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Show y Published Every Saturday BY GOODWIN8 WEEKLY PUBLISHING CO., INC. L. J. BRATAGER, Business Mgr. F. P. GALLAGHER, Editor and Mgr. SUBSCRIPTION PRICE: Including postage in the United States, Canada and Mexico $2.50 per year, $1.50 for six months. Subscriptions to all foreign countries, within the Postal Union, $4.50 per year. Single copies, 10 cents. Payment should be made by Check, Money Order or Registered Letter, pay- ble to The Citizen. Address air communications to The Citizen. Entered as second-clas- s matter, June 21, 1919, at the Postoffice at 8alt Lake March 3, 189. Act of under the City, Utah, Ness Bldg. Phone Wasatch 5409. Salt Lake City, Utah. 311-12-- 13 TER WILSON AS FIRE-ENAVAL WARFARE A In the light of what our navy did during the war the address of President Wilson in 1917, as quoted by Secretary Daniels, is intensely diverting. Perhaps the president cherished some grandiose idea of what the navy should accomplish. Perhaps in his minds eye he saw Admiral Benson damning the torpedoes and eke the submarines as his flagship led the way into Wilhelmshafen, while German capital ships blew up with horrific din or sank in red flame beneath the midnight waves, while on shore buildings and monuments collapsed and the earth trembled as far as the Unter Den Linden. The achievement of the navy was no less praiseworthy than it would have been had the admirals attempted the audacious thing to the extreme limit of risk and daring. The object of the navy was to win the war and the war could be won only by getting as great a number of American soldiers as possible to France. The accomplishing of this task with the aid of the British navy and transport service was the most admirable feat of the war and probably centuries will pass before it is duplicated in all its grandeur of conception and execution. Somewhat less notable, but imposing in the vision it connoted, was the planting of the mine barrier from Scotland to Norway. It was an achievement that the British regarded as impossible and they lent their support to it gradgingly. On the surface there was nothing spectacular about either of these achievements. One has to let the mind dwell upon the signif- icance of the tasks to get even a thrill of appreciation. The Americans did nothing so audaciously pyrotechnic as the British dash into the harbor of Zeebruggee. That went to the farth- est limit of risk and daring, but events have shown that it accomplished little. Nor did our warships take part in any major operation like the Battle of Jutland. Not a single capital ship was engaged in the whole course of the war. Ours was the duty of patient plodding, of silent grappling with an unseen enemy. George Creel, Uncle Sams publicity agent, gave us one moment of glorious inspiration when he described the massed attack of the submarines on our first convoy of troops, but his story turned out to be fiction. Admiral Benson testified that he would not have hesitated to engage the German fleet, but added that, judging from the technical point of view, victory would have been impossible. Because of the restraint under which our navy operated throughout the conflict, it is easy for the layman to be confused by the testimony before the investigating committee. Probably, as Secretary Daniels believes, the navy did all that it could in the circumstances, but the very fact that it was not called upon to fight decisive major IN engagements, makes it possible for Admiral Sims to give force to his criticisms. Americans must be content that the navy came out of the war, if not with flying colors, with colors flying. Wilsons speech was sufficiently ludicrous at the time it was delivered. In the light of history it is an ecstacy of the absurd. As an amateur strategist he was really proposing a plan of action to the grave and reverened seniors of the navy and was bragging about amateurs as contrasted with mere professionals. He (the amateur) knows so little about it that he is fool enough to try the right thing, said the president. After modestly saying that he wished he had the brains to think of the right thing, he actually proposed that the British and American fleets make a descent upon the German coast in an effort to destroy the submarine nests. He was impatient that the allies should go all about the farm hunting down the hornets while neglecting the , - nest. Here was a bold, an appalling enterprise. It had daunted the utmost daring of the British for three years, but finally they tried the plan in their raid on Zeebrugge and Ostend. It was a futilely heroic affair. The British were fool enough to try it and they tried the wrong thing. The president was willing to sacrifice half the British and American navies in the attempt. He was willing to go fifty-fift- y in this modest little enterprise. Most Americans would have been willing to sacrifice a greater proportion of the British ships. Which is reminiscent of the German irony of war-tim- e that the British were willing to fight to the last French soldier. In the long run it was the policy of caution that won. The allies continued to plod along in the old rut. They massed their soldiers on the western front, defeated the Germans on land, and forced the German admiralty to send out the navy either to fight or to surrender. At the time the president spoke some of Great Britains own naval experts had denounced the policy which so irritated him. They had demanded a decisive naval exploit and, of course, there was only one exploit that could be worth anything a descent upon the German coast, the destruction of the enemy navy and the submarine nests. The president was simply voicing the sentiment of those who had already objected to the British policy. There was nothing new in his plan except the air of novelty he gave it by his usual picturesque phrase-makinwho Despite the thrilling words of their commander-in-chiedo-nothi- ng g. f, ' |