Show Ce beneral ueral aloe r shiu I 1 qs V S slora ROL 0 alte e A E F 11 II b th nonh world id n forai Ol lOral I 1 ah 1 reiT 4 i idin th 61 1 alrod alon la in who or la in P pirt rt p h t L V L i ti t i i jolin john J pershing inq S rak CHAPTER continued replying april 3 to the depart mento cable I 1 emphasized th tant at it was not intended that our units should re place the losses of british or french organizations and therefore our artillery should be held field in readiness to tollow when tian called for although it was P possible that the altun situation tion might become so serious that some of our infantry units will be forced to serve with british temporarily my bly intentions were further Ind indicated leat by saying americans must not lose sight of tile purpose to build up divisions and corps of their own and also abio we roust must avoid the ten tendency denry tu to incorporate our infantry into british divi divisions blons where tt it will be used up and never relieved sly my cable recommended that the infantry of two divisions be sent by british shipping and two by our own but that present plans plana should go g no further than this it was my purpose not to become too deeply involved in ili an agreement that would make it tin possible later to form our own inde pendent force under our own officers CHAPTER secretary baker and I 1 had find frequent ly discussed the question of a supreme allied commander com mauder and wo we were both ready to accept it in principle when in response to a notice from pro ire aler clemenceau I 1 went april 3 to to meet with tile the supreme war council arriving early colonel boyd and I 1 had to wait an hour at tile the hotel do da villa before M 31 clemenceau and lloyd george came into the conference room Al arshal haig general foch retain Iet aln sir henry wilson allson bliss and myself were the others participating brigadier general spiers noted acted as interpreter and col sir mon rice ll ankey who usually accompanied mr lloyd george its as recorder the mating ma tang was finally called to order by M W Clemenc clemenceau enu who stated its purpose saying in substance e have como come together to settle a very simple question regarding tile the functions of general foch I 1 think wo we are all in ili agreement as to the coordination of allied action but there is some difference in the understanding of general cochs powers as aa conferred upon it him im nt at the doullens Doul lens lons con ference of march 20 general foch will explain his difficulties 11 foch calls call for action general then set met forth briefly hla his situation as follows tile tho powers conferred by the he doul lens lena conference were wera limited to tile the ordination coordination co of at action between the allies whey they were conferred while the action ana on the power to coordt co elate bate line haa been construed to be limited to the time the allies were in action that waa march 20 nt at doullens Doul lens now wt we are at april 3 now that the two opposing armies are no longer in action but have topped stopped and tire are facing each other there to la nothing to co ordinate there bo be auth authority to prepare for notion and direct it it so we are right back where we were and nothing can be done until tin an action starts again lloyd george georga pleads pleada for unity mr lloyd george then entered the discussion saying substantially we have had more than three years of thin war and we have not had unity of action during that time during SEA nieuport flo fl o ghent aoki k N YS el tia zebro aulle dehun mom 0 ground gained by german offensive aprile april 9 2619 S 9 aa g ao miles 1 the last year we have had two kinds of 0 strategy une one by hall llala and another by retain both different and nothing has haa b ben been en gained tile the only thing that was accomplished was by general nivelle Nl velle when he was in supreme supreme command general foch Is now empowered to ordinate coordinate co the action of the allied armint but this does docs not go 50 tar far enough as be has no authority to control except by conferring with the respective spec tive commanders in chief ile he wants authority to prepare for action I 1 think tile the resolution made at doul lens should be modified so that we may have a better understanding understand ln I 1 should like to hear what general bliss and general pershing faveto say ay pershing gives give his view 11 1 I then gave my view which was set forth in a brief memorandum prepared prepare tl in pencil after the discussion began as follows the principle of unity of command ta U undoubtedly the correct one tor for the allies to follow I 1 do not believe behave it la Is possible to have unity of action without a supreme commander W bare already had bad experience enough in trying to ordinate coordinate co the op of crat era tlona lons of the allied armies without success there hua has never been real unity of action such lucli co orall nation between two or three armies Is impossible no nia matter tt r who the commander in chief may ita be commander in chief Is Inter esteil in his own army and cannot get the other oilier point of view nor doi grasp the problem as a whole I 1 am in favor of a supreme commander nud believe that the success of the allied cause depends upon it 