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Show llllom Lewi jlult fake (Tribune Saturday .Morning, November Experts Question Nuclear Strategy New York Times Service 21, 1981 r.. 1 BOSTON President Reagan has set out the U.S. oosition for his administrations first arms control negotiation with the Soviet Union, due to start Nov. 30 in v' iwxi Geneva. The subject is 1 Nuclear Weapons Cutback Offer Bolsters Confidence in Reagan Reagans dramatic lor reducing nuclear President proposal weapons in Europe was a timely, significant and sincere gesture. From lie American point of view, it is also eminently reasonable. But the Soviet Union is highly unlikely to go along and there is every reason to believe that the president knew as much when he made the plan public in a speech to the National Press Club on Wednesday. The offer to cancel deployment of 72 intermediate range U.S. missiles in Western Europe if the Soviets I dismantled their inter- home-base- d mediate missiles aimed at Europe, was mainly a positioning maneuver. And as such, it was an immediate and solid success. The speech was timed to cut the ground from under mounting protest against basing the U.S. missiles in Europe. Coming a few days before Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev visits West Germany, the Reagan oiler was well calculated to put the Soviet leader on the defensive. Further. documenting U.S. willingness to forego installation of intermediate missiles in Europe should greatly influence the course of U.S. Soviet negotiations on such weapons. The talks are scheduled to begin Nov. 30. There is no question about the correctness of the Reagan emphasis on reduction of nuclear forces, both those in Europe and the strategic nuclear weapons each nation stocks in ridiculous quantity on its own soil and at sea. But it is easy to understand why Mr. Brezhnev is cool to the suggestion that the Soviets dismantle missile launchers already in place in exchange for the American -- promise not to deploy missiles at some future date. In addition, Soviet concern for U.S. and NATO nuclear weapons not included in the Reagan bargain seems natural enough. Despite its timely delivery and thrust, the Reagan proposal masks a more basic alternative which the United States could exercise without Soviet participation. That option is deciding not to put new intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe no matter how many such devices the Soviets deploy. So long as the United States maintains a fleet of airplanes capable of delivering nuclear bombs to the Soviet homeland, and stations nuclear missile carrying submarines just off the European coast, the need to introduce additional nuclear clout is at least questionable. After all, the new U.S. missiles are not in place now and the Soviets appear to be contained by the threat of other forms of U.S. and NATO counterforce. It is difficult to believe that Western European security will be enhanced by introduction of the 108 Pershing II and 464 ground-launche- d cruise missiles the United States will presumably set up if Mr. Reagans offer is rejected. But never mind, in nuclear gamesmanship the logic is seldom readily apparent. Our lapse into wishful thinking aside, there is reason for genuine relief in this presidents public promise that nothing shall have greater priority in coming months than what to achieve he called his agenda across and freedom peace, security the globe. There were those of us who had our doubts, now partly dispelled by Mr. Reagans overtures. well-intention- theater nuclear forces, as they are called: nuclear weapons systems based in, and designed for use against, Westrn Europe and European Russia. On the eve ol those negotiations two important British voices have challenged the fundamentals of western nuclear strategy in Europe. Carver, who is probably nent soldier today, spoke of an "unrealistic and suicidal concept.' Professur Michael Howard of Oxford, a leading military analyst, said some Western strategic thinking was naive to the point of absurdity. Thc Carver and Howard comments, made in lengthy letters to The Times of London, should be considered by all the American politicians and diplomats and military men who deal with nuclear arms questions. The two Britons throw fresh light on the hot current issue of whether to deploy new U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe and on deeper questions. Two years ago NATO decided to deploy on the ground in Europe 572 medium-rang- e missiles that could hit the Soviet Union: Pershing II and cruise missiles with thermonuclear warheads. Thev were to counter a a mobile missile new Soviet weapon, the that can reach Western Europe and that is already on station in large numbers. But the Pershing and cruise missiles have SS-2- not yet been deployed, and they have become an extremely difficult political problem