Show 1 I i Allied Supremacy in Air Airi i I R Result If 0 of f Af African l Lesson esson 1 ti Borrowed Page From From Germanys Germany's Book Boo Taught Us to Coordinate Efforts of Air i- i IIi I Jr i Land and Sea Forces i W b By BAUKHAGE News Analyst and Commentator Service Union Trust Building j I Washington ashington D. D C. C Early in the war with Japan when the little men of Nippon were swarming down the Peninsula Pen- Pen at an unbelievable rate through impossible terrain and rolling rolling rolling roll roll- ing up one inconceivable victory after another I had a talk with a wise old military campaigner and andas as a result of the conversation sat down and wrote that infiltration is a word you are going to hear used a lot before this war is over Then followed the days when the J Japs aps i t pushed the allies back from Singapore to New Guinea and themen the themen themen men of Nippon were acclaimed as the aces of jungle fighting the artof art artof artof of of filtering through territory in which heretofore human beings were not supposed to be able to fight Today the allies have produced the best jungle fighters in hi the world We are daily beating the Japs at their own game And today I was reminded of something else after another session with another anonymous of another time and place He told me some things about the allied air force and I recalled the days when Hitler began to bully Europe and I realized that it wasn't so much appeasement corruption deceit or Nazi diplomacy then that made the Fuehrer master of central central central cen cen- Europe first at Munich and later in France and the low countries but the threatening shadow which the dreaded Luft Luft- cast across the world Today just as the allies have out- out the Japs they have out- out the In the latter latter latter lat lat- lat lat- ter case we must admit the Get- Get mans taught us in Africa how they did it Warfare War We will be able to understand the invasion of Europe much better if we understand a little more about the two roles which the allied air force has played in modern warfare ever rever ver since we took a page from Germanys Germany's book and learned what it means to coordinate the efforts of pilot and bombardier with the foot soldier and the sailor especially in what is now generally called tri warfare First it might b be well to state clearly the difference between the tactical a and d strategic bombing Strategic Strategic Strategic Stra Stra- bombing is directed toward the destruction of enemy strength at ata a distance Tactical bombing is destruction destruction destruction de de- de- de or interruption of enemy operations in nr or near T the combat t n u 1 area Because the valuable quality of air power is flexibility the two roles sometimes overlap but in general the strategic effort is a long range effort in terms of both time and space space space-it it requires the use of long- long range bombers and range long-range fighters terse Tactical bombing is the quick answer to instant needs needs needs-it it involves involves in in- wIves lighter bombers and usually does not require long range for its craft There is an exception which Ill I'll mention later Strategic bombing is aimed as we have seen at factories at all installations installations installations in in- which contribute to the enemy's war effort railway lines junctures military bases rolling stock and all means of transportation transportation transportation tation and communication I F The targets in tactical bombing are more varied and will be mentioned mentioned mentioned men men- later The Final Phase We are interested at present in inthe inthe inthe the final phase of the European war so it might be well to describe the preliminary efforts before and the continued effort after the assault assault assault as as- sault on an enemy shore The Sicilian campaign is a good example The first job the air ir force had was to remove an obstacle That obstacle was the island of Pantelleria Pantelleria Pantelleria Pan- Pan and you remember what t happened to it It was flattened into surrender in two days Then the real effort began It followed a pattern which is pretty much the one accepted for invasions since The first step is the neutralization tion of the enemy air force and this is a ajob ajob ajob job nobody but an air force can do This means the destruction of airdromes airdromes airdromes air air- and other distant vital areas later providing fighter coverage coverage cov cov- for the beaches and for ship ship- ping The Germans had a thousand planes based on or near Sicily Thirty-one Thirty of the airdromes had been attacked in the preliminary phase for a month Rail communications communications Ii were bombed in order to I isolate Sicily as nearly as possible I Ithe ithe the sec second md in the list of the thc bombers bomb bomb- bomb I ers ens fun functions Messina was a chief target for it was a convenient rail I bottleneck Also the principal rail lines running down the boot of Italy were hit I Telephone exchanges and stations where radar sets were located were hit This is another thing the Germans Germans Germans Ger Ger- I mans taught us in their invasion of ol I 1 Poland and it explains what seemed to be some of the senseless bombings bombings bomb bomb- ings of the little Polish villages bomb I Radar and telephone exchanges were often set up in these villages I They were located by radio detec detec- tion I detec-I In Sicily itself the enemy bases had been so thoroughly destroyed that the Germans couldn't get enough of f the their planes ans in the air ir t to int inter inter- r-I r tere fere WIth wun the landings Also AISO the second second sec sec- sec 1 ond and third functions of the tactical were well carried carried car car- ried nod out namely the isolation of the I enemy forces from their supplies I and also interruption of movement of reinforcements The fourth function of the tactical bombers which is to break down the signal communications I referred referred referred re re- re- re to before destruction before destruction of telephone telephone telephone tele tele- phone and radio installations Ground Troop Support The fifth is the close support ol ot the ground troops This w was s achieved in Sicily with more success success success suc suc- cess than was fully realized at the time Some commanders of the landing landing landing land land- ing troops complained that there were no fighter planes over them Later some of these same commanders commanders commanders com com- manders when they advanced and saw the wrecked armored cars tanks and other equipment strewn along the roads realized that the enemy had been held back by bythe bythe bythe the attacks from the air In Sicily meanwhile troops were dropped behind the lines and this contributed its share to the success of the invasion We know how well airborne troops have operated in the Pacific theater and in Burma This job is listed as sixth in air forces tactical operations and includes carrying carrying carrying car car- of paratroopers paratroop rs running a shuttle of transports and towing gliders which land personnel and equipment the glider r pilot fights with the land forces since he cant can't glide uphill We now come to the last two functions functions of an air force less force less dramatic but highly important reconnaissance reconnaissance reconnaissance sance and the building of air bases In the Sicilian campaign a million million mil mu- lion photographs a month were made so that the commander of ol each landing unit had pictures ol of olevery every place he had to go to with his objectives plainly marked We know of the record time in which bases have been destroyed captured and reactivated in the Pacific theater of war war In New Guinea a bas base base- was taken built manned and put into complete operation a hundred miles from the nearest allied base and well behind the enemy lines Thus we see the scope of air force operations how closely they are knit into the operations of the land and sea forces and how the allies have achieved air supremacy in Europe But because air forces are areso areso areso so elastic they can be m massed suddenly suddenly suddenly sud sud- denly and therefore actual command command command com com- mand of the air is much harder to maintain At a given moment the Germans who certainly do not have air supremacy any longer might be beable beable be beI beable I able by heavy concentration and great sa sacrifice to achieve temporary temporary temporary tem tem- command of the air in a given locality The allies did have command of the air in Italy Otherwise Otherwise Otherwise Other Other- wise the beachhead at Anzio could never have been maintained As it was supplies and reinforcements could be landed in broad daylight On the German side no concentration tion of men or supplies could be attempted attempted attempted at at- tempted except at night The shadow of the has grown thin the weapon Hitler f I created to enslave the world has turned in hi his hand I |