Show i I I II 4 i Pershing StOTt Of the A. A E. E F F. Copyright IB la ill all countries b- b by J th the North American Alliance World Bt General rights reserved including the Scandinavian Scandinavian- Reproduction in lD whole or in lD tart art prohibited Servie J John 0 h n J J. J P Pershing ers h. h r l CHAPTER Continued Continued I stated state 1 that but few of the allied authorities seemed to realize that American participation would 1 depend upon the amount of shipping available for the transportation of ot our troops and that the time when they would be needed was near at hand As there bad had been some reference to amalgamation tion I also took occasion to emphasize the point that we expected expect ell as a matter of ot course that the American army would have e Its own front frontas as an Independent Inde lode Independent pendent force and not be used merely as a reserve resene to be sent here an and there One Insuperable reason I said why ve we the j could not amalgamate with the was iras the difference In language an and I added that t we t e would not use our I troops in that way at all unless It became became be be- came tame absolutely necessary I then discussed our problems calif call call- calling r f ing lag attention to the delays at the I I French ports and our shortage e of ot rail mIl transportation and touched on th the backward state of ot procurement of ot of of equipment munitions and airplanes They all appeared surprised to learn of ot our difficulties especially General Foch although even as chief of If the general genera stair staff he he could not interfere in matters matters handled directly by the ministry It was astonishing to find how little comprehension an of ot them had of at the enormous task that confronted the Americans Foch said None of these questions has been referred to me whereupon retain Petain retorted that one should not waft wait until such things are brought to his attention but should look around and find them added at once that he would send an official to study our situation and Haig Halg later sent one of ot his ot officers cers who offered many suggestions suggestions sug sug- out his own experience It was the sense of ot the conference that every assistance should be given us MS in getting our troops across and all seemed fully to realize that no successful suc sue offensive could be undertaken without them Bliss Favors British Plan Conversations with General Robertson Robert Robert- son contin ed the next day at the Crillon hotel In Paris with General r Bliss present The same arguments t I were repeated in favor of ot Incorporating ing ng American units into British divisions divis divis- divisions ions and General Bliss expressed himself himself him him- self in favor of ot the Robertson plan 1 I Iwas was forced to declare myself then and there My stand was not quite what t Robertson had expected and the meet meet- meet meet-ing adjourned with the position of all aU concerned no longer In doubt General Bliss BUss and I met later by appointment ap- ap to talk the matter over ber between be- be r tween ourselves and if possible come cometo to an understanding After some discussion dis dis- I r he suggested that each of ot us r cable his views to Washington and ask f. f for tor a decision It was not my policy then or at any other time to put anything anything any any- 1 thing up to Washington that I could possibly decide myself This would have been the last thing to do In this case especially as the secretary had left in my hands the determination determination determination de de- de- de termination as to how our troops should be employed For two men in our positions to have appealed In this way would have indicated a clash and Washington had enough trouble besides be sides Ides the secretary could not possibly have been sufficiently in touch with the undercurrent of ot these negotiations to make a wise decision So I said Yell Well Bliss do you know t what would happen It If we ve should do that We would both be relieved from further duty In France an and that thatIs Is exactly what we should deserve We then spent some time examining the question from all angles until finally he be came around to my view and bald ld wild I think you are right and I l lV V l shall saU back you up in the position you i have nave taken CHAPTER Once General Bliss and I had reached I an understanding as to our attitude toward toward toward to to- ward amalgam amalgamation of our troops with the British he be gave me his support In lu lul l later conferences When we saw the British representatives for tor further talks at Versailles January 29 1918 1118 all their arguments were met frankly and 1 squarely After had they presented present present- ed their case Prime Minister Lloyd George asked Bliss for his views to I which be he replied Pershing will wU speak for us and andI I I whatever he says sars with regard to the disposition of ot the American troops will have m my y approval An agreement was then signed by 1 ir r. r Lloyd George General Maurice and ana d myself as ass set forth In the follow follow- tog hg g copy of ot the memorandum submitted submit submit- ted and aDd kited cabled to Washington In In order to meet the situation as preSented by bi SIr William an and l hasten the arrival and