40.000.(100 Inhabitants, could keep up only 43. After further argument on discrepancies dis-crepancies of various figures, and Insistence by General Focb that the number of divisions be maintained, the consideration of the transportation transpor-tation of American troops In' June and July was resumed. Tbe decision de-cision bavlng reached an Impasse, It was suggested that Lord Milner, British war minister, General Foch and I should undertake to draw np a program. In the consideration of the question ques-tion by ns the point of my contention conten-tion was won when General Wey- PRnrl whn vm Fnrh'a nrfnHnnl arl. 1 CHAPTER XLI Continued. When . General . Harbord's turn ; came bis place as chief of staff was taken by General McAndrew. Sev-f Sev-f era I of the higher officers of the genera staff had a tour with t troops, not only that they might ( have the opportunity to serve at J the front which is every soldier's ambition, but because they would return to staff duty with a broader and more sympathetic understanding understand-ing of the line officer's point of view and appreciate more fully the consideration that he deserves at the hands of the staff. ; According to the plan for the ro tation of officers between line and staff several others were relieved N and sent to serve with troops Among them were Col. Frank R. McCoy, secretary of the general staff, relieved by MaJ. James H. Col llns, and Col. W. D. Connor, assistant as-sistant chief of staff 0-1, relieved by Col. G. V. H. Moseley. Morrow on Maritime Council. Our members of the interallied maritime council were wide nwak at this time In their search for ad dltlonal tonnage. Dwight Morrow reported prospects of some In crease, besides calling attention t tonnage that was Idle or not belnu tween Solssons snd Rheims, began on the morning of the 27th and was making dangerous headway. By the morning of the 28th the gains of the enemy were such that tbe French high command was compelled com-pelled to relieve much of the reinforcing re-inforcing artillery behind the First division and transfer It to that front The enemy's artillery within range of Cantlgny thus became superior su-perior to ours and was able to con-centrate con-centrate a terrific fire on the an sheltered troops In the captured position, po-sition, ills reaction against our troops was extremely violent and apparently be was determined at all cost to counteract the excellent effect the American success had produced upon the allies. Under cover of heavy bombardment bombard-ment a series of counterattacks were made by the enemy, but our young infantrymen stood theit ground and broke up every attempt to dislodge them. The regiment sustained severe casualties from the large caliber shells poured town upon It and had to be reinforced rein-forced by a battalion each from th eighteenth and Twenty-sixth regi ments. It was s matter of nrlila tn tha whole A. E. F. that the troops of this division, In their first battle and In the unusually trying sltua tion that followed, displayed the fortitude and courage of veterans, held their gains and denied to tht enemy the slightest advantage. U. 8. Troops to Chateau Thierry. The alarming situation had caused General Petaln to call on me on the 30th for American troops to be sent to the region of Chateau Thierry. The Third division (Dick-man), (Dick-man), then in training near Chan-mont, Chan-mont, being the only division within with-in reach, besides the Second, was ordered to move north Immediately. Dlckman started his motorized machine-gun battalion over 'the road on the afternoon of May 30. The Infantry and engineers entrained the same night, and the division's supply trains marched overland. The first element to reach Chateau Cha-teau Thierry was the machine-gun battalion, which arrived the after- used to the best advantage. The Immense shipment . of American troops contemplated the use of all available passenger-cargo carrying elilpB, British, American and neu '' , tral. As very little. If any, space would be left In Such ships for car- J go, the latter class of ships was tn f greater demand than ever. " Meanwhile the amount of world t cargo tonnage built during the pre- ceding five months was scarcely I equal to the losses, and the ships we were manufacturing bad only Just begun to be turned out for I service. It was at once evident (that the Immense program of troop shipments would call' for extraordinary extraordi-nary concessions on the part of all concerned, i ; j CHAPTER XLII. ' A strong German offensive opened ( May 27, 191S, against the French, , with the famous Big Bertha firing on Paris. IP The nnsltliin of fh First division rw 1 Doughboys Bringing in German Prisoners. vlser, remarked that It would be as well to leave the new drafts to be trained at home a month or so longer. Although , my arguments had failed to make any Impression on General Foch he at once approved Weygand's suggestion. Agreement on U. 8. Troops. With tbls out of the way we soon drew up the agreement embodied in the following cablegram sent to noon of May 81, and Immediately went into action against the enemy, who then held the half of the town north of the Mnrne. By daylight on June 1 all avalluble guns bad been provided with cover and were in their positions, one compnny with eight guns, defending the main wagon bridge, and another with nine guns about 500 yards to the east, guarding the approaches to the railroad bridge. From these positions they repulsed all attempts by the Germans to cross the Marne. Meanwhile, as the infantry of the division came up on June 1 Its battalions were put Into line to reinforce the French from Chateau Thierry east to Dormans. The conduct con-duct of the machine-gun battalion in this operation was