Show schley MORE THAI FAIR TO SAMPSON hero of the battle of july 3 explains why he complimented his rival schley thought there was glory enough for all so included the new york in the list of ships engaging the spaniards lawyers have a tilt end of long cross examination washington oct SO with the open ing of the schley court of inquiry today admiral schley began the fifth day of bis testimony and the third day ol 01 his cross examination the prospect then was that he would continue on tho stand throughout the day judge advocate lcmay still nad a long list ot typewritten questions before him and the different members ot the court havo been industriously preparing questions to be put to the admiral for his consideration when his examination by counsel is concluded the testimony began today where left on yesterday taking up different phases of the blockade of santiago and passing from that question into the of may 1 when the spanish cruiser cristo bol colon was bombarded the battle of july ard 3rd was left tor the last subject to be considered the first question capt lemly asked wag whether the iowa was with tho flying squadron at ll ampton roads when he gave the captains of the ships tho verbal orders as to attacking the cue j mys fleet admiral schley replied that she was not in response to questions I 1 he said that he first fell in with tho iowa off cienfuegos captain evans wag then ill and commander was in command he did not recollect whether he had communicated the verbal orders to ane latter he first met captain evans on hay was then i questioned as to bis conversation with captain folger when the latter sug a circular blockade such as existed at wei hai aci witness said he thought the fleet was larger than kia at wei giai wei he was asked whether he did not consider a circular blockade with the vessels pointing in as mobile as the other in as much that the could move cither way with the turning of the helm the replied that he thought a circular blockade where all the vessels charged to the center would produce confusion and inevitably evit ably lead arrangement according f the ene jinyi moved west the outcome saldie sal dhe could only be more or less confusion such as did actually occur later the admirada adm irala attention was called to captain folgera statement that the latter had advised him to go in closer at santiago and his own statement in chief that on the next day captain fol had signalled signal led him that they were within range of tho batteries the admiral in reply changed the date of tho signal to a day ular he read folgers signal 1 I think the forts may open at this range he said when folger made ahn the squadron was in practically the same position on the day folger testified he had asked the admiral to go in closer witness attention was then called to his statement that neither at cienfuegos nor santiago had any vessel entered or departed and he was asked how he knew this he replied that he only knew it because he never heard of any ship getting in on the north cuba blockade when a frenchman succeeded in getting through the blockading line into canava the fact had been widely advertised as a great accomplishment his conclusion therefore was that none had entered coming to the of stay when the spanish ship colon was bombarded as it lay in the harbor at santiago captain lemly asked admiral achley when be first received notice that the commander in chief would be at santiago the witness replied that the not ice had come in the dispatch brought to him by captain cotton which was dated may 29 this telegram was ho taid not received until wy pos tilly too ano new orleans might havo brought information of the coming ot admiral sampson why did you wait two days after the discovery of the presence of the fleet in the harbor before undertaking your rc t for the reason that 1 had used these two days for coaling ane vessels of the fleet so as to lo 10 prepared in case the en emy should come out relating the occurrences of the bombardment bar dment ho said he recalled that captain higginson had asked after he Sih lcy went aboard the massachusetts that the bombardment be postponed until after dinner that he warned some people to get off the turrets and fiat lieutenant commander potts had given notice that they were on the range ho did not recall he said the signal rot to go in closer but it was possible eliat such a signal had been sent and that it had not been recorded it might be that it was with this as with other signals which had not been recorded because the writing of them was always done the next day no man lie said except press cor who brave all dangers can always have paper and pencil at hand while a tattle is in progress and as a consequence there is a lailure to record many occurrences that should bo recorded here followed an examination of tho various signals from the massachusetts on the aay of the bombardment which the admiral verified at the same time lie that he thought there were other f unrecorded admiral schley said he had ordered the range at yards for that day but he had not supposed the colon was so far up the harbor of couric he said 1 I left the measurement of the range to tho executive officer does your letter to the senate dated february 18 plead precautionary order jot the department for not destroying