training of troops PS it iso is proposed that the British Z o government use the available sea sell transportation i In question for tor bring bring- ng g JB over the personnel of ot entire II dons ns S under the following conditions t tr 1 That hat at the Infantry an and auxiliary r OIS s of these thes divisions be trained frith tinder tl British divisions ns by battalions battalions u such uch plan as aB may b be agreed 1 der der T That bat the artillery be trained un r F direction In the use of french r Ch material as at present 3 r lint hal the hl higher h r commanders commanders' and sta staff officers be assigned for trainIng training train train- ing and experience with corresponding units of ot the British army 4 That when sufficiently trained these battalions be reformed Into regiments regiments regi regi- ments and und that when the artillery Is fully funy trained all the units comprising each ench division be united unite under their own officers for service 5 That the above plan be carried out without Interference with the plans now in operation for bringing over American forces G That question of supply he arr arranged arranged ar ar- ar- ar r ranged by agreement between the British Brit ish and American comman commanders ers In chief 7 That question of arms and equipment equipment equip equip- ment be settled in similar manner War Council Meets Again The supreme war council began its third session January 30 At the opening open open- ing session Mr Lloyd George made a tJ statement In some detail of ot the tion on the thc tilled allied fronts He then spoke of the large number of casual casualties casualties ties the thc allies had suffered during 1917 and In a very ery pointed manner declared that the costly offensives had bad produced pro no tangible results But instead In stead he lie sal said the allies now found themselves short of ot man power at H a critical period of ot the war Ills His sharp criticism was evidently directed at ut Sir Douglas Halg Haig and General Robertson but neither was given an opportunity to reply The military representatives presented presented presented pre pre- a Joint note with reference to military policy as directed at the December December December De De- cember meeting and the opinion given was identical with that of the conference conference confer conter ence at January 24 and ands s Jy s tC R Pershing in to Tin Hat also In August at the meeting in Paris except that the campaign under General Gen General eral Allenby then In progress In Palestine Pal estine should continue It will be recalled recalled re reo called calle that these two Informal conferences conferences conferences confer confer- of commanders in chief bad had concluded concluded con con- eluded that the allies should remain on the Defensive on all fronts until the Americans should arrive in sufficient s force to warrant the offensive See No End of War Until 1919 The Joint note was approved d as the decision of the council with the understanding understanding under under- standing as suggested by the French that no white troops should be sent from France to Palestine It was vas decidedly decidedly decidedly edly the opinion of M. M Clemenceau and of ot all others present who expressed themselves that the war could not be ended until 1 1919 when the American army it was thought t would reach its maximum strength The allied forces at the moment were sup superior In all active fronts except except except ex ex- in the Balkans but the Greek mobilization mo mo- mobilization mo- mo when completed would add sufficient strength to give the allies the advantage there also Th The American strength was then negligible but the prospect was that we should have bave a afew afew afew few divisions ready for service by June and and by September possibly sev sev- ten teen or the equivalent of ot thirtyfour thirtyfour thirty thirty- four French divisions The danger o on the western front lay In the continuous Increase of the German Ger Gel German Gelman man forces and In their ability to con concentrate concentrate concentrate In turn against the French and British and as neither had bad s sum m clent dent reserves of their own It wa was clear that unless some arrangement could be made mae between them for tor bet better better ter c ordination co-ordination and support the war might easily be lost before the Americans Ameri Amer cans should arrive Plan Allied Reserve The study of ot this problem by the military representatives led to another Joint note which proposed a plan for tor forthe forthe the organization of a general allied reserve resene It provided that the tilt British Fr French and Italian should each set apart a u certain number of divisions division I Ito to constitute this res reserve which would be called Into action only In a It great emergency The discussion of ot this question became acrimonious Halg Haig and both pointed out that they would be short of divisions very soon In case of ot severe fighting and present presented ed figures on the subject that were very ery disturbing But the councils council's scheme was cut and dried The recommendations set forth In the note were adopted then there and there by the council The general reserve was created and und Its control was placed under uner an executive w 11 board to