Show jeneral 0 aral P 30 1 r S his ane cje 19 rom 0 of f I 1 the h 0 OF 0 1931 in all 11 II countries by t th he north american Rewe paper alliance wo world ald bil Sc reserved including the th scandinavian in whole ot or in palt service john jan J per pershing inq CHAPTER XI continued the attack of the beconi brench breath army although made astride the river was directed principally against hill mort homme and both famous in the struggle of 1410 1916 to destroy the wire entanglement and demolish trend cs es as a tion against I 1 leavy eavy lossis lie it e intro assault wis was lie receded eded hy by f ur lus continuous bomb aid ald rel i dively if tie e am lint tint of al tillery anini anim i dialon exi extended ended exceeded tl at of any previous engagement its value bein bacina as I 1 remember it some rome 00 hie 1 lie prop artion of tl it e art I 1 11 I 1 ry t f ne re as compared to the infantry Infant rv in this battle was as eleven to ten 1 e fir ing attained such precision ani an 1 volume that tl it e fernian cerman tro ps in tl if e forn forward ard positions were ere sul i arged an aa the attack li g infantry reached most of its objectives by nii ni nightfall I cfall the fit alist t dav day making an advance of five kilometers and ca capturing COW pris nira the sector alere wl ere the french attick took place was to have a ir in fit terest for me before the end f tie tl e war ily my headquarters heid quarters as commander com minder of the first army one year later mccu pled the b in tl en ell used by major general at and the line reached by a tr ps in the battle became our jump oft off I 1 ne tie ti ila the meuse arg battle in fact every foot of the ground covet el in this inspection ft ith general I 1 etain became associated later with ameri amerl cas greatest effort in the war petain a Cont contact ct va liable after visiting tl ti e I 1 rench li it stalla eions and tie manifold activities car ried on behind this front with the sh fi ft ing masses of con bat troops ni at d tl e thousands engaged in the services ol 01 supply and transportation it seemed quite improbable that we should bp be able to marshal a sufficient army in time to replace tl it e french on this afroz froit t before J I 1 found it most agreeable as ab vell anell as instructive to be with pet aln in tl ti I 1 intimate way and I 1 ave an anity fo hear romett ing of his expert ence H s discussion of tl tie e defense rf f N V eldun in which he be played an in por tant part beg second in cornand coan and was especially entertaining As we drove about Is t e spoke of the courage of his troops and of the tremendous losses they had sustained he po anted out the vast nast amount of roid work including the vole lole sacree from bir ledue ie due to verdun rebuilt under his direction for the constant movement of large bodies of troops and sip s applies plies necessary to maintain tl e defense in lighter vein its 1 Is comments on french politicians during this trip were mere amusing if not always campli and he congratulated me many times on being so far removed from political interference one after noon the conversation drifted to paint ing and he be aske asle I 1 me how many times I 1 had sat for my portrait ait alt several times already I 1 said the last oue one which was very good was done by a distinguished artist by the name of jonas english nn glish jonah for I 1 Il lustra oon lion immediately he said dont don t let thena them pi blish it I 1 don t do it I 1 avery officer whose p by jonas haa has appeared in thit journal has been re llevad from h s command not that I 1 am superstitious quite the contrary but I 1 imn edrit elv for bade the publication of the portrait and to this diy daiy it I 1 is cis never appeared bu ids id up frenzi morale from the time of nivelles Ni velles failure in april tie tt e depression in the french armies hid bid so greit that I 1 4 11 5 av V f all e S r yanks learning to use the bayonet who succeeded him had been content simply to hold the trenches tren trend cles es and no french offensive operation of consequence had been attempted until this one I 1 rom the moment of his assign anent retain began to build up tl it e shattered morale of his armies and probably no otter oti er officer in france could have performed the task so well nell petain s immense success in the de bense of verdun had find won for him tl tie e confidence of tl it e army and the coun try and yet he remained the sin e modest unassuming character consist ent and conservative he peri perl at a q better than any other understood the temperament of the I 1 crenna soldier t wj ii whom he I 1 ai at died with infinite patience and tact CHAPTER XII in view of the gravity of our ton nage s tuat n it was ras I 1 imbor tant that it be brought forcibly to the atter tion of the allies AI at the appi ill ing inter allied conference on sl clig I 1 cabled NN washington ashington augus angus 24 21 iian in I 1 tart art as follows folio vs tl TI e I 1 and especially the P rend I 1 lave a v e i ea ea ed ab of blute ute 11 lint it t of at in power ail at I 1 any auen er tation if heir air mil tat tjay y forte force cannot be exi expected acted ira im I 1 prat ve s e listen 0 ir oi g an I 1 trian tr aln i g so tl if dt at we will I 1 ave th the e ti 01 cis s 41 t naemi y ur project