Show admi J L JF X 1 0 O q X story aur i the ah As A E F copyright 1 in 11 II 11 by th 11 north th A ainah 1 by assi general WS ripp ri pp alleane Al world wid righta rfd frfd t d ty 1 adl g th the 8 adt I bip d 1 la abol bw bohia wn J it or la in put prohibited u 5 16 W ts pershing CHAPTER continued As the situation in which we found ourselves regarding artillery ammunition was approaching a crisis it became necessary to lay jay the whole question before tile the munitions board after a full investigation of their resources both tile french and british concluded they could undertake to meet our requirements with the distinct understanding tin aernt an ling that their plants must be greatly increased in ap p and that we fili should furnish rw materials promptly the late gen tasker 11 II bliss chief of the war department general staff represented us in the allied conference and reported results and agreements reached ile ho had bad brought the latest data dat t I 1 from home and his knowledge con berning steel and munitions enabled him to give file valuable assistance to my chief of ordnance in our efforts to find a solution to the difficult munitions problem A letter from secretary of war baker dated september 10 had only recently been received and gave gaie mo me an idea of some of ills his problems lu in part he wrote as follows 1 I am especially concerned vint that our troops should not be engaged in actual fighting in france until they ure there in such numbers and have made such thorough peep preparation their first appearance will be encouraging both to their own morale and to the spirit of our people here I 1 think it goes oes without saying that tile the germans will make a very special effort to strike swiftly and strongly against any part of the line which we undertake to defend in order to be able to report to their people encouragingly about our participation and also with the object of discouraging our soldiers and our people as much as possible in the matter of selecting corps and division commanders I 1 constantly feel that I 1 ought to have your advice and judgment from all that you have said supplemented by all I 1 have learned elsewhere the need for young and physically strongmen strong men Is apparent and I 1 am perfectly willing to go any limit in meeting this requirement it will of course necessitate passing over a substantial number of our older generals who are very eager to go to franco france and who in their own ideas and that of the country have certain right to be preferred but their occupation here in the training of troops Is of course a valuable can contribution trib ution to the cause and whenever I 1 can feel sure in the selection of the younger man that he actually has the capacity to develop to a sufficient lelent ex tent to justify lila lils being preferred to ft A roan man of greater experienced experienc eI 11 shall not hesitate mobilizing of army delayed in view of the emergency that was so clearly set forth by the joffre anti and balfour missions when they visited the united states and which was can confirmed after my arrival in france ant and reported with nil all emphasis I 1 have hae never been able to understand the un necessary rec essary delay caused by waiting six months tor for the construction of large cantonments canton ments before calling out men and assembling them tor for training of course it was particularly urgent that the specialists and laborers needed in france to build up our facilities should have been provided as fast as they could be profitably employed but nothing should have postponed tile the immediate mobilization of the combat units of the regular army and the national guard CHAPTER axi the units of the twenty sixth division maj oen gen clarence edwards commanding began to arrive the latter part ot of september continued during october and the early part of november and were now assembled in the billeting area near I 1 inspected the division november 11 1017 and found the various organizations presented a very creditable appearance the officers seemed alert and military and the personnel pea onnel looked strong and vigorous their instruction st had bad been carried out under the direction of brigadier general traub one of the brigade commanders and seemed to be well advanced the probable situation as aa to man power tn in which the allies would find themselves in the spring was causing much solicitude solicit uge the germans had captured aliga in september keren ekys power was at an end and tile bolshevik government was established with lenin and in control the situation was such that russia had become entirely negligible as aa far as assistance to the allies was concerned an analysts analysis of the possible strength of the contestants showed allowed that oer ger many would be able to spare a considerable number of divisions from tile the brusslan Ilus sian front careful study by my start staff in operation cooperation co with the allied staffs had led to tile the conclusion that thai her total number tn in the lite west by spring would be as aa many as not counting the po possibility so of the added strength of forty eight divisions frona from austria the greatest number the allies could muster according to estimates estlin atea would be IGO divisions counting two