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Show 11 THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE,' SUNDAY MORNING, JULY 11, 1920. German Fail to Sink Single U. S. ' Army Transport Ship '' U-Bo- ats - V .V V r-- ri . ,.-- s Efficiency of Allied Convoys Enables. America to Send Two Million. Fighting Men to Europe . Without Loss From Enemy' Submarines. , By .ADMIRAL WILLIAM SOWDEN SIMS. HB sinking of s great transport, with 4004 or 6000 American boys on board, would have been a dreadful calamity and would have struck horror to the American something which the navy Seople; it was io prevent, and which we did prevent Considered as a strict military question, however and that was tile only consideration which influenced the Germans It ia hard to see how the loss of one transport, or even the lose of several, would have materially affected the course ' of the war. In judging the purely military results of each a tragedy, we must . remember that the allied - armies were losing from 6000 to 6000 men a day f thus ths sinking of sn American transport once a week would not have particularly affected the course of the war. The destruction of merchant shipping In large quantities, however, represented the one way In which the Germans could win. Thera were at least a hundred merchant ships to every one of our troop thips; and. If a considerable number or the former could be sunk, Germany would have scored a decisive advantage. From the declaration of submarine warfare, the objective of the German admiralty had been for tonnage! tonnage!" By March, 1918, as already said, the chances of destroying sufficient tonnage to win had . become extremely alight: yet It still represented the one logical mission of the submarine, -- Attack Difficult. , ' The two alternatives, however!, that of attacking mercantile convoys or troop convoys, hardly sxistad In fact Let us suppose for a moment that the Germane had changed their program, had taken their group of operating submarines from the northern trade routes and had stationed them to the south, in ths track of the troop transports. What would havs been the results? "Lane, though a convenient word for descriptive purposes, is ocean hardly an accurate one, for this passageway was really about , ZOO - miles wide. Imagine eight or ten submarines, stretched across that sxpanse and hunting for troop ships At this rate the Germane would nave had aboutS one submarine tor every twenty miles Inamid stead of finding themselves a swarm of surface ships, assailing they were when they were stationed la the busy trade routes of the Irish sea or the English channel, the submarines woulld have found themselves drifting in a great waste of waters. Our troop convoys averaged not more than three a week- - even in the busiest period; In all probability the submarines would therefore have hung around for a month without even catching a glimpse of ona Fastest Vessels Used. The speediest vesels only were used fdr transporting troops At the beginwhich made less tkan twelve ning ships knots an hour were not deemed eefe for such precious cargoes; when the need for troops became more and more pressing against a German raider which might -- possibly have made. Us escape Into the ocean; the work performed by these ocean escorts, practically all of which were American, was for the most part and unspectacular, but It unobtrusive constitutes a particularly fine example of efficiency and seamanlike devotion. All Traces Avoided. - At Berehaven, Ireland, ' as described above, we bed stationed three powerful American momentarily dreadnoughts, prepared to rush to the scene in case one of the great German battle cruisers succeeded In breaking Into the open sea. Even the most- - trivial precautions were taken by the transports The soldiers and crews were not peroverboard mitted to throw anything which might betray tha ecu fee of a convoy; the cook's refuse was dropped at a particular tlms and in a way that would, furnish no clew to a lurking submarine; even a tin can. If thrown into the sea, ess first pierced wiy holes to make .sure that It would sink. Any one who struck a match' at night In the danger son and attempts were made to do thla committed a punishable Offense. It Is "thus apparent why the Germans never "landed a single one of our transports - Ths records show only three or four cases in which even those few efforts were feeble and Ineffectual, Of course, the hoys all had exciting experiences with phantom submarines; Indeed I dont .suppose that there Ja a single one of .our more than 9.000,000 troops who has not entertained hit friends and relatives with accoun.ts of torpedo streaks and schools of ' and when our transport service had demonstrated great skill in the work, a lew slower vessels were used; but great were majority of our troop transit those which made twelve knots or more. Now one of 'the greatest- - protections which a Ship possesses against submarine attack Is unquestionably high speed. Like all convoys the troop ships