li it bur eur pe for active by ma ala 0 ii it ne tie M 11 1 I epry es f all es on land lana sl st out I 1 he gly re nf reed I 1 v con I 1 pe pel I 1 div PS es and desi ru tion U aloit I 1 oat b sos ses acs acion oil I 1 11 I 1 shed if poss ble illel 11 blitsh arny olli cers c n lemn waiting policy british idair alt aati aiti in view of gravity of st ii 11 I 1 ng i estion recon mend our govern ment insist upon ve p I 1 cy by combined british ai at d Ai 41 merican nivie our pos tion in this verv ner stion strong all es no v fully lecog n ze dependence leperi dence upon our co oper tion aid ai d NN we e need not I 1 eb tate de nand b al tl naval policy and full share co n ercyal sl si dipping end american representative shipping con ference be instructed accord n angly ly U S adv sed sod on powder eds e ds a study by a joint biech and sod american commission of tl it e lu fuestion estion of production of p aders at aid d exi esil I 1 sil es in I 1 ranee rance sa s1 slowed owed tl if it the gi eater part of the raw material must be imported and that due to the sh rh pi ing situation france in decem her ber would produce only about lilt ol 01 tie current output it was vms apparent appi rent therefore that to ainold calamity the united states must not only turn furn sh powder and explosives for all of its own forces but must supply about half tl it e french requirements and the war department v was as so aan advise ise I 1 by this ar arr rangen angenent ent a fat laige ge g of t anage would be effected as tie weight of raw materials was ten t twenty times tl at of the f gisl ed prod duct As nitrates for it U e m e of powder and explosives had to be sported from U chilt ill the h izard t sl I 1 ili it g would woul d be reduced by avoid an old n D the long haul to france at hi ili ns Us of collars were expended in the construe tion lion of plants at home in an attempt to produce nitrates but none had beet turned out before the end of the war dawes mode supply ch ef of in view of the incerta nty of obtain ing more than a limited amount of ocean tonnage it was as natural tl if at we e should procure abroad as large a pro portion of supplies as poss ble and our supply began at orce t male inquiries to meet the demand for construction material subsisted subs istel ce stares and engineering equlia n eni ent many sources of general supply tad ind been developed by the french aid va we e soon found ourselves not only in cot ton i petition with them and tl ti e british bu our d efferent departments also began to bid against each oti oil er to my mind the solution seemed to be merely a matter of co ordination tl TI I 1 established a pure purchasing basin board to consist of one or more depre senta tives of eich service biking p ir chases of any sort including the I 1 lei e I 1 cross and Y at C A aleut col cot charles G dawes sev ente entee euth nth engineers well known as a i in of large business exl ex was ii 0 ap HS if tie heid of thia this beald the members oi 01 which were to meet together and make leonn n their respect tive needs neds ind then agree among them selves as to where and by which department part ment such purchase pur clase was to be made thua thus mutually assisting instead of competing with ith each ether other under tl it e adrai gement operation cooperation co with the french was estat I 1 sted slued st ed and the agency became increase angly effective la in liau hall dl ill ng our procurement activities couldn coulden t depend on french R R s tie use uge of railways for the moi move e m nt of troops ard supplies had never before attained rna such artl is as in tre IN world orld war and there was u n service except sea transportation upon AA A A ut adale aira efa ai NN alich I 1 ach we placed zi aleater eater da et lence tor for our success it was ras ai at arent that we coul coull I 1 not nol depend on tie anith ath it gie t risk of f at a crit critsil e it moi mot ei et I 1 and it was e evident went tl if at if we exi ejected acted the n iii um ef effic filet lei cy ey in tl it is service we must provide ur own oan personnel a well ell as additional and cars all to be as fir as practicable under american management niam gement na ith this plan in view con progress had been n ade toward b it 1 I procurement and organization by lol of onel and complete estimates tor for roll ng dg stock and construction at ports terminals and yards yard an accurate survey of building and equipment requirements had been mi ini m i ie le under his direction by maj W J wilgus formerly vice president of the new york aft afterward after vard errard a colonel who hid id been a member of the I 1 ar sons board tl TI ese eboli ates without change served as a pen pert guide for milivay nil vay construction plans and material creation of transportation corps As co coordinate ordinate vv with ith the pr cu rement and 0 of mitella m and equipment quip ment we with the vital question of 0 n f r operation and n anagan ent b but U t we hid no in the regular service f sufficient ident exi ermence in railway man argement to insure success TI aref re the e evid id it i t eo co arse to purs ie t to 0 which tl if e i rece lent of both british and I 1 i ench po anted n ted I 1 tl I 1 e div wit was s to brei breite te a transportation corps immediately Z x 14 11 gen W W