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Show i.-'lf N U.J . .' :-------'-::J-.,.r:i y- - HE modern battleship Is I I a marvel of concontra- V tion ar"' srace tconornJ'- Af There Is no room fjr iff-j tilings purely ornarc.en- OA ,al- liut ev(,ry foot ot KM r space is used to some wY"''2' purpose in connection Ji'ij' wltn the slorae or op" oration of the myriad ad-juncts ad-juncts necessary for the work, the safety and the comfort of the hundreds of men who crowd one of these floating fortresses. If one were to choose, however, the one section of a battleship which above all others is a veritable nest of wonders and surprises choice would unhesitatingly fall upon the "bridge" that elevated structure which is so appropriately named and which extends ex-tends the full width of the deck on the forward part of the ship in front of the huge smokestacks, as a "land lubber" lub-ber" might designate its location. For one thing, we find on the bridge an even greater array than anywhere any-where else on the ship of those remarkable re-markable mechanical and electrical devices which do so much of the work on shipboard that would seem to require human Intelligence. But the bridge has in addition a special spe-cial significance which multiplies many times Its importance and tho interest of its equipment. It is the "nerve center" of the ship, the seat of authority and command which directs all the operations within the bounds of the big armorclad, and also the intelligence in-telligence office through which this warship community communicates other vessels of the fleet and, indeed, with the entire outside world. Under ordinary conditions when the battleship is cruising at sea, participating par-ticipating in battle drill or target prac-titse prac-titse or engaged in any of the other important functions of a sea warrior the captain commanding, the navigating navigat-ing officer and other responsible officials offi-cials of the ship have their positions on the bridge. In time of actual battle those directing heads of the fighting machine would not expose themselves on the bridge, but they would not be far away. Sheltered by conning towers tow-ers or some other protective screens, - o HE modern battleship Is )A i j '- a marvel of concentra- 'W, . r;1- K - . . s f v tion and space economy. sj'l tVif V ' 'Wfe? Jf T I Af '? There Is no room fjr tt Mi-JZV ' fV , r" j (M 11 things purely ornarc.en- -'-J;- 1 j ZT ' ' Tf 1 '"" W k tal. but every foot of &WWi f , I , .-'X V'fdjs purpose in connection ''ZfJ?' , I ' -Vjfr Nvith the storage or op- f,, y t , . ' , V tf I M oration of the myriad ad- JF ty ' N. " ' ' I ' : Xsf juncts necessary for the "gf ? . ' W '' ' ! work, the safety and the t , , ; " '-.'XM t ' J comfort of the hundreds of men who E:.;:.::(. ' s , ' , 1 ' ' 2 I . : f crowd one of these floating fortresses. B. . " . ; . ' S f 4 If one were to choose, however, the & i'lfi ' , , ' . P, M , X one section of a battleship which f ' " ; v . V ' "VV , .-- ? I ! above all others is a veritable nest of '4 ';' V " 'f, v , ' i wonders and surprises choice would v 1 ' , ' . " -t ' i ' 4 J j unhesitatingly fall upon the "bridge" 6't , ''IN. . '- V iT, . 1 ! that elevated structure which is so V - - " '" v '74 K y ' ' - i appropriately named and which ex- y rf V , ' . ' Tf e" "Z ""X tends the full width of the deck on the '.;v - i " '-.) 1 rWV"-' " - r?,-' ' forward part of the ship in front of . " I 4i?tifty ? ' " ''i " the huge smokestacks, as a "land lub- ferjf ' ' -:'i A JtfeSlt I W" i ber" mlglit designate its location. N: ' ' Jp-Q (stll) I ' ' For one thing, we find on the -j Jil t Jsjlsj' s ' ' - " ' X bridge an evrn greater array than any- fr",rJl A ''A - T - i ! t where else on the ship of those re- rBLff!-. JX At l, - . '". markable mechanical and electrical THJfilT y"k " 1 - " " devices which do so much of the &TZ ITV ' - XXk&A'! ZA- 'U U work on shipboard that would seem J, - ,1 ; ' . , t , ( . 8 AfiLLiaa -ig,--"1 7T, to require human intelligence. But - W ; ' ' 'iJLHOtf fr'fl the bridge has in addition a spe- 1- 7Vi cial significance which multiplies V - 'x jP "it 1 " !. -" ficH " many times Its Importance and tho 1 r ,j u il interest of its equipment. It is the 2 f'V C5" V 3 "nerve center" of the ship, the seat of S ti h ? .fs " i , - 9 , . ,, t v authority and command which directs , l , (;y .' f , t " the Amencan navy we would not have all the operations within the bounds . 5?"k' 'i S "i J'il Wn th6 "f war at all: of the big armorclad, and also the in- 1 M i VI ,that is; hw TlZl telligence office through which this o i-r""" 4 t0 warship community communicates W Vf KV x " ri V 1 aga"? , t. , , ,, other vessels of the fleet and, indeed, V ( v.fc tl r 4 he same re at.ve sktll prevaed In with the entire outside world. I ; V i I 1 " 1 the War of 1812 Our ships of the , u B,'- .t v. 1 same class were superior to the ships Under ordinary conditions when E,,. -Tf , -V S ' ' s ,x . . v4l E",llc 'eli:'a 1 '. , ... , . , , . . Bp , ' v 8 of our opponents This statement is the battleship is cruising at sea, par- fi.i ri . ' A i S i , ..... ' ... , ... . . It-W iuC i t ' ! 