began sigzagglng as soon as, they entered .the danger sons; end this In Itself made it almost Impossible for a submarine to get its bearings and taka good aim. I believe that these circumstances In themselves the comparative scarcity 0( width Of tbs Ians troop transports, .iu- - whlch tbey- - traveled, the high speed Transports Left Alone. which they maintained and their conBut tha Germans mads no concerted stant slgsagglng would have defeated the campaign against our transports; fundagreat majority qf attempts the Germans- mental conditions already described, could have made to torpedo them. rendered such an offenstva hopeless; and tha skill with which our transport serAll Risks Avoided. vice was organised and conducted like, Though 1 think that most of them wise dissuaded them. I have always bewould have reached their destination un- lieved that the German admiralty ordered captains to let the American harmed without any other protection, their Still the risk, small as It was; could not transports 'alone; Or at least not to atbe taken; and we therefore gave them tack except under very favorable .Circonone other protection greater than any of cumstances and this belief Is father those which I have yet mentions. the firmed by a passage In General Luden-dorfmemoirs destroyer escort. A convoy of four or Ftom our previous experience with flvo large troop ships would be surroundthe submarine .war, General Ludendorft ed by as many aa ten or a doxen destroyI expected strong forcea of writes ers. , Americans to come, but the rapidity with Very properly, since they were carrydid arrive proved which they actually human we an them cargoes, ing gave General von Cramon, tha escort at least three times as large as surprising. with the German plenipotentiary military that given to large mercantile convoys of Imperial and royal headquarters often twenty or more vessels; and this fact called me me knd to asked assist in up mads them very uninviting baits for ths the sinking of American troop ships most venturesome commanders. deWhen the engineers built .the Brooklyn public opinion In Austria-Hungar- y It. bridge they introduced an element which manded von "Admiral HOUaendorff could only they called the factor of safety. It was that everything was being done to their usual procedure to estimate the reply tonnage and to sink troop greatest weight which their structure reduce enemy It was not possible to direct the ships be called to bear under any submarine upon might against the troop ships ex conceivable circumstances and than they They could approach the eluslvely. made It strong enough to stand a numbetween anywhere ber of times that weight. This additional coast of Europe north of England end Otbraltar, a strength Is the "factor of safety; It ia tha 1404 soma of front nautical miles never called Into use, of course, but the consciousness that it sxlats gives ths publio a sense of security which It could Impossible to Close Area. obtain In no other way. "It was Impossible effectively to close thla area by means of submarines One AD Safety Margin Large. , . could have concentrated them only on The American navy adopted a similar certain routes: but whether the troop policy In transporting these millions of ships would choose the same time was American boys to Europe. We also had the question. As soon as the enemy a large margin of safety. Wa did not de- heard of submarines anywhere he could pend upon one precaution to asaur the always sand ths ships new orders by lives of our soldiers; we heaped one prewireless and unload at another port. It cautionary measure on another. From was, therefore, not certain that by this of the troops at New Tork method we should meet with 4. sufficient the embarking or at Hampton Roads to the disembarkanumber of troop ships. The destruction tion at Brest, St. Naasire, La Pallice, of , the enemy's freight tonnage would one of their other destiBordeaux or at then have been undertaken only spasnations, not the minutest stfeguard was modically, and would have been set back omitted. in an undesirable manner; and in that We necessarily thus somewhat dimin- way the submarine war would have beished ths protection of some of the mer- come diverted from Its original object. cantile convoys and properly so. This The submarine war with commerce was was done whenever the arrival of a troop therefore continued with all vigor posconvoy conflicted with tha arrival of a sible. merchant convoy. Apparently it became the policy of the All across ths ocean they were also German admiralty, as 1 have ea'd. to on merchant attended by a crptser or a battleship concentrate their whose business it was to protect them shipping and leave the American troop t. L - at fs at -- - hips practically alone at least those howbound to Europe. Unfortunately, ever, at no Uma did we have enough destroyers to provide escorts for all of thess transports as fast as they were unloaded and ready to return to America, was but as time In the "turn around consideration In gettha sent