consist of or Generals och loch resenting e the French chairman Bliss the Americans Cadorna the Italians and a British general officer to be named At this meeting Mr Lloyd Geor George George- designated Gen Sir Henry Wilson us as the British representative to the very cr I evident disappointment of General Genera Robertson who was present at the ses sion slon The selection of ot Wilson was regarded regarded regarded re re- re- re by the British high command and the war office as open disapproval of their conduct of ot the war Winter of 1917 18 18 Most Severe It has been said that the winter of 18 1917 was the most severe seere of the war The he cold was at times so intense e as to make the generally unheated houses barns and anti lofts used as billets ts nearly neally uninhabitable The gloom of short days and lon long nights In the Isolated Isolated isolated Iso Iso- an and largely depopulated French villages can hardly lI he described Then as we ha have seen there was also a shortage e of heavy winter clothing clothing cloth cloth- ing although frequent cables early In Inthe Inthe inthe the fall fail had called attention to the probability of ot a de deficiency No doubt douht the demands were greater than the quartermaster department coul could meet hut but the relatively small number of troops In France going thru through h the winter under actual war conditions should have been given first consideration consider consler Much of the clothing that we received received received re re- re- re for our troops looked to be shoddy and being light and thin of course offered Insufficient protection The deficiencies were met In part by purchases from the British althou although li our men did not take kindly to the Idea of ot wearing the uniform of another er nation and It was with considerable considerable consider consider- able protest and chagrin that they did so until our om own could be supplied To the credit of our officers and men meI be It said said that they generally Ignored adverse adverse conditions an and barring some Irritation at French methods and occasIonally occasionally occasionally occa occa- at our own they kept at their tasks with commendable tion Looking back over the different phases of ot th the war I regard that winter winter win win- ter with Its difficulties anxieties and apprehension for the future as the most trying p period of them alL CHAPTER At the ports In France the amount of ot freight discharged In January 1018 1918 was more encouraging being about two-fifths two as much as during the preceding preceding preceding pre pre- ceding seven months The rate of ot discharge discharge discharge dis dis- charge was accelerated to some extent by the better distribution of our transports transports transports trans trans- ports by the navy More construction material was being delivered where It was needed for port works and the future future future fu fu- ture was somewhat clarified In this respect respect respect re re- re- re by Iy the arrival of ot additional logging logging logging log log- ging machinery During the month there was also an Increase In troop shipments Including some some elements of ot the Thirty-second Thirty Haan's division with men for forthe forthe forthe the service of supply By the en end of January approximately combat troops engineer troops and anti Gl 61 Gl- others for the service of ot supply were in France Fiance nce Although promising this was only the tle merest start as we were still far behind our schedule It must be added however that the Increase In the arrivals of ot men and materials remained haphazard and not at all in the proportions needed It continued apparent that my recommendations were not accepted In to Inan Inan toan an altogether unhesitating spirit of helpfulness and that the serious need for tor executive leadership back home borne had not been met My diary notes the following Chaumont Monday February 18 1918 General General Foch and Major General visited headquarters headquarters headquarters head head- quarters Thursday had luncheon with us s and examined the general staff organization Captain Todd director of ot naval construction came to confer regarding wireless stations at Bordeaux Left Lett Friday spent Saturday and Sunday visiting First division In Ansauville sector Inspected Infantry in infantry infantry In- In fantry in line front-line trenches and the artillery artiller Called on General Ge Debeney F French rench First army Returned this morning stopping at aviation park les Ies ey-Ies- Belles MaJ Arthur Page com corn manding mantling Camouflage work exceptionally exceptionally exceptionally ex ex- well done Passed through to see General de Castelnau who speaks highly of our troops Foch Cold to U. U S. S Problems As General Foch then chief of ot the I French rench general staff starr had shown some surprise when at the allied meeting at In January I told of ot the d delays de lays and difficulties we were having ha at atthe atthe the ports and In the operation of ot rail rail- Invited him hIm to make a visit to tomy tomy tomy my headquarters hoping to put him himIn himin In touch with our activities We had already reached a state of development that confirmed the thc soundness soundness sound sound- ness of ot our organization and could forecast Its ability |