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Show TOr TIMfcS P" HILL Friday, August 5. 1983 npn k ,X; I )i t At i S V v. ..J If ....w, SS-1- 1 mdiriraaze:- Seffs Project Warrior. Editor's note: This is the second in a series of articles concerning trends in the continuing Soviet military build-u- p based on a 1983 report titled "Soviet Military Power" published by the Department of Defense. Soviet deaders since Kruschchev's time have followed a consistent policy for nuclear development. Their main objective is to capitalize, in peace time, on the coercive leverage inherent in powerful nuclear forces, to induce paralysis and create disarray in the free societies. In wartime, they regard employment of those forces as the key to their survival and winning. The Soviet policy calls for forces which are designed to destroy Western, nuclear forces on the ground and in flight to their targets, and for the capacity to survive should nuclear weapons reach the Soviet homeland. The overall missions encompass the likelihood that intercontinental nuclear war would evolve from a general E conflict across the face of Eurasia. These missions are: protect the homeland, support the land war in Eurasia and eliminate the United States' capability to conduct or support warfare beyond its own shores. .... ast-We- st hardened facilities numbering in the thousands, command vehicles, and evacuation plans designed to protect party, military, governmental, and industrial staffs, essential workers and, to the extent possible, the general population. Intercontinental forces Supporting a land war in Eurasia and eliminating the United States' capability to fight beyond its own shores require a capability to employ intercontinental forces useful over a variety of ranges and the destruction of: other military-associate- command and d control, Protection of the homeland is the most difficult mission. The strengths and weaknesses of Western forces. determine the tasks of the offensive and defensive forces assigned to it. Because of this, the Soviets attach great importance to working hard to keep Western modernization programs to a minimum during peacetime. industries, arsenals and major war-supporti- ng military facilities, ports and airfields in the United States and those along sea and air routes to European and Asian theaters of war, and surveillance sensors satellite and ground-baseand facilities and communications. ; d Soviet intercontinental forces are designed to fulfill their missions under the best and worst of circumstances. In the Soviet view, the most favorable circumstance is a first or preemptive strike; the least favorable is a follow-o-n strike after nuclear weapons have hit the USSR. In between is the k circumstance. launch-under-attac- Preemptive strike In a first or preemptive strike, the Soviets feel it essential to have effective coordination of the strike : Protection of the homeland in a nuclear war would and sound intelligence of the West's intentions. involve: Soviet nuclear forces practice almost constantly, emphasizing command and control under various disruption and destruction of the enemy's conditions. During wartime, the main mission of nuclear-associate- d command, control and. Soviet intelligence is to determine the West's nuclear attack intentions. communications, Homeland protection destruction or neutralization of as many of the West's nuclear weapons as possible on the ground or at sea before they can be launched, interception and destruction of surviving weapons - aircraft and missiles before they can reach targets, protection of the party, state, and industrial infrastructure and the essential working population . against those weapons that reach their targets. The forces and programs in place or under active to accomplish these tasks development designed ' Launch-under-atta- ck The Soviets practice launching weapons under the stringent time constraints that would prevail under K:i.:5S-'- ' t ifjitif circumstances. hypothetical satellite-base- d have established a ICBM They launch detection system, have built an radar missile launch detection system to back up the satellites, and have large phased-arra-y radars ringing the USSR. launch-under-atta- ck over-the-horiz- on strikes Follow-o- n strikes stress the survivability of the command, control and communications systems and that of the weapons themselves. The Soviets have invested heavily in providing this survivabiliSS-1- 8 and SS-1- 9 ICBMs are housed ty. The SS-1in the world's hardest silos. Silo deployment has been adopted for missiles as well. The SS-2- 0 long range intermediate range nuclear force (LRINF) missile is mobile," and a mobile strategic SAM is being developed. The launch control facilities for offensive missiles are housed in very vehicles. Communications hard silos or on d v are redundant and hardened. Higher commands have multiple hardened facilities and mobile command vehicles and aircraft available for their use. Bombers have alert procedures and dispersal airfields. Ballistic missile submarines can be placed in tunnels near their home ports, submerged in deep fjords just off their piers, dispersed and protected by Soviet surface and submarine forces. Follow-o- n 7, anti-ballist- ic Protracted war The Soviet belief that war might be protracted requires the survivability needed, for follow-o- n for peo- strikes, along with warJ reserves, protection 1. J pie anu equipment, tuiu uie capacity tu reiuau launchers. For their ICBM, LRINF and air defense forces, the Soviets have stocked extra missiles, and warheads throughout the USSR. ICBM silo launchers can be reloaded in a matter of days, and provision has been made for the decontamination of those launchers. Plans for the survival of necessary equipment and personnel have been developed and practiced. Resupply ships are available to reload Soviet SSBNs in protected waters. 1 ' 1 L A 1 . 1 1- pro-pellant- s, . Despite these comprehensive warfighting objectives and ambitious development and deployment programs over the years, the Soviets are continuing to modernize all aspects of their strategic forces. (Note: Next week's article will discuss the Soviets capability to launch an intercontinental attack.) SJkSKJ V x::.xS::K''''. At inirnnn ol Defense Photo) off-roa- ; hard-target-capab- nmfiil fere s s11,ir(affin passive defense forces, including civil defense forces, and troops and equipment devoted to confusing incoming aircraft, . in (Department ICBM include: 9 7 - - , . le missiles, bombers capable of penetrating U.S. defensive systems and submarine launched ballistic missiles which can be postured for short flight times, antisubmarine forces capable of attacking U.S. nuclear armed submarines, air and missile defenses, including early warn ing satellites and radars, interceptor aircraft, surface-to-ai- r missile radars missiles, some and interceptors, and artillery, anti-ballist- 4 - ic anti-aircra- ft SS-2- 1 Transporter-erector-launch- er ' ' ff1M . .. ., Jf 4 4 '. (Department of Defense Photo) l t |