atterbury ui der the direction of some man of outstanding reputation in the railroad world orld in accordance with the auriell ie le of obtaining the most competent men for important positions the following cable was v as sent july 29 00 have made thorough study of rail road situation and am convinced that petition of railroads must be under man with lare large experience exper ence in manag ing railroads at home successful I 1 an fling our ralli rallied oid lines so important that ablest men in country should be selected after almost disastrous re suits with inexperienced in gitary men running ra inroads british selected ablest man could find to have charge transportation question I 1 e e mainly one of physical operation and management in intimate relation with french who retain gen eral control which Is necessary to I 1 andle ord nary commend com il it traffic question of railroad transportation of course involves an ent amainte i ance and new neu construction at front as army advances ad vinces and should be cally independent del department artmont al a though nominally un ler ter eng I 1 ailman allman chosen should be sent here without delay together with three or four able assistants of his own selee aton later on it Is believed these men sl 1 be given appropriate military rant rank in cieply the war department rec en ell ed W W atterbury then bell u eral maniger manager and now pres dent of tt I 1 enn sylvania railroad tor for the pi ice let and I 1 immediately requested that he be seat sent to france CHAPTER XIII tie tl e roost most important question that confronted us in tie tl e preparation of ur forces of citizen soldiery for effi dent clent service fee was training axcel t for the spanish american war nearly twenty years before actual comb it es ex per peri lence ence of the regular irmy had been limited to the independent action of minor conin it Is in tl it e I 1 nes ties ind to two expeditions into mexico each with forces smaller than a in d ern american divisi n the wort I 1 war involved the han citing of i lasses where even a d vision was relatively a snail unit it was ene one thing tl tt call 1000 1 or 2 WO men to the colors and qu te another thing to transform them into an or instructed army capable ot of meeting and holding its own in bittle against the best trained force in eu rope with rith three years actual war ex per ence to its cred t A general ach me of schools for th stir A E R t k wis w is I 1 repaired by the opera lions and tra ning section but in order that this instruction should he be as its corn com and uniform as poss pos sille ble ind al at the same time be co with other activities I 1 declare I 1 that tra iran n ing should ibe ibe handled by officers 1 atu I u could dei devote ote their entire tin fill e to it an additional section of tie tl e lead 1 headquarter ead quarter staff therefore was e etibo t ihl sled sl ed called the training section to function unde a y pe bonal ul direction AS chief of tl tj is section col cot paul B mat ne wd wao chosen with col cot H B E ake as bis his assistant the british methods of teace in trench warfare pealed a to me very stron strong gl tl TI ey tau dauel t tl it e r men to 1 re e agi dessive and unberto it to I 1 erbec them in ili hand to 0 o han ban I 1 figl ling with I 1 lionet grenade and lager A tain amount tl it is iq k nd of trilling ning was as ame suy to stimulate the maiale f troops by giving tl e a confidence lu in thir th ir ann pers orni prowess tt TI the k I 1 edness of sir douglas hag flag we were fortunate birly in our exper ence to baa have e assigned to us meat gen it 11 II k butler and oil er officers of tie tl e british army to assist in this individual training later on several french and brit arh officers also niso came to lecture at a number of our schools e found d however in using these allied instructors in that the I 1 rench and to 0 o a large extent tt it e Brt british ind 1 ad practically settled down to the c nv cletion tl at developments since 1914 1014 hid bid changed the principles of warfare loth I 1 eld that new con 11 eions in tri posed by trench fighting had rendered pravio is conceptions of train ing more or less obsolete and that art preparation pa ration for open warfare no long er was necess decess iry try french publications and manuals were generally in accord with tl it Is tl it eory if the I 1 rench reach doctrine had pr pre vallel evalle I 1 our instruction would have been limit ed to a brief period of training for trench fibbing fish ting A new army brought up entirely on such principles would han have e been seriously I 1 handicapped landi andi capped with out the protection of the trenches it would probably have lacked the ag gress i ei er ess to break through the enemy s lir it es and tt it e knowledge of how to carry on thereafter it was evident that the victory could not be wun by the costly process of at brition but that we should have to drive arlie the enemy out into the open and engage him in a war of movement in st ruction in open warfare was baerd ba ed upon individual ard group resourcefulness and tactical judgment which were vere of equal advantage in trench warfare tl TI we took decided issue with the allies and without neglect ing thorough preparations for trench vi at tare fare undertook to train |