highly praised by General Petaln In a citation issued is-sued later. Stopped German Drive on Parle, The Second division (Bundy) May 30 was near Chaumont-en-Vexln and was preparing to move northward the next day for concentration concen-tration near Beauvals to relieve tbe First division at Cantlgny. But Its orders were changed late that night, and the division, moving by motor truck, was rushed toward Meaux, twenty miles northeast of Paris. Beaching there, the leading elements were hurried forward In the direction of Chateau Thierry. The roads were crowded with French troops and refugees. There was great confusion among the rapidly retreating French troops, many of them saying to our men that all was lost was near Cantlgny, where it had been In line nearly a month opposite oppo-site the town and near the point k of farthest advance of the enemy In the Amiens salient. Although some weeks had passeu since my offer of troops In the ; emergency, np to now none had I been called upon to take part In ac-jj ac-jj tive operations., The . reason ap- j peared to be that the allies were , skeptical of the ability of any of j. our units to conduct an offensive, .j The opportunity now came, however, how-ever, to remove misgivings on that score. The French corps In which the Flrwas serving bad prepared a f counterattack to be launched In the Amiens sector about the middle of f May in case of another offensive 9 by the enemy In Flanders, which, It was believed, would occur between be-tween May 15 and 20. The counterattack counter-attack was to be directed due east toward tbe heights of Montdldier, with tbe advance of the First dl- vision, supported by a French division di-vision on each flank, as a preliminary prelimi-nary move. This was to be followed fol-lowed In forty-eight hours by a general advance northward of the entire French army, which covered the front from Montdldier to ) Noyon. Ammunition dumps had been filled, special trenches dug, new battery emplacements prepared for the re-enforclng artillery and necessary neces-sary orders Issued for the counterattack, counter-attack, but the enemy did not put in Its appearance according to tbe forecast. First Seeks Better Position. determined by ourselves according to circumstances and after discussion discus-sion with the allies. So I objected to their consideration considera-tion by the council, as such, and suggested a meeting outside the the council, which was approved. Accordingly, In the late afternoon, General Foch, Lord Milner, British war minister; General Weygund and I, with Colonels Conner and Boyd, met In the premier's room. General Foch began by stating the serious condition of the allies and proposed the continued shipment from America of nothing but infantry infan-try and machine-gun units in June and July, in effect 250,000 In eacb month. Every one realized the gravity of the allied situation as strongly as he did, but, as previously previ-ously and persistently contended by me, there were two sides to the question. I was prepared to make- some concessions and stated my views, but neither facts nor arguments seemed to make any Impression. General Foch especially was very positive and earnest, and. In fact, became quite excited, waving bis hands and repeating: "The battle, the battle; nothing else counts." With erfual emphasis I urged that we must build up our organization as fast as possible to carry on the battle to the epd, and that our program pro-gram had been seriously Interrupted Interrupt-ed by concessions already made. I called attention to the fact that the railways all over France were on tbe point of breaking down for lack of efficient operators and of skilled workmen to repair rolling stock; that our ports would be hopelessly blocked unless we could Improve the railways; that his plan ' would leave us 200,000 men short to complete combat units and fill np special organizations that were absolutely necessary In the S. O. S., and, finally, that tbe restriction of our shipments to Infantry and machine-gun nnlts would be a very dangerous and short-sighted policy. To much of this he paid little or Washington June 2: "(a) For June: First, absolute priority shall be given tbe transportation transpor-tation of 170,000 combatant troops (viz., six divisions without artillery, artil-lery, ammunitions trains or supply trains, amounting to 120,000 men and 44,000 replacements for combat troops) ; second, 25,400 men for the service of railway, of which 13,400 have been asked by the French minister of transportation; third, the balance to be troops of categories cate-gories to be determined by the commander com-mander In chief, American expeditionary expedi-tionary forces. "(b) For July: Fleet, absolute priority for the shipment of 140,000 combatant troops of the nature defined de-fined above, four divisions minus artillery, etc., amounting to 84,000 men plus 56,000 replacements; second, sec-ond, the balance of the 250,000 to consist of troops to be designated by the commander In chief, American Ameri-can expeditionary forces. "(c) It Is agreed that If available avail-able tonnage in either month allows al-lows the transportation of a larger number of men than 250,000 the excess ex-cess tonnage will be employed In the transportation of combat troops as defined above. "(d) We recognize that the combatant com-batant troops to be dispatched in July may have to Include troops with Insufficient training, but we consider tbe present emergency to justify a temporary and exceptional departure by the United States from sound principles of training, especially as a similar course is being be-ing followed by France and Great Britain. fSltmed) The Initial deployment of the Second division was made by the Ninth Infantry and the