ying the colon I 1 J should rather think that h the inference the admiral astl precautionary order from alie department at the opening of the war lie again explained as chehad done before that when rewrote he wrote thia communication to the senate he did not have all the records before him he omitted to mention in the communication admiral sampsons Samp sons caution at key west lie had prepared it largely from memory in further support of hia r the admiral read the departments instructions of may 31 y warning the com mander in chief against risking armored vessels to the fire of land batteries he was cross questioned closely as to all the orders bearing upon aliis subject ho said he had never acen until ho saw them in the report the orders of april 0 and april 28 modifying to some ex herft the original order but he had been advised of their purport in your report of june ast 1st to the department part ment concerning the you did not mention any purpose to ink or destroy the colon did not but in your telegraphic report you did say eliat your purpose wag to destroy the colonl incidentally yes the judge advocate then asked the admiral to tell exactly what his purpose wasi on that occasion and what instruction bad been given Kc plying that ho had testified fully on this subject before he eaid alie signals made indicated the purpose the signals instructed the ships to use their big guns against the colon the new orleans with her lighter battery was directed to fire at the bhore batteries the instruction was to go in to yards and he thought until several days afterwards that the ships had gone in to that als lance I 1 directed the ships to follow the alap to operate against the colon and lo 10 fire against the forts to develop them and I 1 thin alio as far aa it went was eminently successful the batteries were developed and the fact waa demonstrated that the enemy was in port a squadron of only five or six ships I 1 believed that only the military necessity would have me in risking alic loss of a vessel that might have saved the squadron from the enemy had one r two of our ships been crippled the nemy might have come out and engaged us with disastrous results the development of the face aa to the batteries and ships was in my opinion sufficient tho ships could not get away and they did not get achy the admiral was then asked whether he had informed ensign macy captain cook and correspondent graham that the affair of slay 31 was to be a mccon he thought lie had in a general way and he thought he could bo fairly said to have informed tho captains in the signals hoisted did you signal to the commanding that it was to be a sancil no I 1 think not I 1 think I 1 signalled signal led that we should go in and fire our large guns did the affair develop without ques ion of the enemy in the harbor 1 I thought so because of the largo shells fired at us and also because a number of vessels were seen deferring again to the alleged signal not to go in closer admiral said he did not consider on sider it probable that if sent tt was sent because any vessel had shown a disposition to go in no one was more anxious than I 1 was to go in on that day be said captain lemly asked why the mouth of santiago harbor had not been enfiladed and all the ships used on slay admiral schley replied that lie had not done so simply because the batteries would have ben be n safe while the ships used thus would have been placed in greater danger this is like many arrangements which we might make that we do not make the question of coaling was BO important and had cwi iwi so strongly urged by the commander in chief I 1 felt that we should lose no opportunity of putting the ships in the highest condition of efficiency fici ency he said why did you steam more slowly as you passed the mouth of the harbor the witness replied in a deliberate manner well that is a technical error that might have cicen remedied if some one else had been in command possibly the firing would have been more effective if we had gone in closer but if we had and had steamed more closely there would have been no grin as the range would nave been narrow er it wag a case of dee on one aide and dum on the other captain lemly at this point passed to sia te 1 la 13 questions about the of the joiy 2 on july 2 when the suspicious movements were seen in tho harbor of santiago the witness said he talked with captain cook about the advisability of coupling up the engines it was decided not to do BO ho supposed the ship was always ready for a e admiral Sch leys attention was called to capt cooks testimony that on the night of july 2 he turned in with no intimation that the fleet would come out the witness said that capt cooks statement was not in any sense inconsistent with bis lie biad no intimation that tho fleet would come out alio cross examination of the witness on tho battle of santiago began a question as to what the first move of the brooklynn Brook lyna helm was after tho ships were sighted coming out we were heading west by north he replied the first helm was to port captain cook gave the order for the yea you regard that turn ns very important do you nott 1 I think 1 I was the movement that decided the events of eliat day the admiral said in response to questions that ho had not mentioned the loop in his