4,8 confiimed when we study the exact tic pating in battle drill or target prac- B ' tl, , . TT t ... . . , Ri , J; - vs?38 figures For instance m the Hor-t- titse or engaged in any of the other B . 1 N K J,?5 i. 4. v t. i , . . ? .. , . tt a " . ' J!,)-';l Peacock contest the British ship lost , important functions of a sea warrior CTSsipW' O -mI W , ,, . , , . , , i . ., ,, , t srffi XvCTCi,. v Jb.ijsLaaioK ilC five men killed and 37 wounded, out of the captain commanding, the navlgat- ie: Sj asa1 W 'tiaiM&ll,iTTT chid . , ... . 1 o- 1 . -u, , Ar i-7 , NJ3riA MasJ3:'7 3JT'i-cSnP a crew of 130, while .the American ing oflicer and other responsible offi- it 9 Vi?- S3 7c -rFf? ftiJ , . . , , , , , s , . . ... ,. , ,, ' ... A " r VPie' ' TA ship had but three wounded this in cials of the sh p have their positions f, A : eleven minutes. In the Wasp-Frolic on the bridge. In time o actual battle A tj VJ fight the British ship lost 15 men those directing heads of the fighting ' (5? V IajiV , r,, , j m 1 1 . ,, , r , i-ULii sz.jrj I killed and 47 wounded, out of a crew machine would not expose themselves s V jf ii y V tv u .j . ... ... Vi 1 j. v. c 1 -nj . ., . , , . 4 ,, Tlf ?SXf JW 1 1 On the bridge, of 110, while the American ship lost but five killed on the bridge, but they would not be s "Jt,, i'il ,7 w ... . , ,, , . . , ,4.1. , , ' . , , f C?A i.jjf likewise, we find all and five wounded from a crew of the same size, far awav. Sheltered by conning tow- htrH ,sSvff pi s . ,. ,, ,. . . s ?J i 1 l the parapnernaha I could mention a number of similar instances ers or some other protective screens, I ' IS f'7I Si FV . i V f , j t , , , , t- fl p A- 11 i?v Lull fr steering the which demonstrate my statement that at that time l"" 1 -Vt ! ' slliP' including the we were able to shoot well, and we have been f,f$kM 4 il great wheel, the shooting better ever since. Not only the men of (f' I 4 j-sl ' a electrical control, the north, but the men of the south, shot well dur- H jt4.'" Vw, the compasses, the ing the Civil war; they shot well during the Span- ; -v: -i . ; . ;-Js;:,' Ss V jlf lilMsfe 1 "'" v JjfjL 3 0 chart board, with its ish war; and we can shoot half a dozen times as A''''A-s'iWi:fi?T h- " '("i 4-v " V f M i fw stores of charts and well today as we could during the Spanish war. N 'S l!'J fe a11 tlle otner me" Never has the American navy made such a rec- "'.i&SlfKfei VI ''i?ftLr ill f ftf chanical adjuncts ord as it is making today, and never has there been v.t V r t ' t $f for keeping the a navy having a record excelling the one which v t ,f.-'; i r 8 ' ,'w' ri i '$- huge vessel on the our navy is now making for capacity to hit the c vv;iM :: ; Pv'jBPli tJ, 4 f" ! "i proper course. Here, target. That is really the whole war problem V 4 x ' V cAsxik- vtxl x Jih- too, are the seeming- to hit what you are shooting at. s,l,f': "l-'S T simple devices We have not In the past built homogeneous i 1 pVMPJf' QRLHLlGHr which now con- fleets. We build a surplus of battleships and then yjfjfy a " trol the -manipula- provide the men to man them, and frequency pro- . -i, j f tion of the huge vide more than we have ships for. We build auxil- " . m'V , ' searchlights perched iaries and torpedo boats, if we do it at all, without f C v -l ' ' up aloft on skeleton steel towers a means of manag- any regard to the relation which such craft should !lw.?:'Kvlii :' i&M in,r ti.(, searchlights which is not only more rapid but bear to the battleship fleet, and while we have AVv'KO; I'iiv more cff- ctiv.- than the old plan of turning them this built or have in construction 29 battleships, we have y : y!; way ami that by manual labor. On the bridge, too, are practically no means of furnishing tenders for them . p no emi 0( signaling devices for supplementing the under service conditions. 'l5 wireless telegraph in communication with other ships When the battleship fleet was sent to the Pa- Afes7r or with the shore. There are signal flags for. use with ciflc recently it was necessary to charter 40 foreign lfefWW7'?,y r various codes and with the always useful "wigwag;" ships to carry coal for it: If it had been found (Sjr-" '. "?sllra there are the semaphore and Ardois systems for signal- necessary to send the fleet around the horn in ti ne ing at night by means of different combinations of red of war it could not have been attempted, because and white lights, and there is the electric torch we could not have furnished American vessels in the American navy we would not have won the Revolutionary war at all; that is, it might have been necessary later to have fought that war over again. The same relative skill prevailed In the War of 1812. Our ships of