for European governments. They are a principal demonstrations going target of the on these days in several countries. Opposition to the new missiles in Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's Social Democratic Party could bring down the West German government. anti-nucle- Howard, in his letter, attacked the whole idea of "matching with new American the SS-2missiles in Europe as an unnecessary and divisive strategy. He said history would put it same eccentric category as the "multilateral force" proposed and eventually in the abandoned by Washington in the 1960s. That idea was to put nuclear missiles on ships manned by mixed crews from various NATO countries. Only "meticulous pendants believe that nuclear deterrence no longer carries conviction unless it is precisely balanced at every level, Howard said. He said the United States had attached "exuggeiaied importance to the views of a very small number of on the threat of the European specialists , just as the United States was led down the blind alley of the multilateral force by a iiiiaieauiiig uf European views. "There is no consensus in the European defense community, Howard wrote, and no sense among the European peoples as a whole, that the SS-2present a threat of a new order of magnitude . . . They remain a very small proportion of the enormous nuclear force that the Soviet Union is capable of launching against Western Europe. He dismissed as politically naive the idea that the Russians can only be deterred from attacking us by the installation of precisely ground-launche- d mismatching systems siles must be matched by ground-launche- d The true deterrent, he said, missiles remains the whole network of American links to the European allies: military installations, SS-20- the submarine-base- d ard social nuclear force economic ties. Then Howard took on what has long been a premise of NATO strategy: that the West, because it is weaker than the Soviet Union in conventional forces, must rely on the first use of nuclear weapons as defense against attack on Europe. Howard called that doctrine "not only morally dubious but politically and militarily incredible. That was the point at which Lord Carver directed his extraordinary letter. He condemned "the concept that an inadequacy in conventional lorces tail be compensated for by the threat to use, and, if the deterrence of that threat failed, actually to use theater nuclear weapons in a first strike to counter a conventional invasion. That strategy had been incredible and Lord Caver irrational for over 20 years, wrote, ever since the Soviet Union gained the To capability to answer back in kind. initiate nuclear war would not redress or restore the situation; it would be an act of unredeemable folly. LJkc lluwurd, Lcrd Cisryr pFnnh'ii.inH the need for NATO countries to build up their conventional strengths. He wanted that unless NATO abandoned its unrealistic and suicidal dependence on a nuclear response, it will not set about putting its conventional house in order. These days U.S. spokesmen tend to dismiss many critical comments on nuclear or worse, Vice Presiweapons as dent Bush said last month that the rhetoric of demonstrators was "oddly consonant with the editorial line" in Moscow. Lord Carver and Howard ex' mot be brushed off so crudely. Nor can their point that the real in Europe and military problem of the West is conventional strength. elswehere (Copyright) ... soft-head- anti-nucle- ... A Flawed Fee As an indiscretion, the procurement of an appreciation fee for Nancy Reagan's interview with a Japanese magazine writer has caused more dismay, investigation and concern than hard evidence seems to justify. But an indiscretion it was and dismaying it is. So far, the only verified facts are that $1,000 was given to a White House aide, following the interview Jan. 21 and that, at some point, national security adviser Richard Allen passed the money to a secretary and it languished in a safe for months aiterward. No one claims the "gratuity" was Mrs. Reagans idea. Rather, it seems she and her husband are being by too-zealo- the First Ladys cooperation, Mr. Allen does say he understood such were a Japanese cash thanks custom. His further explanation that, under the circumstances, refusing the money might have seemed ungia-eioustrains credulity more. Japanese familiar with their couns, try's reporting and publishing methods acknowledge paying for interviews is not uncommon. But they also said no olfense is taken if the fee offer is declined. Regardless, a staff spokesman at the womens monthly, Shulu no Tomo, in the March edition of which the First Ladys comments appeared, told Western new's reporters the fee originated not at the associates. magazine but with a Reagan aide. While denying he was the one That causes legitimate concern. described bv the Japanese as asking As the most prominent representawhat "gratitude" would be shown for tives of the American people, the Orbiting Paragraphs Few things are more interesting than your i (.Hiding with one driven by your insurance iar agent. come the inventory ot a sidewalk stand dwindles so lust with no ustomers Row icmoii.ide i Nowadays marriage is when you discover live with someone you thought you miu uuldu't live v I'liout t i Illil Kel proposal president and his wife ought to be able, encouraged, to speak out on matters of public interest as often as possible. But whether on platform, in broadcast or print, their views should not solicit the sort of fee that makes the exchange seem more a commercial transaction than communication of inspiration or elucidation. Those who overlook the distinction embarrass the presidency and shame the nation. W ill it Sill in Fim' New Arms Proposal Merits Faint Praise By Dmitri K. Suites Special to the Los .Angeles Times President Reagans pronouncement oil arms (ontrol once again represents a case of commendable policy objectives but poor policy implementation. It's doubtful that it will sell well in Europe for long. To the administration's proposal that the Soviets dismantle their existing intermediate-rang- e missiles as a way of avoiding the more problematic deployment ol the Pershing II, Moscows answer is a predictable Nyet. The question is whether the president's propaganda offensive will have credibility among West European governments and Dmitri European Simes is director Research Program School of Advanced International ton. F. Stephen Larrabee is a Johns Hopkins program. K. ot the Soviet East at Johns Hook ins Studies in Washingsenior fellow in the publics. If they perceive the U.S. position as just a barrage in America's psychological warfare with Moscow, the ploy can easily backfire. A number of provocative and contradictory statements made bv administration officials have created serious doubts not only among European pacifists but among the middle classes, too about the American commitment to arms control and the avoidance of nuclear war in general. What stalled as a fringe peace movement is e ixiwerful increasingly developing into ri ca n tr. a i :i st rea m Taking all this into account, was it really anti-Arn- wise to present the American "zero-optioproposal in such an unconventionally public and challenging form? Was it really necessary to demand that the Soviets dismantle not only their missiles but also their obsolete, ineffective and vulnerable SS-4- s and SS-2- 0 SS-5s- ? These latter systems were deployed almost decades ago; they never particularly bothered NATO until the Soviets began adding d the much more accurate SS-2- 0 to their European theater arsenal. The and SS-5-s without inclusion of the SS-4-s potent French and mentioning the increasingly British nuclear forces- - makes the Reagan that one position so obviously will not need to seek a Soviet manipulating hand to quickly discover a lot of skeptical reaction in Western Europe. two three-warheade- What the administration has essentially done is respond openly, boldly and directly to the Soviet propaganda offensive in Europe. The if anything it was resjxmse was necessary long overdue. But in this competition for European hearts and minds, as in any other area of U.S. Soviet rivalry, it is not necessary to replicate the methods and tricks of the other side. The United States is not, should not and will not ever be a match for the Soviet Union in the game of polemics. We should not even try. The United States has a vital interest in maintaining the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. That clearly requires upgrading its theater nuclear fortes in response to the vast increase in Soviet nuclear and especially l Tin lxis Angeles Times wouldn't wont to lx; a judge. Or maybe I would love it after gulping down dully doses of reverence from attorneys mid all those respect !ul subordinates tiptoeing about the premises. Still. don't think so. I prefer to remain a kibitzer. I can attempt to persuade, but my ieadii's. as they often do, can remain uner-stiudeIt is their uneocreed choice, and I like it that way. Otherwise, I would be nervous Judges are in a different position. They have authority. Backed by the jxiwer oi the state thev can tell people what to do and make them do it Oltcn that means that a jxxir wretch will spend years of his life cooped up in pn-o- n sin ink Irom that kind of ixnver. Nol that the authority ol the state isn't necessary. It has to be exercised lor an orderly society to exist I don't wish to disillusion any of the few remaining radicals brought up Ml the old lime 1 it-- g Moreover, to many Europeans U.S. ixilicy appctirs contradictory and hypocritical. For example, on one hand Reagan chooses a patently political option for the MX that does little to overcome the strategic problem that he claims is so serious, while