Show Sel melba aa 1931 in bit all countries countr lea by the north american Newspaper New paper alliance off the AG 0 11 served scandinavian world rights re re to the production reduction in whole S service by CHAPTER LX cont aued tie third phase of the meuse ar gonne opera operations tiong began october 14 during the previous phase important gains had been made along the whole front i increasing intensity of resistance the retirement of the en emy in front of tl 11 e all es to the west which was being accelerated bv by our persistent gains in the east indicated clearly that he ft m as trying to sai save e him self from complete di sater which hibb it was as ardent that we should strive all the more vigorously to hasten tl TI e enemy s strong defenses in the B Bs Os de romagne and the bols bois de bantheville had to be reduced before burti er considerable progress could be made to the west of romagne heights we faced the strongly fortified position which included lote cote de chat illon landres st georges george st juvin bols bois des I 1 oges and granoli Gran opie e our attacks on the and in with gouraud s french fourth army met violent appo especially at the beginning and although ground was often taken and retaken several times our lines were mere steadily pushed forward eist east E of the meuse in the french seventeenth corps the sixty fifth brig ade edward edmard L king hing of the thirty third division had made some ress and the twenty ninth division despite the difficult terrain and severe casualties had entered woods north of Mol milleville leville farm the fifth division in the face of intense fire on its front and flanks on the reached the top of the slopes northeast of romagne and cleared the wood north of cunel bunel ele meets ments of the division pushed through to the northern edge of tt it e bois des rappes crappes but were mere withdrawn by dint of the superior de tion of our troops the enemy s lines were broken at a vital point by the fifth corps cote dame mane marie taken unstinted praise must be given the thirty second division which standing heava losses october 14 bril captured cote dame marle marie per haps the most importing Import int strong point of the hindenburg line on the w estern gestern front the town of romagne and the eastern half of bois de romagne Poin agne were also taken by this division on that day while on the foll following oming day its line was advanced about a mile to the southern gou thern edge of the bols bois de baethe ville the forty second divis on fought ag gres against the most obstinate defense forcing its way may through the w m estern half of bols bois de romagne its eighty fourth brigade douglas mac arthur scaling the precipitous heights he bights of the cote de chatillon and carrying its line on beyond that poci portion tion the desperate resistance on the left of the division south of st george and lan dres et st georges however could not be ON overcome the importance of these operations can hardly be overestimated the capture of the romagne heights especially its dominating feature cote dame marie was a decisive blow we now occupied the enemy s strongest fortified position on that front and flanked his line on the ainne and the heights of the meuse unless he could recapture the positions we me held our successes would compel the enemy to retreat from his lines to the north as we were within heavy artillery range of his railroad lines CHAPTER the pressure of the american army in the great meuse aleuse argonne offensive had profoundly impressed the enemy october 3 marshal von hindenburg HInden bum sent ent the following letter to the german germa chancellor the high command insists on its demand of september 29 for the immediate forwarding of an offer of peace to our enemies there Is now no longer any possible hope of forcing peace upon the enemy the situation grow grows more desperate every day and may force the high command to grave decisions the chancellor yielded and october 5 telegraphed through the swiss government to president wilson the german government requests the president of the united states to take in hand the restora tion of peace acquaint all bel balliger belll liger ger ent states with this request and invite theal them to send pleni poten clarles for opening negotiations it accepts the program set forth 1 ak x al 44 I 1 4 ir tw desperate fighting in me argonne by the pres dent in his message to congress january 8 and in his later addresses especially the speech of september 27 as a basis for peace negotiations with anith a view to avoiding fur ther bloodshed the german gov requests the immediate conclusion of an armistice on land and water and in the air S ined max prince von bedan imperial chant ellor the president presidents s reply was not satis factory to the german government and the ex exchange chane of notes continued until finally the bermans accepted the very frank ent by the president con keyed in a state department message october 23 that the nations of the world do not and cannot trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of german policy and abit the government of the united states cannot deal with any but able representatives of the german people who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of germany if it must deal with the military masters and the monarchial autocrats of germany now or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the german empire it must demand not peace negotiations but surrender Mean meanwhile hile with these peace stations in progress and with our ewt and allied offensive continuing to pro duce favorable results it became more and more evident that the time soon must come when we should have to consider terms and conditions under which hostilities might cecce the discussion of armistice terms in a gen eral way by the allies had in fact begun the enemy s most important deafen sive position on the romagne heights was in our firm possession and his final defeat was only a question of time he had fought desperately to hold his ground but had bad been corn com polled to give way steadily becore our effective blows we could have gone forward without special preparation and succeeded in driving the enemy from the field but the situation led to the conclusion that his defeat could best be accomplished by one powerful stroke by a well organized offensive the difficult and continuous often offen sive from september 26 had been very trying on our troops and had resulted in a certain loss of cohesion it was therefore deemed adv advisably isabl to take a few days for the replacement of tired troops the renewal of supplies and the improvement of coro com munica tl if ns french delay attack october 28 was tentatively besig bated tor for the beginning of the next general advance the fourth phase of the meuse argonne offensive but the french army which was to support our attach attack on the left could not get ready in time so the attack of both armies was fixed for november I 1 in accordance