| Show et p e i plied AllIed A I II Ie d S Supremacy in In I AI AirI Air Ir R 7 Y y Result of African I Lesson esson Sy k j Burr Borrowed owed Page From Germanys Germany's Book K Taught Us to Coordinate Efforts o of f fAir Air Land and Sea Forces By BAUKHAGE News Analyst and Commentator Service Union Trust Building m Washington D. D C. C v Early In th the war with Japan when the little men of ot Nippon were swarming down the PenInsula Peninsula Pen- Pen at an unbelievable rate through impossible terrain and rolling roll roll- Ing up one Inconceivable victory after another I had a talk with a wise old military campaigner and andas as a result of the conversation sat down and wrote that infiltration Is 5 a word you are arc going to hear used a lot before this war Is over I Then followed the days when the I Japs pushed the allies back from fromI I Singapore to New Guinea and the themen themen themen men of Nippon were acclaimed as ashe the he aces of ot jungle fighting the art artof artof artof of filtering through territory in which heretofore human beings were not supposed to be able to fight Today the allies have produced the he best jungle fi fighters in the world We are daily dally beating the Japs Saps at their heir own game And today I was reminded of something else after another session with another anonymous of cf another time and place He told me some things about the tilled allied air force and I recalled the thes days s when Hitler began to bully Europe ope and I realized that it wasn't io o much appeasement corruption d j or Nazi diplomacy then that ir ce e l the Fuehrer master of cen ten centra lr tra tru r Europe first at Munich and later tater In hi France and the low countries but the threatening which the dreaded Luft- Luft cast across the world I Today just as the allies have out out- the Japs Saps they have out out- the In the latter latler latter lat- lat ter ler case we must admit the Germans Germans Germans Ger Ger- mans mans taught us In Africa how bow they did It Iti itt i t Warfare I We will mn be able to understand the Invasion of at Europe much better l if we we understand a little more about the two roles which the allied awed air force has played In modern warfare ever ever since we took a page from Germanys Germany's book and learned what It ft means to coordinate the efforts of pilot and bombardier with the foot soldier and the sailor sanor especially In what Is now generally called tri warfare I First it might be well to state dearly clearly the difference between the tactical and strategic bombing Strategic Strategic Strategic Stra Stra- bombing is directed toward the destruction of enemy strength at ati att i t distance Tactical bombing is de- de or interruption of enemy opera opera opera- us as In or near the combat a J Because the valuable quality of air power is flexibility the two roles overlap but in hi general the e strategic effort Is u a long range effort In hi terms of both time and It space space it requires the use of long long- range range bombers and long range long range fighters I Tactical bombing is the quick answer to Instant needs needs needs-it it involves Involves In In- lighter bombers and usually does not require long range for its craft There Is an exception which Ill I'll 11 mention later Strategic bombing is aimed as we weave have bave ave seen at factories at all in- in installations installations in which contribute to the enemy's emy's war effort railway lines Junctures military bases rolling I stock ck and all means of transportation transportation transportation tation and communication I The targets in tactical bombing are re more varied and will win be mentioned men men- mentioned later The Final Phase J I We are Interested at present In Intoe inthe toe the final phase of the European war so 10 o It H might be well to describe the toe preliminary efforts before and the toe he continued effort after aUer the assault assault assault as as- sault on an enemy shore I The Sicilian campaign is a good example The first Job the air force had bad was to remove an obstacle That at obstacle was the island of Pan Pan- and you remember what happened to it It was flattened into Surrender lUrrender in hi two days f 4 Then the real tri p effort I be began an it followed a n pattern which b Pretty much the one accepted for tor Invasions since a The first step Is the neutralization of the enemy air force and this i is a Job nobody but an air force can do This means the destruction of airdromes air air- and other distant vital c ct t areas later providing fighter coverage coverage cov cov- for the beaches and for tor ship ship- ping The Germans had a thousand planes based on or near Sicily Thirty-one Thirty of the airdromes had been attacked in the preliminary phase for a month Rail communications were bombed in to order to isolate Sicily as nearly as possible the second In the list of the bombers bomb bomb- ers functions Messina was a chief target for it was a convenient rail bottleneck Also the principal rail lines running down the boot of Italy were hit I Telephone exchanges and stations where radar sets were loca located ted were hit This is another thing the Germans Germans Germans Ger Ger- mans taught us in their Invasion of Poland and It explains what seemed to be some of the senseless bombIngs bombings bombings bomb bomb- ings of the little Polish villages Radar and telephone exchanges were often set up In these villages They were located by radio detec detec- tion lion In Sicily itself the enemy bases had been so thoroughly destroyed that the Germans couldn't get enough of at their planes In hi the air to Interfere interfere Inter inter- fere with the landings Also the second second sec sec- ond and and third functions of the I tactical were well carried carried carried car car- I ried out namely the isolation of the enemy forces from rom their supplies and also interruption of ot movement I of ot reinforcements The fourth function of the tactical bombers which Is u to break down the signal communications I referred referred referred re re- re- re to before destruction before destruction of telephone telephone telephone tele tele- phone and radio installations Ground Troop Support The fifth is the close support of the ground troops This was achieved In Sicily with more success success success suc suc- cess than was fully tully realized at the time Some commanders of at the landIng landing landing land land- ing troops complained that there were no fighter planes over them Later some of ot these same commanders commanders com com- commanders manders when they advanced and saw the wrecked armored cars tanks and other equipment strewn lD along the roads realized that the I enemy had been held back by bythe bythe bythe the attacks from rom the air In Sicily meanwhile troops were dropped behind the lines and this contributed Its share to the success of ot the Invasion We know how well I airborne troops have operated in hi the Pacific theater and in Burma This I job is listed as ns sixth in hi air ah- forces tactical operations and includes carrying carrying car car- of paratroopers running a shuttle of transports and towing gliders which land personnel and equipment the glider pilot fights with the land forces since he cant can't glide uphill We now come to the last two functions tunc functions of at an air ah force less force less dramatic but highly Important reconnaissance sance and the building of at air bases In the Sicilian campaign a million mil lion llon photographs a month were made so that the commander ol 01 each landing unit had pictures of 01 every place he be had to go to with his objectives plainly marked We know of the record time in which bases have been destroyed captured and reactivated In hi the Pacific theater of war In New Guinea a base was taken built manned and put into complete operation a hundred miles mUes from the nearest allied base and well behind the enemy lines I Thus we see the scope of air force opera operations how closely they are knit Into the operations of the land I and sea forces and how the allies have achieved air supremacy in Ind I Europe But because air forces are areso areso areso so elastic they can be massed suddenly sud sud- denly and therefore actual command com corn mand of the air is much harder tc to maintain At a given moment the Germans who certainly do not have I air supremacy any longer might be beable beable beable able by heavy concentration and great sacrifice to achieve temporary temporary tem tern command of the air in a given locality The allies did have command of the air In Italy Otherwise Other wise the beachhead at Anzio could never have been maintained As it I I was supplies and reinforcements I could be landed In broad daylight I I On the German side no concentration tion of men or supplies could be a attempted at tempted except at night t-I t I The shadow of the has haa grown thin the weapon Hitler created to enslave the world has turned in hi his hand |