were over, the troops they ting back through tha submarina sone under the escort of armed yachts, and occasionally not escorted at all. German Chiefs Disappointed. Under these conditions the transports could be Attacked with much lees risk, a was shown by the fact that five were torpedoed, though of these happily only three ware sunk. The position of the German naval chiefs, as la shown by the quotation from General Ludendorff's book, wae an extremely unhappy ona. Thay had blatantly promised the German people that their submarines would prevent the transporAt tation of American troops to Europe. unfirst they had ridiculed the idea that could America unmllltary disciplined, aver organise an army; after wa adopted conscription and began to train ojir young men by the millions, they Just aa vearmy could hemently proclaimed that this never be landed In Europe,-- In this oplnlort the German military chieftains were not alone. No such army movement had ever before been attempted. The discouraging forecast mads by a brilliant British naval authority In July, 1917, reflected the Ideas of too many military people on. both sides of the ocean. 'I am dtstresed, he said, "at ths tact that It appears to ms to bs impossible to provide enough shipping to bring tha American army over In hundreds of thousands to France, and, after they are brought over, to supply ths enormous amount of shipping which will bs required to keep them full up with munitions, food and equipment. harmslng questions. What had become of their submarines? Had the German people not been promised that their would sink any American troop ships that attempted to cross the ocean? A the shipments Increased, and as the young effect, of these vlforous fresh troops began to be manifest upon the western front, the outcries in Germany waxed even more fierce and abusive. Von Capetle and other German naval chiefs made rambling speeches in .the reichstag, once more promising their people that the submarines would certainly win the war speeches that were followed by arrivals ot American soldiers In Francs. The success of our transports led diCapelle as minrectly to the fall of Von ister of marine; bis - succesror, Admiral von Mann, who wks evidently driven to desperation by the popular outburst, decided .to make one frantic attempt to attack our men. The new minister, or course, knew that he could accomplish no definite results, but the sinking of even one transport with several thousand troops on board would have had a tremendous effect upon German morale. When the great British Uner Just Ida was torpedoed the German admiralty officially announced that It was the Leviathan, tilled with American soldiers: and the Jubilation which followed In the German press, and the subsequent dejection when It wae learned that this was a practically empty transport, sailing westward, showed that an actual achievement of this kind would .raise their drooping spirits. Admiral Von Mann, therefore, took several submarines away from the trade routes and sent them Into the transport sone. But they did not succeed even in attacking a single eastbound troop ship. The only result accomplished was the one which, from what I have already said, would have been expected; the removal of the submarines from the commercial waters caused a great fall In the sinking of merchant ships. Ia August, 1918, these sinkings amounted to 980,004 tons; In September and October, when this futile drive was made at American transports, ths sinkings fell to 190,004 and 110,000 tons. , - Magazine, London; without their pei mission no quotation may be made, pub-- ., Ilahed by epecial arrangement with (he McClure Newspaper syndicate) GENERAL-MARCHONORED. WASHINGTON. July 10. By direction: of President WUson, a distinguished eerv- -; Ice cross was awarded today to General. March, chief of staff of the army, fee? gallant services in the Philippines. citation reads: "General Peyton C." Maraii (then in the A.tor battery), for extra ; traordtnary heroism tn action before M:l- nils, P. L, August 19, 1899. He gallant a charge on the enemy'h breastworks volunteers having been called for; by the . brigadier general commanding. .,;i -- Th' j lisui-tena- d BERGOOLL REPORTED LOCATED ! WASHINGTON, July 10. The war received Information today pertinentCleveland Bergdoll bad been lo. (Copyright, 19Z0, By the World's Work. cated In ths northern part --of ths country, The copyright ef these articles In Great and that, if this Information prove 41 Britain la strictly reserved by Pearsons correct, his arrest is expected shortly. ' 'that-Grov- er - en Have To Support Their Parents Why. So .Many , German People Angry. ,It Is thus not surprising that tha fhyxid&n Say Lade of Iron in the Blood Saps the Strength and Breaks Down Health of Thousands at Middle Age and Makes Them a Burden on Their Sons and Daughters Appeals to Fathers and Mothers, Who Feel Themselves Growing Old, Weak and Rundown, to Build Up the Iron in Their Blood.' 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