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Show I i " 1 I When France Held Verdun LWhen tho German attack beforo Verdun developed to Its true propor-tions, propor-tions, General Joftre and the French high command practically as a unit advocated tho abandoning of Verdun. Not only did they advocate this, but precisely as Field Marshal French issued tho orders for tho withdrawal from Yprcs in tho First Ilattlo of Flanders, JofTro is holloved to havo ordered 'the retreat from Verdun, and to his orders Is attributed tho loss if Douaumont, which naturally but as it turned out, erroneously convinced tho Germans that Verdun was about to fall Into their hands. Joffro's reasons wero perfectly plain. To retreat for a few miles to straighten tho lino and abolish tho valient, was to surrender a city that had no present military value, to glvo over a point which was difficult to hold which was, In fact an Invitation In-vitation to attack and to attack under un-der the most favorable circumstances circumstanc-es for the assailant. To give up Ver-dun, Ver-dun, now under the tcrrltlc flro of tho most extensive artillery concentration concen-tration tho world evar had seen, was to glvo ovor a few miles of French territory that and nothing more. In tho present trench war It is only tho piercing of tho lino that counts. In September tho French had made an advanco of two or threo miles In Champagne, In May and Juno they had scored similarly In Artols, In April of 1915, tho Germans Ger-mans had dono tho samo thing about Yprcs; but theso successes had been 'without morrow, becauso tho lines behind had held. To keep Verdun meant to spend many thousand lives, to loso It meant from tho military standpoint just nothing, sines tho hills south of Verdun wero quito as sultablo for defensive operations. They wero bo-yond bo-yond tho reach of tho German heavy artillery, ns It was then In position and behind these hills tho French could concentrato artillery and men In sufficient quantity to meet tho German concentration, which would havo to bo moved forward over several sev-eral miles to reach the ,ncw front. ThuB for many days Paris and London believed that Verdun -would bo ovacuatcd and Berlin, doubtless knowing tho French point of view, steadily insisted upon the npproach-lng npproach-lng fall of tho town. Up read the German statements and official communiques com-muniques and you wlll,flnd n confl-lgfft. confl-lgfft. denco which is patently not merely Bf mans believed that they wero about to tako Verdun becauso they know that tho French high command did not mean to defend It to tho last ditch. Rut French high command did not havo its way. Ono hears much in history of tho evil consequences of tho Intcrforenco with tho soldLer for which tho politician Is responsible Conceivably, tho caso of Vordun may provo ono example of tho wisdom of tho politician and tho Inferior Judgment Judg-ment of tho soldier. At all events, tho French statesmen, tho Prlmo Minister, members of tho Cabinet, members of tho two branches of the Legislature promptly appreciated tho political as contrasted with tho military mili-tary aspects of Verdun. They recognized recog-nized what tho effect upon tho world would bo of a shining Gorman success suc-cess of a success that would shlno because, whatever tho military fact, tho civil legend concerning Verdun mado of it a Gibraltar. Thcro was then a sudden crisis a real crisis In tho political Hto of tho Republic .Tho civilian government said to, tho military, Verdun must bo defended; it must bo defended becauso be-causo its value, Us moral valuo, Is Incalculable To tills opinion the military mil-itary mind yielded, It is said, becauso General do Cnstelnnu, tho second in commnnd, finally camo to sco tho situation as tho politicians saw it. As n result, do Cnstelnau went to Verdun. Tho man who had saved Nnncy undertook at tho eloventh hour to save Verdun and ho succeeded. succeed-ed. With him lw took Retain who will always bo remembered In tha Trench history as tho actual defender defend-er of Verdun. At Verdun, soldiers and ambulanco drivers alike told mo- cf tho electrical electric-al effect of tho coming of theso two men. For several days tho crowds of Inhabitants of tho villages hnst-ily hnst-ily evacuated as tho German adanco was pushed and clogged the roads. Men said tq ono another, "Cost la rctrnlto" This means retreat, llut suddenly there wnB an end of retreat; re-treat; the lines held. Tho famous Twentieth Corps, tho Iron Corps of so ninny great achievements, arrived. arriv-ed. Men, munitions, guns and still more guns arrived. At tho end of ten days tho lmmedinto peril was over, tho Hrst furious drive had failed fail-ed before Verdun, ns tho French nt-tncks nt-tncks had failed in Artol8 and Cham-pngno Cham-pngno a J ear beforo. Prisoners, .positions, .po-sitions, guns the Germans had captured. cap-tured. 'Their local triumph was quito as great as that of tho French In the picccdlng September, but tho French had only been compelled to shorten their lines, as tho British had been forced to shorten their lines nbout Ypres after the ga8 attack in the previous spring. American Ilevlow of Reviews. |