| Show SPANISH DEBT AND THE WAR bradstreets aug in spite of the rigors of the censorship sufficient information comes from madrid to make it plain that it to is the financial position more than anything else that has brought all parties in the P peninsular en insular to an appreciation of the necessity for an immediate peace A brief b dispatch which came early in the week stating that the note issues of the bank of spain were to be increased from to evidently indi indicants cats that the last lunge has been made and that the bank and the spanish treasury hav gone upon a paper basis by its charter the bank of spain Is bound to keep in cash the equivalent of 33 39 per cent of its note issues half in gold and half in silver last may this was modified by providing for note issues up to provided ft a reserve of one half of the additional adit lonal ional notes above was maintained it is hard to say whether this provi provision slon has been observed and still more difficult in the absence of information to determine whether the present plans contemplate an observance of the tha reserve clauses of the bank of charter and its amendments another significant indication is in the form of a state statement meAt made by one of the organs of the present spanish cabinet to the deffet that since the revolution began in cuba the total cost of the operations there and of the war with the united states has been not les leg than for a country already so seriously involved as is spain this is simply a crushing expense and the probability is that the figure in question underestimates rather than exaggerates the real situation an analysis of the spanish financial situation recently published in the london economist puts the issue of treasury obligations and bonds by spain and the fiscal administration of cuba and the philippines since the war began at representing increases in the bond issues both of the peninsular and of the bankrupt colonial treasuries the same authority however points out that these creations of indebtedness do not by any means represent the full amount of the cost of the colonial and foreign war it seems that according to the admissions of the madrid authorities more than is due in cuba alone to the army navy civil service and contractors of all kinds the arrears amounting to anywhere from six months to a year it is the same in porto rico and the philippines and while the amount which spain Is thus in debt to its military and civil service is enormous no one seems able to form even an approximation of the total under these circumstances it can readily be understood that the spanish colonial authorities civil and military are quite ready as they have shown to give up a struggle which involves the practical certainty that the governments men ts necessities would involve a repudiation tion of their pay the inanc lal difficulties of the spanish government have been the controlling factor in determining ter its action in regard to peace those who have examined the subject have held from the first that this would be the outcome they have not been disappointed and they furthermore see in the of the french government a as S m mediator the hand of paris banking interests which have given support to spain in the past and which in the crisis have evidently enforced upon all parties in the peninsula the necessity of seeking peace on any terms |