report of the battle it was an incident of alic battle which ho biad no idea would ever come into controversy captain cook had given tho order without orders from him except under his general instructions to close in and keep somewhere about 1000 yards away outside of the broadside torpedo range when the time camo for the turn capt cooks conception of tho movement coincided with bia own although capt cook gave the order lie would have done go in a moment had the captain of tho brooklyn failed to do so do you ass uirt full responsibility for the absolutely if I 1 did not give the order I 1 approved it asked where lio had heretofore before the beginning of alila inquiry mentioned that ho had during the battle given the bignal follow the flag admiral schley replied s 1 I F have kept my mouth pretty close on all these subjects and do not recall speaking of this incident I 1 dl recollect giving tho signal and that it wag flying for twenty minutes did tho brooklyn egand in and attempt to sink the fleet in tho channel t 1 I started in at first to help the and them help me I 1 felt that if we could stop tho tho battleships could go in and sink ahcin I 1 never had any idea that they would get away continuing he salil in reply to questions ho estimated that the brooklyn had gone to within from n allo to n mile and a halt from alic mouth of the harbor and waa within range of the shore batteries lie thought that for from 12 to 14 min napa the within a range of less alian two thousand yards from tho spanish alii pa they looked very close llo mid when the spanish ships succeeded in getting out of the without boing sunk in accordance with alio orders what alternative was there but to chase wan no alternative no other churco was open lut much depended upon the character of aho climac whether it was made in the proper avny t c at effective was one thing while a poorly conducted and ineffective blockade would have been another thing the admiral said in reply to a question that while several of the vessels biad failed to join in the chase leaving the work after the sinking of alie teresa and the oquendo to the brooklyn and the oregon this was because they could not follow at the pace set by the spaniards at this point captain lemly introduced the following paragraph from admiral report dated guantanamo july 18 1898 since this place and holding conversation with of the captains viz captain eulate of the vizcaya and the second in of the colon commander contreras I 1 have learned that the spanish admirals scheme was to concentrate all fire for a while on the brooklyn and the vizcaya to ram her in hopes that if they could destroy her the chances of escape would be greater as it was supposed she waa the swiftest ship of the squadron this explains the heavy fire mentioned and the Vizca yaa action in the earlier movements of the engagement the expectation pec tation of this purpose was promptly defeated the fact that all the shins of the rf el cd into close an e f ca djs fire litif squad ayn as it was coming out of the har bor admiral schley identified this para graphics grap hias a part of his report tho witness said that before the helm of the Brooklyn was swung ard aport in order to make the loop alio helm was put alternately to port anu to starboard in order to meet the movements of the ships it was difficult he said at eliat time to say whether they meant to go between the texas and the brooklyn or the other way you stated in your examination that on malting the turn you did not see alio of the texas v did say go absolutely admiral schley in response to a question bid he never heard of tho texas incident until six months after the battle ho had been under the impression until later that the starboard engine of the brooklyn was backed to facilitate the turn he recollected distinctly that he warned captain cook as the enemy approached that they acro going to ram him he was closely questioned w to the order which went below to stand by to ram in answer to a question he said he supposed the can tain had given the order he was not certain hiis attention was called to ft letter of june 13 1000 written from the atlantic station in which the admiral was quoted as saying that the turn was made to avoid the last attempt of tho vizcaya to ram but as the letter could not be produced at the time I 1 he was not questioned upon it his ati was next called to hi letter to alie senate in which he said the turn was made to avoid blanketing the fire of his own ships and abo to hla statement in examination in chief thai he had not turned to port because to do so would have brought the ship into dangerous proximity to the vessels and exposed her to possible torpedo at tack or ramming now said capt lcmay hero appear three reasons why you made the turn why did yon make that turn aa I 1 already stated in my direct testimony there ii another very much more important reason which you have not asked and that waa that alie ship might continue in the action and beat the enemy as wo did I 1 oat waa th controlling ono of all have you slated asked capt lemly the witness replied 1 I never stated that because I 1 thought it was evident 1 stated it for three or four reasons we could perhaps conjure up about it 1 have them in mind I 1 have stated in relation to the document that the matter was |