on the other hand lie demands that European leaders nol cave in to more acute political pressures at home and accept deployment of U.S. medium-rangmissiles in areas that are far more populous and exposed than Nevada or Utah. Similarly, the oresident lifts the grain embargo and agrees to sell a record amount ot grain to the Soviet Union, but at the same time to curtail their he asks the Europeans economic relations with the Soviets. This looks to many of the Europeans us if the president is asking them to make sacrifices that the United States itself is unwilling to make. If the United States is to avoid a further weakening of the alliance, it is imperative that the administration give more attention to alliance relations. The president must jettison some of his ideological baggage in and sensitive favor of more sensible policies. Otherwise there is a danger that the alliance will revolt. Or simply split. (Copyright) e Theres Distinction Between Sirhan, Ollier Murderers I conventional military power. Il the United States is indeed committed to deploy mi Pershings and cruise missiles lo meet this threat, there is no alternative to persuading the Europeans that there is more tu the administration's arms-contrprogram than mere propaganda. In many circles in Europe today the United States, rather than the Soviet Union, is seen as the main threat to peace. This has not simply been the result of Soviet propaganda. The unfortunate truth is that in many cases the administration has proved to be Moscow's greatest ally, and made the woik of , propagandists easier. Often the administration has made statements or adopted policies with little or no consideration to their effect on our allies forgetting (or choosing to ignore) that many citizens of Europe do not share its view of the world and are in fact frightened by it. While the administration has rightly sought to strengthen American defenses, its saber-rattlinand bellicose rhetoric have given the impression that it seriously considers nuclear war as an instrument of policy, and have reinforced the perception, current in Europe today, that the United States hopes to limit such a war to European territory. religion uf Marxism, hut the state will never wither away. Yet. granting all this. I wouldn't want to he in a ixisition to ileeuie irrovoiably the fate of to relerto the most another human being like Sirlian di.imatie example of the moment Sirhan. But if I were a member ol the state Board ol Prison Terms. I would he compelled to vote to keep him in prison. Not in vengeance, not in defense of any one person but in defense of an entire nation. What dues that mean'. It means that a distinction must he drawn between Sirhan and any other murderer. Sirhan drew the distinction himself when he fatally wounded Robert F. Kennedy on the night of the senator's presidential primary victory in Calif. an. a in 1H. As Larry Trapp, deputy district attorney ol Ixis ngelos County, told the Hoard ol Prison Terms this week Wliat I wish to Sirhan is no ordinary murderer and that it is inappropriate to treat him as such. On the contrary, Sirhan has bv Ins own election joined an elite class ol outlaw that of (xditical assassin." Snhan himself seems not to understand the dilference He once said during an interview with the Los Angeles Times, "Mho was Robert Kennedy Was he a greater creation of Gixl?" But it wets riot Robert Kennedy who thought he was a greater creation of taxi It was Sirhan wiio played God not only by assassinating tile senator but by striking at the very heart ol the democratic process, a free election. And in another interview. Sirhan. expressing outrage at Kennedys Mipixnt of Israel, accused Hie senator of promising to "Kill other people to advance lus own interest at the expense ol hose other people." Sirhan implied that bis interpretation of Kennedy's xhcv l the assassination I ie Yet Sirhan cannot be separated from the reality of existence as he knew it. Growing up in the fury of the Middle East, violence was a part of his life 11 the version of his youth given bv his family is correct, he saw shiKitings, he saw Iximbiiigs, he saw a brother killed, and he had those nightmare memories within him when the family emigrated to the United States 2") years ago. This history may create some compassion lor Sirlian as a human being, it may create some Ix'tter understanding of his motivation. Imt it does not argue for his release. His crime must lx weighed on a special scale, and the consequences of his act must be taken into account. To release him now would send the wrong kind of signal to deranged or fierce minds who might lx encouraged to slxxit their wax into history. Copyright i n A small town is a pl.yee where nulxxly Hunks anything of it if the policeman knows you by name. There was a lime when many people had large families while some had only four or five children |