anted amerl can itty could not be counted on to do more than barely hold tier her own e even v ea with the help of the eleven allied divisions then on that front other american divisions might possibly be in europe by may alay 1 I it if they should arrive according to schedule which was doubtful but they would be too late to participate in the expected early spring campaign at tile the low rate ot of arrival we should not have more than half of the twenty one divisions promised by the war department ready for service by june outcome depended on america lu in this war where the battle lines extended across entire countries and in which the qualities of the opponents were about equal the aspect largely resolved itself into n consideration of the number and location of divisions on art either side bide the situation was nas of such a diameter character vial it was a question which side could provide the superiority of forces nee necessary to success in other words the outcome would depend upon tile the nuni her of troops that america could send over all eyes yere were on the eastern front to allied statesmen the collapse of russia meant possible grave political consequences to the alie allied command ers it forecast the release of divisions and the increase in the enci enemas nys ranks in belgium and northern france to a preponderance that could not be overcome to us its it indicated a race between americas best effort to pour our fighting men into france and germanas germanys Germ anys best determination mi nation to crush the allies before our soldiers could arrive lit in sufficient lelent nuni nuin hers bers to dominate the battlefield faced defeat with allies our estimates of the shipping for troops and supplies as set forth in tile the plan by which a due proportion of combat and line of communication troops were to form such increment of six divisions would require by june 1 for the shipment of twenty four dl di visions a total of over tons no one seemed to know where wt we were to obtain the tons of shipping in addition to the CWON tons tona we were then supposed to be using it appeared almost certain then that should disaster befall the allied armies that under these conditions we would have to go down with them I 1 always felt certain however abal tonnage could be found tor for our purpose if tile necessary pressure were exerted to force it into use appeals were made continuously and perets bently in an effort to get action on this vital question but several months elapsed before it really came taken as a whole the apparently slow progress ot of our preparation in europe also caused considerable adverse comment it if not dismay almonr the allies inquiries were made dl directly by the military and civil officials as to why we did not move more rapidly to which the reply was always wilys lack of shipping 11 new british offensive immobilized by the mud of flanders where british attacks had continued intermittently from the end of july to the middle of november with rather excessive losses the british commander in chief turned to a more southerly portion of his line for the final offensive of the year choosing the cam brat front on which to launch the effort careful preparations including the concentration of fin an unusual number of tanks were made to insure a break through tile the defenses the tanks and the infantry were to make an opening through which the cavalry was to pass and attack the flanks of the enemy then french troops held in readiness la in the vicinity were to follow As to the question of command of these combined forces when both should become encased it was to be left to the senior general officer in the vicinity who might be either cither french or british lit in going over these blansit pans plan sIt lt seemed to me that their idea ot of securing operation cooperation co after the french should begin part participation I 1 c 1 way was rather vague during the adny we first went to visit general byng byn commanding the third army who ft ho explained further details of the attack and the progress already nl rend made ile he and his fits calef of staff were busy receiving news front from the front and felt that all was going well british victory spurs allies the attack was made on it a six nilla front and the british had the advantage from the outset the sudden do bouch ment of the alie long line of tanks closely follow ed etl by the infantry all without the usual warning of long preliminary ll artillery bombardment completely surprised the germans the tanks broke wide vide gaps in the wire and subdued the machine gun nests aiding the infantry through the defenses with a minimum of loss tile the front was rather narrow considering si the depth of the objectives A maximum gain of some four and a half miles was secured the tirsa hrs day and a greater result was prevented it was sald said by a serious check to the tanks at for some reason or belier the french were not called into action but pre it was because the british cavalry which was to precede them could not go forward as planned the rite offensive continued tor for two or three days davs longer with varying success it was however a decided victory and while not as great as the british expected it gave encouragement to the allies on the western front and no doubt