the same class were superior to the ships of our opponents. This statement is confirmed when we study the exact figures. For instance, m the Hor-vt-Peacock contest the British ship lost five men killed and 37 wounded, out of a crew of 130, while ,the American ship had but three wounded this in eleven minutes. In the Wasp-Frolic fight the British ship lost 15 men killed and 47 wounded, out of a crew On the bridge, likewise, we find all the paraphernalia for steering the ship, including the great wheel, the electrical control, the compasses, the chart board, with its stores of charts and all the other mechanical me-chanical adjuncts for keeping the huge vessel on the proper course. Here, too, are the seemingly seeming-ly simple devices which now control con-trol the manipulation manipula-tion of the huge searchlights perched up aloft on skeleton steel towers a means of managing manag-ing the searchlights which is not only more rapid but more effective than the old plan of turning them this way and that by manual labor. On the bridge, too, are no end of signaling devices for supplementing the wireless telegraph in communication with other ships or with the shore. There are signal flags for. use with various codes and with the always useful "wigwag;" there are the semaphore and Ardois systems for signaling signal-ing at night by means of different combinations of red and white lights, and there is the electric torch of 110, while the American ship lost but five killed j and five wounded from a crew of the same size. I could mention a number of similar instances which demonstrate my statement that at that time we were able to shoot well, and we have been shooting better ever since. Not only the men of the north, but the men of the south, shot well during dur-ing the Civil war; they shot well during the Spanish Span-ish war; and we can shoot half a dozen times as well today as we could during the Spanish war. Never has the American navy made such a record rec-ord as it is making today, and never has there been a navy having a record excelling the one which our navy is now making for capacity to hit the target. That is really the whole war problem to hit what you are shooting at. We have not In the past built homogeneous fleets. We build a surplus of battleships and then provide the men to man them, and frequency provide pro-vide more than we have ships for. We build auxiliaries auxil-iaries and torpedo boats, if we do it at all, without any regard to the relation which such craft should bear to the battleship fleet, and while we have built or have in construction 29 battleships, we have practically no means of furnishing tenders for them under service conditions. When the battleship fleet was sent to the Pacific Pa-cific recently it was necessary to charter 40 foreign, ships to carry coal for it: If it had been found necessary to send the fleet around the horn in ti ne of war it could not have been attempted, because we could not have furnished American vessels in which to carry the coal. Very few people realize the deplorable condition we are in, as far as our merchant marine is concerned. con-cerned. If we had a large merchant marine we could draw from it without having special auxiliaries auxil-iaries for the navy, but we are so lacking in both that it makes our present situation almost hopeless. hope-less. When the Spanish war broke out it was necessary neces-sary to purchase colliers and transports. One hundred hun-dred and two vessels were bought at a cost of something some-thing over $17,000,000, but they cost a very larje percentage more than their market value, and more than twice as much as they could have bsen sold for if they had been put on the market at the termination ter-mination of the war. In other words, we paid out millions of dollars because we had not provided ourselves with suitable auxiliaries for our battleship battle-ship fleet. We should have a navy adequate for our needs; net only adequate in battleships, but adequate in every other respect. they would be as near as possible to the vantage points to be found only on the exposed bridge and from those substitute observatories some of them located directly behind or otherwise adja-"X adja-"X cent to the bridge would direct the action of the battling armorclad. . In order to enable the officers on the bridge to be at all times closely in touch with all parts of the ship this elevated promenade is made the W---. nerve center of elaborate telephone, telegraph and signaling systems that afford instantaneous communication v-. ith the engine and fire rooms, the ammunition magazines, all the different "gun stations" throughout the ship, and, in fact, every scene of activity that has part in the complex mission of one of these great fighting machines. The telephone system on a battleship is much like the private telephone system in a great store or manufactory, but with the difference