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Show Published Every Saturday BY GOODWIN'S WEEKLY PUBLISHING CO., INC. F. P. GALLAGHER, Editor and Mgr. L. F. BRATAGER, Business Mgr. 8UB8CRIPTION PRICE: Including postage in the United 8tates, Canada and Mexico $2.00 per year, $1.25 for six months. Subscriptions to all foreign countries, within the Postal Union, $3.50 per year. Single copies, 5 cents. Payment should be made by Check, Money Order or Registered Letter, payable to The Citizen. Address all communications to The Citizen. Entered as second-clas- s matter, June 21, 1919, at the Postofflce at 8alt Lake Act of March 3, 1879. City, Utah, under the Phone Wasatch 5409. Ness Bldg. 8alt Lake City, Utah. 311-12-- 13 PRESIDENTS PARIS ILLNESS AFFECTED TREATY EVERYWHERE there is the profoundest sympathy and Wilson in his illness, which, the physicians tell us, will keep him from his official duties for a long time. The letter of Senator Moses acquaints the public with the serious nature of the case and reveals to us just why Doctor Grayson and the nerve specialists were so gravely anxious. It now appears that when the President was in Paris Dr. Grayson observed a symptom that stirred in him the utmost alarm. Whenever the President subjected himself to a great strain, as he did frequently during the progress of the negotiations, one side of his face began to twitch. The facial spasm continued until he put aside his torturing cares and obtained complete rest for several days. Despite Dr. Graysons warning the President began his western trip. It is said that the faithful physician begged the President to remain in Washington, fearing the heaviest consequences from a tour which would threaten even a younger man with physical collapse. During the last days of the tour the ominous facial twitchings began again and, no doubt, Dr. Grayson suffered the most acute anxiety and it goes without saying that he warned the President to cancel the remaining dates. At Pueblo or a few hours after leaving Pueblo, the President was afflicted by the stroke which made it impossible for him to complete his series of addresses. It is pathetic to hear that, despite his crippled condition, he begged to be allowed to finish what he had undertaken. As a result of a brain lesion the power of mental concentration was taken from him and it is obvious that he cannot soon subject his mind to the intellectual strain which him by the European war and the subsequent gjyas imposed upon negotiations. Senator Moses thinks that the President can never again be a material force or factor in anything. If the readers will carry their memory back to the spring months when the President was in the midst of the Paris negotiations they will understand some things that were then obscure. The President was really in no condition to undertake the terrific task, and yet, as lie looked at the old Tiger of France standing up under the strain, he could not realize that it was too much for his own strength. Suffering from colds, headaches and the poignant nervousness which evidenced itself in the facial twitchings he was unable to hold his own against such giants as Lloyd George and Clemenceau. They Pgan to win from him the surrender of most of his fourteen points and finally, in a mental confusion which we can hardly appreciate but which appeals to us by its pathos, he acquiesced in the Shantung wrong and in other injustices. We have curious proof, as we look back, that the President was not his old intellectual self, while conducting the negotiations in Paris. It was not the intellect that coped with the kaiser and the kaisers wiliest statesmen and sometimes overthrew them with a blasting phrase or the expression of a great principle. It is only a few weeks ago that William C. Bullitt was testifying before the foreign relations committee and giving us the key to the Presidents collapse in Paris, but we did not understand what he was driving at. In fact, Mr. Bullitt himself did not appreciate the sigsoul-movi- ng nificance of his description of the Presidents condition in Paris. It will be remembered that Mr. Bullitt and Mr. Lincoln Steffens went on a confidential mission for the President to the Soviet government of Russia. Inasmuch as the sending of the mission implied recognition of the Soviet government it stirred objections as soon as the public in this country became aware of it. But at that time the mission was kept a secret from all the members of the peace conference except Lloyd George. The envoys wTere to obtain from the Soviet government the term on which they would be ready to stop fighting. They were ordered to secure the statement and have it back in Paris before the President returned to Paris from this country. Mr. Bullitt accomplished his mission, obtained a clear statement from Lenine of the conditions that could bring about a cessation of hostilities and, at the end of a week, started on his return trip to the French capital. In his testimony he stated that, as soon as lie reached Paris, he had a two hours interview with Colonel House, who was entirely and quite decidedly in favor of making peace, if possible, on the basis of the proposal. Lloyd George said the report ought to be published. Smuts thought so, too. In fact everyone thought so, but nothing could be done without the consent of the President. Now witness the curious turn of affairs: The first night after I got in, Colonel House went to the telephone and called up the President right away and told him that I was in, and that he thought this was a matter of the utmost importance and that it would seem to be an opportunity to make peace in a section of the world where there vras no peace; in fact, where there were twenty-thre- e wars. The President said he would see me the next evening down at Colonel Houses office, as I remember it. The next morning, however, the President had a headache and he did not come. The following afternoon Colonel House said to me that he had seen mind and was octhe President and the President had said he had a cupied with Germany at present and he could not think about Russia, and that I used he had left the Russian matter all to him, Colonel House. to see Colonel House every day, and indeed two or three times a day, on the subject, urging him to obtain action before April 10, which, as you will recall, was the date when this proposal was to expire. one-trac- k Mr. Bullitt savs that the President referred the matter to Colonel . |