Show K e K K General erS In s X X X S MK M X MM M K e Story of the e A. A E. E F. F e X X Copyright 1931 In all countries by the North American Ameri Amerl- X I General can Newspaper Alliance World right reserved g Including the tb Scandinavian Reproduction In John 0 If M W or In part port prohibited Service J Pershing ng CHAPTER II Continued II-Continued Continued I The secretary of or war much to the disappointment of Colonel Roosevelt Hoose wisely made an adverse decision In his ils case case which was WIlS confirmed by the resident President It was evident e that hO both 1 Mr Ir Wilson and Secretary Baker were looking for trained leaders and were determined to 10 avoid the embarrassment embarrass ment President Lincoln experienced In Inthe inthe the he Civil war when he lie was more or oress orless orless less ess driven to fill 1111 many high positions with political appointees appointees' who In the end had bud to he be replaced f fly by y men trained In n the military profession Roosevelt's Plea for Sons The following letter from Colonel Roosevelt dated May 17 Ii 1917 will how his own fine attitude My Iy Dear General Perching I 1 very heartily congratulate you and especially the people of the United Stales upon your selection selection se see se- se I lection to 10 lead lencl the expeditionary force forre to the front tron When I was endeavoring to In p persuade the secretary secretary secre secre- tar tary of war to permit me to raise a division or two of volunteers I stated that if you ou or some men like you ou were to command the expeditionary expeditionary ex ex- l' l force I could raise the divisions without trouble I write you ou now to request that my two sons Theodore Roosevelt Jr Tr n aged ell twenty seven se en mid grid ArchIbald Archibald Archi ArchI- bald hald B B. I Roosevelt aged agell twenty- twenty both of Harvard be allowed to enlist c as privates with you ou to togo togo togo go over with the first troops The former is a major and the latter lutter lattera latterI I a it captain In the officers' officers reserve corps They are at Plattsburg for their third summer My own belief Is that competent competent competent compe compe- tent men of their standing and rank can gain very little from a third summer at Plattsburg and und that they should be utilized utilized as officers even if only as second lieutenants But they are keenly desirous to see service and if they serve under you ou at the front and are not killed they will be far tar better able to instruct the draft army next fall or next winter or whenever they are sent home than they will be after atter spending the summer at Plattsburg The President has announced that only regular officers are to go with you and if If this Is to be the Invariable rule then I apply on behalf of my two sons that they may serve under you ou as enlisted men to to-go to go goto to the front with the first troops sent ove oveT over T Trusting to to- hear that request request request re re- re- re quest has been granted I am un with great respect Very sincerely yours THEODORE ROOSEVELT P S. S S.-If S. If I were ph physically fit instead of old and heavy and stiff I should myself ask to go under you In any any capacity down to and Including a sergeant but at my age and condition I suppose se that I could not do work you would consider worth while In the fighting fightIng fight fight- Ing line my only line In a lower grade than brigade commander CHAPTER III Our deplorable situation as as' as to as-to to munitions munitions munitions mu mu- was fully discussed at a conference conference con con- ference called by Secretary of War I Baker May 10 It was yas brought out that we had for issue not In the hands of troops fewer than Springfield rifles caliber 80 SO only a afew afew afew few more than light field guns three-Inch three and heavy field guns As It was vas Impossible because of manufacturing difficulties for our factories factories factories fac fac- tories to turn out enough Springfield rifles within a reasonable time the the secretary decided to adopt the I Enfield rifle rille for tor our Infantry It was then being manufactured for the British In large quantities at private factories In our our country and a slight modification of ot the chamber only was necessary to tomake tomake tomake make It fit our ammunition The total prod production of this rifle rUle exceeded 2 2 during the war As to machine guns It was reported to the conference that we had a n few fewless fewless fewless less t than mn 1500 and these these were of four fou types Congress In 1910 1316 had appropriated appropriated for machine guns but the War department had not decided decided de de- de definitely to adopt any uny particular lar one for tor our army array although an order had been placed late In 1916 UnG for a n quantity of ot the heavy Vickers Vickers- Maxims Short on Ammunition Of Ot artillery ammunition except for tor forthe forthe the three Inch we did not have enough to 0 provide more than nine hours' hours supply sup pl ply even for the limited number of guns on hand firing at the rate ordinarily used In laying down barrage for an nn Infantry attack The situation at that time as to aviation avi aI was such that every American ought to feel teel deeply chagrined to hear heRr hearit heRrIt it