1 I think the necessary action should be anken by this council at once I 1 nut in favor of conferring tile the supreme command upon general foch when I 1 hail had finished mr lloyd george came over to where I 1 sat took roe me by the hand and said 1 I agree fully with general big this Is well put after some further informal discussion a draft of the resolution was submitted which omitted reference to the american army whereupon I 1 called to the oversight say ing 1 I think this resolution should in elude clude thu the american army the arrangement Is to ile be in force na as I 1 understand it from now DOW on and the american army will soon boon be ready to function as aa such ond and should be included as tin an entity like the british and french armies therea The ralls Is no american army yet RR na such general retain interjected ass as its units are either in training or are amalgamated with the british and anc french pershing has U 8 included thero there may not be tin aa american army to la force functioning now I 1 re plied piled but there soon will be and I 1 want this resolution to apply to ll it when tt it becomes a fact the amerl can government la Is represented here at this conference and in the war and any action as aa to the supreme command that includes the british and french armies should also include the american army the foregoing account of the conference may not be an exact record of the language used but it Is given as my uld aid took it down tile following resolution was then rend and adopted foch Is charged by tile the british french and american governments with the lie ordination coordination co of the action of the allied armies on the western front to tills end there Is conferred on film all the power necessia necessary essit ry for its ita effective realization to t the lie same end tile the british F rench french an and d american governments confide in gen era eral foch the strategic direction of military operations tile the commanders in chief of the british french and american armies will exercise to tile the fullest extent tile the tactical direction of their armies each commander in chief will have the right to appeal to his government if la in his opinion hla his army Is placed la in danger by the instructions received from geneval general foch allied commander in chief the idelt of via an allied commander in chief had been suggested and discussed many times aut for various reasons political andl and otherwise it had never been definitely adopted by the supreme war council with the distrust that existed esl among the allies it was not easy to bri bring ng about thede claton in favor of a su all preme commander and it wua made possible only by the extreme emergency of the situation the designation ot of general foch as commander tn in chief of the allied armies in france was proposed by the french april 15 1 received a letter from M Clemence all advising me that mr air lloyd george had approved the suggestion and asked tf it I 1 agreed 1 replied in a personal note expressing my agreement abject to the continuation ot of president wilson which came april 17 one once the question of 0 supreme command was settled tile the mordi coordinated co tinted en erdies of the allied armies could be directed with maximum effect toward a common end while dark days were still ahead we were spared the chagrin of inefficiency through lack of teamwork CHAPTER now that the supreme effort must be made on our part anti and when unita were sorely needed tor for immediate al ac five service it was found much to my surprise eliat although the divisions then coming to france franca had been under training for six months or even more they still contained a larke large percentage of untrained men As already pointed out the general staff when called upon to provide men for special services vices had relied upon taking them front from combat divisions instead of anticipating such requirements and segregating these specialists from the start and training them as buell this was a most vicious application in time of war of a very objectionable practice that had fiad grown up in our army in time of pence it t appears that during the preparation of our armies in ili the world war no other plan wa was followed and the practice was carried to such such an extent that divisions with tay hay men which should have been held intact and each one perfected as an zeil team were constantly called upon to sent send large groups of their trained to other duties inspects available divisions in view of their possible early employment I 1 wanted especially to look into the general state of of our available divisions and give some per personal instructions about training going the rounds I 1 met general clr batter who was one of the able french generals and found him very enthusiastic about tile the second which had find been in line at under his ls command comm mid confirming my own opinion formed from observation and re W oaf A aw q Z the red cross was anthe job ports lie he sold said that without doubt it was then ps s eff efficient lelent as any of his french divisions the first was waa further ther advanced than any of tile the others and its morale was high at the prospect of going into the battle line recent developments had brought the question