with my instructions on october 16 two important prelim inary operations were carried out dur ing this period 1 operations against the bols bois des loges and bols bois de bour bogne to clear the woods east of the aisne aasne and north of the aire and thus flank that part of the hostile line on the aasine and 2 local operations to secure a su table line of departure tor for the general attack during the meuse argonne battle my personal quarters were on my train which lay partially hidden in backof arta r alet jovo f k F ot o t ff beached oct a 08 fron IN each edby novi 1918 ix cc blunda bounda A eak nume r a e man vid ce e car edae anand whet of 2 brabant ea 14 do T f I 1 I 1 a the woods on a pur near souilly bouilly while there I 1 spent a portion of each ei h day at official headquarters giving dl di relations reLt lons ions regarding operations and I 1 ng other important questions I 1 usually occupied the rest of the day at the front in close touch with corps and divisions although I 1 had now rs relinquished ed the immediate command of the first army its activities and those of the second army carried out under my direction required cloe close super vision farther west our second corps read with the british fourth army was engaged october 17 south mouth of le gateau cateau in the battle of the selle this corps with the thirtieth lewis and twenty seventh 0 oryan ryan division in line from right to left crossed the selle river and advanced four miles in the face of strong resistance capturing 1000 1 COO prisoners and 12 guns tl TI e main objective e of our initial at tack september 26 had been reached fail fall ng to capture it in our first at tempt we had deliberately system at leally and doggedly stuck to the task in the face of many difficulties and discouragements CHAPTER the demands of incessant battle ha I 1 compelled our divisions to fight to the limit of their capacity troops were held in line and pushed to the attack until deemed incapable of further ef fort because of casualties or echaus uon don artillery once engaged was sel set dom withdrawn many batteries dougi t until practically all the animals were casualties leaving the guns to be to ved ted out of line by motor trucks or by hand oui men as a whole showed uarl fortitude in this continuous fighting during inclement weather and under many disadvantages of position consider armistice terms my diary records paris monday october 28 1918 met marshal foch and al at lied commanders at senlis denlis friday to consider terms of armistice petain s views were stiffer than mar haigs haig s and mine more gent than either have been laid up with grip since S saturday at the opening of the conference marshal foch said in substance you are doubtless aware amare that the germans are negotiating for an armistice through the intermediary of the amer lean government and declare them selves ready to accept the fourteen points of president wilson as a basis he went on to say that he had called us together to obtain our views and that he be thought the terms should be such as to render germany power pomer less to recommence operations in case hostilities are resumed one of his life officers then read aloud from a news paler the fourteen points defers to british and french foch then asked my opinion as to conditions that should be imposed and 1 I replied that as it was a latter of j creater concern to both great britain and frince than to the united states state and that as their armies bad had been en longer and had suffered more than ours I 1 thought it appropriate for sir douglas halg haig and general I 1 etain to express their views first marshal halg haig said in substance that the german army was far from being disintegrated and was still capable of 0 withdrawing to a shorter front and making a stand against equal or great er forces on tl it e otter ott er hand the al at I 1 e es were pretty well exhausted the total shortage of men for the british and french armies he said was about each with none available to fill the gap gape the american army array he further said was not yet complete and some time must elapse before it would be large enough to relieve the ing allied armies he thought the terms should be such that the ger mans would mould not hesitate to accept them tie lie then proposed immediate and complete evacuation of invaded belgian and french territory occupation by the allies of alsace lorraine and the fortresses of metz and strasbourg restitution of all rolling stock seized by the germans in france and bel glum or its equivalent and re patria tion of inhabitants of invaded terri tory marshal foch then asked my views I 1 replied in effect the general view that an armistice should provide guarantees against a resumption of hostilities give the al at lies a decided advantage and be un an favorable to germany in case hostila ties should be resumed meets with my approval I 1 think that the damage done by the war to the interests of the powers with which the united states la Is associated against germany has been so great that there should be no tendency toward leniency the present military situation Is very favorable to the allies the ger man forces since the be beginning inning of the counter offensive july 18 have been constantly in retreat and have not been able to recover since that time the condition of the french and brit ish armies can best be judged by the fact that they have been continuously on the offensive since then and find that they are now attacking with much vigor As to the american army the part acay scay farm it at 02 67 or 3 T 0 h farm t N SV W if ae v blanc it at ir 2nd deslon and brigade blanc mont oct 29 2 9 1918 ak front lines div slon boundary somme 2 of roll tell it has taken in the operations since july 18 has not been inconsiderable it Is constantly increasing in strength and training its staffs its services and its higher commanders have ina proved by experience so there I 1 Is I 1 ev ery reason to suppose that the american amerlean army will be able to take the part expected of it in the event of resumption of hostilities I 1 therefore propose I 1 evacuation of france and belgium within 30 days and of all other foreign territory occupied by germany without delay 2 withdrawal of the german armies from alsace lorraine and occupation of those territories by the allied armies 3 withdrawal of german ar to the east of the rhine and and the possession of such bridgeheads on the eastern side in the rhine by the allies as may be nee essary to insure their control of that river 4 unrestricted transportation of the american army and its ma aerial across the seas 6 5 immediate repatriation of all nationals of foreign territory now or heretofore occupied during the war by germany 0 surrender of all U boats and U boat bases to the control of a neutral power until their disposition Is otherwise determined 7 return to france and bel glum of all railroad rolling stock that has been seized by germany germant from those countries TO BK rz 3 b |