mentioned Of 65 officers and about 1000 men in the tune air service section of ot the signal signal corps corps there were 35 officers who could fl fly With the exception of five or six officers none of them could have met the requirements of modern battle cont con con- t A a W Wa x y k n L r Col Theodore Roosevelt and none had any technical experience with aircraft guns bombs or bombing devices We had some five fifty training planes In various conditions of usefulness usefulness usefulness use use- all ail entirely without war equip equip- ment mente Of these planes It Is amusing now to recall that the national advisory advisory advis ls ory committee for aeronautics which had been conducting an alleged scientific scientific scientific study of the problem of ot flight advised that one fifty-one were obsolete and four tour others obsolescent We could not have put a single squadron In the field although It was estimated that we should eventually need at least squadrons each to tobE tobe tobe be composed on the average of some 24 officers men and 18 planes besides besides besides be be- sides a large reserve of planes for re re- re- re placements Among other subjects considered with the secretary was Vas the assembly for tor training of the National Guard and the men to come in under the draft In lieu of any previous plans the secretary contemplated the construction construction tion of cantonments In different parts of the country and May 7 the com commanding commanding manding generals of or the several departments departments departments de de- de- de were WE're directed to select sites The actual construction of cantonments cantonments cantonments canton canton- ments was not begun until nearly three e months after we were In the war and so great was the task of erecting buildings and putting in Water water water wa wa- ter works and sewers that some ninety days more elapsed by the time these centers of instruction were ready to receive troops Thus It was with some exceptions practically six months before before before be be- fore the training of our our army was under under under un un- der way Even then several se of these camps were not favorably fa located and anel training was V seriously handicapped during the fall taU and winter months Rivalry for Our Troops this time the allies brought up the question of utilizing our men mento mento to build up their armies As we shall see the subject arose from time to time In one form or another and we I had to fight against It until the end of the war Doth Botts the French find and nd British missions missions missions mis mis- under M M. M Rene Vivian VI and Arthur Arthur Arthur Ar Ar- thur G Balfour respectively th then n In our country countr were very ery keen to have us consent to till fill up the ranks of ot their armies with Americans I J was decidedly against our hc om F h 3 4 I s F Troops of First Division Leaving Mexican Border for New York ing a recruiting agency for either the French rench or British and at that time this was the attitude of the War department department de de- de also While fully realizing the difficulties It was definitely understood un un- between the secretary of war and me that we should proceed to tor organize organize or or- our own units from top to bott bottom bottom bot bot- t tom ln and build a distinctive army of of our own as rapidly as possible The rhe evident rivalry between the British and French for tor control and use of our forces even before we had hadan hadan hadan an army In the field confirmed my Impression that those two governments were not working entirely In harmony As to their armies It had hod been heen apparent apparent ent for some time that there was a alack alack alack lack of operation co-operation between them Their efforts were often otten separate and distinct that distinct that is first one and then the other would attack Friends Sought to Go Along Although It was not generally known that I was to go abroad there was a flood of applications to accompany me One of ot them was was a personal appeal for service In any capacity by my old friend Robert Bacon who had been ambassador to France He had already al at r ready ady given valuable aid to the allied cause and because of his Intimate knowledge of the French people and his tact and discretion I was glad to have him A few days before my departure while at lunch at the Metropolitan club with Charles E. E Magoon gov ex of Cu Cuba a Charles G. G Dawes joined us The three of us had been friends In the days when we were together to to- together gether at Lincoln Neb Magoon and Dawes as young lawyers the latter with a decided talent for business a and andI d dI I as military Instructor at the state university Dawes was an applicant for a commission commission com com- com commission mission In one of the engineer regiments regi ments then being organized under the direction of Samuel Felton from volunteers volunteers volunteers vol vol- with experience In railroad railroad- railroading lug ing and wanted me to help hell him get the appointment I asked him whether he knew anything about engineering and he said that when a youth routh he had carried a chain a month or so for a surveyor In Ohio In was not much Impressed with his hisA A pretentious as an as engineer or as a n prospective