of the employment of american troops into immediate consideration the presidents qualified approval of the recommendation of the supreme war council as embodied in joint note no 18 was seized upon by the allies and construed as a s a concession for the unlimited absorption of our troops in their armies no doubt my offer to general foch tent lent encouragement to the allied view on the day of secretary Secret nry bakers departure general whigham and general came over from the british war office to discuss arrangements for transportation of american troops in ili accordance with tile the provisions of joint note no 18 the conversation indicated that tile the british understood we were to send men per month to train with them and that they were bringing over the same number making a total of per month beginning with april they held that the approval of note no IS 18 had superseded agreements previously made including the six division plan baker speaks plainly the british conferees entirely ignored tile specific condit condition lon that the ilia final arrangements as to training and disposition of all our units were to lie he left in it my hands their error was pointed out and mr baker then said ahat V ll 11 a t Is pertinent to the present discussion dis x ia s lo 10 ti Is that american troops are going to the british for training I 1 dont want th british public or army or the french public or op army to get ou an exaggerated iden idea that tills this scheme provides or will provide a means by which their losses will be made up in tile the future 1 I want no feeling of disillusionment men t when lien general pershing calls for briw the troops aps ops In trusted to them for training mr bakers visit to our armies during this critical period was fortuitous as the problems that confronted us could then he be seen in their true perspective spec tive tie he had an opportunity to meet the allied leaders both civil and mill military tary and get in touch with conditions in ili the different countries of 0 still greater importance he saw with his own eyes the building of our organization lie ile was it a keen observer with clear understanding and a logical mind and obtained in it a short titue time tin an accurate conception of our task and its As to our relations he pave gave me from the start that strong and sympathetic c support which means so much to a military commander in the field bell feared british were lagging before mr air baker sailed for home I 1 had sent hint him the letter quoted below and although we later discussed its contents briefly it Is given as showing the reaction ot at least part of the british press at tile the time april 6 5 1018 1918 dear mr ir secretary I 1 noticed tile the other day that one ona of the british papers in referring to tile filet fact that plans had been made to send american troops to wo th 0 assistance of tho the allies stated that this would re bileve the tha british of the necessity of depleting the strength of the forces kept at home for or defensive purposes this suggests to my mind a certain political phase of the british situation which may give us additional explanation as to rohy mr lloyd george and british representatives are as e urgent in their appeals for assistance from america following this further may I 1 suggest that flint you gle give the matter serious thought there Is so very much at stoke for us that it seems to me very frank representations be made to the government as to the urgency of their putting ginto into the army every possible man inan that can be mustered to meet the immediate emergency it may he be that you would think it adv advisable Isble 1 to RO go to london or else to intimate to the president by cable the urgency of great britaina Brit ains putting into the ranks every possible mail to withstand the present gernian onslaught evin even if they have to promise to withdraw them in sax months and of their doing so without iv uniting alting on us or counting on us its in the slightest degree there will mill be few enough men even een etli with the best we all can do 10 it will be time enough for grent great britain to eon consider sider the defense of england after she has put forth every possible energy on the continent here Is the place to bent germany and not on british soil in writing this I 1 have in mind what you told mo me available men in england CHAPTER on april 12 1918 washington reported a Inc increase rense in cargo tonnage by the use of dutch ships infantry and cuchine kun gun pers personnel onnal of four our divisions were promised for tb that at men month fit the allies alliea were at last thoroughly it live alive to the necessity of an extraordinary effort to provide tonnage for OP transporting trans our troops after months of delay and discussion they realized fully that the superiority of forces vitally necessary to avert defeat must come from across the atlantic america had become their sole reliance not only for the forces necessary to save from defeat but for unlimited financial aid as well mr bakers firsthand first hand knowledge of the situation in france enabled him to give a fresh impetus to the efforts of if the war department with gen peyton 0 march as chief of staff the general afaf fland the supply departments began to exert more energy the |