helped to offset temporarily the depressing effect ot of the serious defeat recently sustained by the italian army CHAPTER an american mission headed by col E al house arrived in france frake toward the end of november tor for an conference other members of the mission were admiral W S benson gen tooker 11 bliss chief of staff oscar T crosby for the treasury department part ment vance mccormick chairman ot of the war trade board data bridge bradge colby shipping board alonzo 0 taylor thomas N perkins war industries dus tries and ana paul cravath As the representatives of different nationalities gathered in carls recent reports of decreasing losses asses of ocean tonnage and greater destruction of german submarines with prospects of still further improvement seemed to give more of hopefulness in the file general situation nud and allied spirits were somewhat revived the british had won at Carob nil and were mating making satisfactory progress in their advance on jerusalem which it was said would be facilitated by the use of their new base at jaffa the italians seemed to have recovered their morale to a limited extent with the stiffening of their lines by british and french divisions and had successfully held their own against the austrian attack on the piave not the least hopeful thing was waa the step just taken toward unity of command in the creation of the supreme war council but the decisive factor tn in the whole situation if it could be utilized in time was the tremendous economical and physical power of the united states to make that available becore it was too late was the problem upon the solution of which depended the success of the allied cause would the nilles allies see it and would they work together to solve it when all were seated around the table in the assembly room at the mitt afa astry of foreign affairs prime minister clemenceau who presided spoke br baloy loy setting betting forth the importance of 0 the gathering and the necessity of translating the noble spirit of 0 the alliance into action no attempts at oratory were in evidence nor ads wa s there prolonged discourse on any subject naturally questions concerning available man mail power shipping munitions and supplies were mentioned but only in a general way the conference did little more than agree that the study at 0 the various subjects should be left to committees composed of representatives it was waa very clear that everybody was looking to america to provide the a additional man power needed to give the allies superiority none was more eager to increase our forces than our solves salves hut but on my part every possible argument to procure shipping g had been presented to the allies and t to 0 01 our ar war department so cheti the conference urged the expedition of our forces it made tile the strongest str oniest kind at 0 a case in favor of immediate increase of allied aid in tonnage for some time rc reliance liance upon tile the 11 illes allies for any considerable amount of tonnage had seemed almost in vain and it looked as we should have to depend upon our awu ow limited resources for most of it the british were giving some assistance in the transportation of men american ships had carried up tip to november 1 I and the british the results of tile british success fit at were not to be permanent as tile the germans quickly retaliated general von uni witz hastily assembled a force of soivio fifteen divisions and november SO 30 suddenly launched a violent counterattack the british were ellort of reserves tind before von marwitz was stopped tits his troops lind had regained most of the lost ground it was in tills this operation that a detachment tach ment of our eleventh regiment of engineers became engaged while serving with the british the men to the uber number of were at work in the Gauz Cauz acourt railway vard when the hit germans attacked one allicer and men were wounded and tile the denine detachment tach ment withdrew they were then given arms and fought with the british war council meets meeta again the second conference of tho the supreme war council was held at versailles december 1 our representatives political and military at this meeting were mr air louse house and general bliss respectively at the opening session 11 Clemenc clemenceau enu drew attention to the general situation referring especially to tile collapse of russia the probable release of enemy that front the adverse situation in italy the depletion of allied man power and tile the bellanca rel lanca of the allies on american tx the premier enjoined the military representatives to bear in mind that their function Is 18 to advise the supreme war council as a whole and not merely as aa representatives of their respective spec tive nations on the coonc council 11 and that they should view the problems confronting them not from a national h A t W A Z EA 4 general pershing perching visits the king and queen of belgium standpoint but from that of the allies as aa a whole the military representatives at this conference were instructed to examine the military situation and report their recommendations as aa to the future plan of operations to study the immediate situation la in italy from the offensive as well as from tile the defensive point of view and to report on the utilization ot of |