e military possibility possibility- but I 1 Idid Idid did have knowledge of his business ability and experience and knew thai that he would be valuable In some position tion requiring his qualifications so 1 I spoke to the secretary of war In his behalf Requests from National Guard om cers and from governors for the earl early acceptance of their state units state units literally liter ally poured Into the War department The clamor became so general and so Insistent that the secretary of war happily conceived the Idea of ot forming a comp composite site division to Include troops troop from every state In the Union I thought the suggestion a good one and gave it my hearty Indorsement This was the origin of the second Forty-second Rainbow division which was tater later to distinguish Itself In several engage engage- ments CHAPTER IV My first and my ray only meeting with President Wilson until after the armistice armistice armistice armis armis- tice occurred Slay l 24 1917 when I I. I called on him with Secretary of War Baker After Atter some conversation with Mr Baker on shipping Mr Wilson turned to me General we are giving you some difficult tasks these days said the President Perhaps so I replied but that thatIs Is what we are trained d to expect Mr President The President then mentioned my experience In Mexico Medico Me and Inquired about my acquaintance with France I had expected him to say something about the part our army should play piny pinyIn In the war but he said nothing Promised Full Support Upon leaving I said Mr President President d dent nt I appreciate the honor you ha have ve conferred upon me by the assignment you ou have given me and I realize the responsibilities it entails but you can cnn count upon the best that Is In me To this the President replied General you ou were were- chosen entirely upon your our record and I have e every IY c confidence that you will succeed you sll shall lI have my full support The President then asked me to con vey to the king of Great Grent Britain and to to the President of ot France his greetings greet greet- ings and best wishes His manner was cordial with his poise and his air of determination His assurance of confidence In me me- was gr gratifying but In the difficult situations situations situations situ situ- that arose later Inter regarding the of the allies allies- he manner aiding was Inclined to yield to the persistent Im- Im vor por of ot the thc allied representatives tives In Washington In the actual conduct of operations I was was given entire freedom and und In Inthis Inthis Inthis this respect was to enjoy nn an experience expert Once ence unique in the history of American Amen Ameri can wars Letter Making Him Chief May 27 1917 the day before 1 was to sail from New York Secretary hiken hi- hi ker ken sent me rue a letter Jetter of or Instructions concerning my command authorities and duties In Europe which is quoted In full The lase President directs me to communicate to you OU the following I 1 The Tho President designates designate I you to command all the land forces Corces of the United States operating operating operating oper oper- In continental Europe and andIn andIn andin In the United Kingdom of ot Great Britain and Ireland Including any nay part of the marine corps which may be detached for service there therewith therewith therewith with the army From Irom your command command command com com- mand are excepted the military attaches and others of the army who may be on duty directly with our several embassies 2 You will proceed with your staff to Europe Upon arrival In Great Grent Britain France or any other other oth oth- er en of the countries at war with the Imperial German government you will at once place yourself In communication communication com corn with the American embassy and through Its agency with the authorities of any country country country coun- coun coun coun- try to which the forces of ot the United States may be sent 3 You are ore Invested with the authority and duties devolved by the law regulations regulations- orders order's and customs of the United States upon the commander of an army In the field In time of war and with the authority and duties In like manner manner manner man man- ner devolved de upon upon department commanders In peace and war in including In- In eluding the special authorities and duties assigned to the commander of the Philippine department In Inso Inso Inso so far as the same are applicable to the particular circumstances of your command U. U S. S Forces Separate 4 You will establish after consultation con con- with the French war om office e all necessary bases lines of communication depots etc and make all th the incidental arrangements arrangements arrangements arrange arrange- ments essential to active participation participation pation at the front 5 In military operations against the Imperial German government government government gov gov- you are directed to cooperate cooperate cooperate co co- co- co operate with forces of ot the other countries employed against that enemy but In so doing the underlying underlying underlying under under- lying Idea Idell most be kept In view that the forces of ot the United States are a separate and distinct component of the combined forces the identity of which |