Sixth regiment regi-ment of marines June 1.' across the Paris highway at Lucy-le-Bocagne, In front of Montrenll-aux-LIons, supposedly In support of two French divisions; but the French had orders to fail back through the American lines. In the early morning morn-ing of June 2 the Twenty-third in-1 fantry, then on the left, was re-, placed by the French One Hundred Sixty-seventh division, and when reinforced re-inforced by one battalion of the Fifth marines, the Fifth machine-gun machine-gun battalion and some engineers, it was deployed to the right between be-tween tbe Sixth marines and the Ninth Infantry, te fill a gap In the French line, and by June 5 the entire en-tire division became engaged. Considering that this was Its Crst experience In battle, this division made a splendid defense, repulsed all German attacks, and by its timely time-ly arrival effectively stopped the German advance on Paris. The sudden appearance and dramatic dra-matic entrance of the Second and Third divisions Into the shattered and broken fighting tine and tbelr dash and courage In battle produced a favorable effect upon the French poliu. It must have been with a decided feeling of relief that the worn and tired French army, retreating re-treating before vastly superior nam ben. caught sight of Americans arriving ar-riving In trucks at Meaux and marching thence on foot bats off. hurrying eagerly forward to battle. And the Germans, who bad been filled with propaganda deprecating the American effort and the quality of eur training, must have been surprised and doubtless rather disconcerted by meeting strong resistance re-sistance by Americans on different portions of this active battle front, especially when our troops ad- !It was then decided that the First division should undertake to Improve its position. The Germans on Its front continued to hold tbe " advantage of higher ground, from I which they were able to Inflict con-i con-i stant losses on our troops while J suffering little damage themselves. Another reason was that at this moment the morale of the allies required re-quired that American troops make their appearance in battle. The Cantlgny sector at this time was very active, with artillery flre unusually heavy, and the preparations prepara-tions for the attack by the First division, which bad to be hastily made, were carried out under great difficulty. Many casualties occurred during the construction of jumplng-' jumplng-' Vff-trenches, emplacements and advance ad-vance command posts. The Twenty-eighth Infantry, under un-der Col. Hanson E. Ely, designated for the assault was re-lnforced by machine guns, engineers and other special units. Additional French artillery was sent to assist tbe artillery ar-tillery brigade of tbe division and particularly to suppress the hostile hos-tile batteries attempting to Inter-fereSit-h the consolidation of the new position after It should be captured. cap-tured. On the morning of May 28, after a brief artillery preparation, the Infantry In-fantry advanced on a front of a mile and a quarter. The village of Cantlgny and the adjacent heights were quickly taken, relatively heavy casualties were Inflicted en the enemy and about SO prisoners were captured. Our troops behaved splendidly and suffered but slight loss In the actual attack. Events developing farther east however, were seriously to complicate compli-cate te success. The German assault as-sault itl force against the French along the Chemin des Dames, be- "FOCH, MILNER, PERSHING." Yanks at Chateau Thierry. The Second and Third divisions, facing the Germans near Chateau Thierry, had made their places In line secure, giving heart to the French, who were trying to stabilize sta-bilize their .own positions around the newly formed salient We shall hear more of these two divisions later. Although fully taken for granted by all of us, it was none the less gratifying to see these divisions, di-visions, for tbe first time In the line, acquit themselves so well. En route to Chaumont we motored mo-tored eastward through Montmlrali. passing long columns of French refugees fleeing from their homes, many on foot, men and women with bundles on their backs, leading tbe smaller children, driving their stock before them and hauling In various types of conveyance the few remaining worldly goods they were able to take with them. Almost Al-most Indescribable were many similar simi-lar scenes as reported by our troops as they came up to reinforce the retiring French. (TO BB CONTINUED.) no attention and replied that all these things could be postponed. Wanted Wilson Informed. Graeme Thompson, British expert on transportation and supply, came Into tbe room at this point with Mr. Lloyd George and Gen. Sir Henry Wilson, and took part In the discussion. dis-cussion. Mr. Lloyd George said he thought President Wilson would be deeply interested to get General Foch's view of the situation, and added that as America had no prime minister present he thought It would be Inconvenient for us to make a decision, but that this subject sub-ject should be brought before the whole council. I then called attention to a cable from Secretary of War Baker, already al-ready quoted, showing that the President had been much embarrassed embar-rassed by representations made to him personally by the French and British ambassadors, and bad suggested sug-gested that the matter might be settled by a conference between General Foch and myself. I pointed point-ed out that the cable did aot mention men-tion the supreme war council, and I again stated my opposition to making the subject one of general discussion by all allied representatives represen-tatives and their staffs. I did not fall to point out fur ther that tbe President was trnst- |