that on shipboard most of tl;.e receivers are of the pattern which fit close to vhe head, covering both ears and strongly resembling those used by the hello girls in telephone exchanges. This special equipment equip-ment is designed to shut out disturbing noises and is very essential when officers and men may be called upon to listen to telephone conversation when the guns are roaring or against the opposition opposi-tion of the various distracting noises always to be encountered on shipboard. Near the bridge of a battleship is the wireless telegraph station vhich is one of the newer yet easily one of the most important adjuncts of the up-to-date battleship. However, the wireless telegraph tele-graph " is not used for Interior communication aboard the battleship but solely for the exchange ""of messages with other ships and with shore stations. sta-tions. What are sometimes referred to as "telegraphs" "tele-graphs" 011 shipboard are not telegraphs at all, as the lay veader understands th'em, but are rather signaling systems. The most common of these communicative systems is that whereby the pressure fi a button or lever at one station on a, battleship say on the bridge will cause a printed print-ed command to suddenly appear in illuminated form In a distant part of the ship. For Instance, the movement of a certain lever on the bridge ."-' of the battleship will cause an illuminated sign to suddenly appear before the eyes of the engineers, engi-neers, 'way down below the water line, reading, "Full Speed Ahead," or "Full Speed Astern," or any other command which it is desired to give. By means of this method of signaling a command can, if need be, be communicated simultaneously to a number of different stations scattered throughout the ship. Indeed it Is by this expedient expedi-ent that the captain of the battleship Insures uniformity uni-formity of action during target practise or In battle. In a twinkling he can send the command "Bfgln firing" or "Cease firing," or any other Instructions In-structions to each and every gun crew scattered frroughout the length of the ship. for unofficial messages. The American navy has been the most successful suc-cessful military organization, from its very inception, incep-tion, which the world has ever seen. That is a pretty broad statement, but it Is absolutely true. There are good reasons for this. In the early days we were a commercial people. We were natural sailormen. Our people, lived along the shores. They made their money in commercial pursuits. The men who commanded merchant ships were not only good sailors; they were good merchants, and the foundations for many of the great fortunes of this country have come from that source. In order to protect themselves them-selves they were obliged to go armed. Their ships were armed as were privateers in time of war. The result is that they not only knew navigation, navi-gation, but they knew gunnery, and combined with these qualities the intelligence which makes great merchants. Naturally, when those men came into positions where they commanded men-of-war, they were equal to the occasion, although they had had no naval training. As time went on they acquired a naval training, so that in the later wars, in the early part of the nineteenth century, they met every requirement, and in the recent wars the gradjates of the Naval academy have been equal to every duty which has been imposed upon them. They have made a record of which everv American citizen should be proud. The American sailorman has always been efficient. effi-cient. They were good men in the time of the Revolution; competent men in the time of the war of 1S12. They are better men today than they were in those days, because today 95 per cent, of them are American citizens, and not a man is shipped in the American navy who has not declared de-clared his Intention to become a citizen. Twenty five years ago not more than 30 per cent, of our men-of-war's men were Amer'can citizens. The American navy has been successful because be-cause our ships have always been as good ships as any that were built in the world. Our merchantmen, merchant-men, in the Revolutionary times, and down to the Civil war, were the best merchant ships sailing sail-ing the seas. They were, no doubt, the best manned, and they made the fastest time. During the period of wooden ships, when wo built men-of-war they were of the same general character. Our men-of-war, gun for gun, were equal to, and probably superior, to those of any other nation. We have always been able to shoot better than most people. Go back to the early times, to the revolutionary war. We lost 24 men-of-war, carrying carry-ing less than 500 guns, In the Revolutionary war, while the British lost 102 men-of-war, carrying more than 2,500 guns. We captured 800 of their merchant ships, and it is not too much to say that if it had not been for the damage caused by |