Show beneral per story of the A E copyright in all coundrie coun trie by the north ameri am xin f ean newpher New All lanca world felted W the in abol W or apart prohibited wms S ric bloew vf M CHAPTER IX continued referring to their lacfi of artillery in the beginning general birch said there was reason to believe that they had finally attained a superiority over the germans real teamwork lacking Si rDouglas told me some of the details of avelles Mv elles unsuccessful attack in the spring how it was known far and wide beforehand and spoke par of the consequent serious als affection among the french troops al though he had placed himself under Nl velles command for these opera he had he said little confidence in the outcome from the start he also commented on the tallue tallu e of the french to co operate fulla on various occasions ills remarks entirely con firmed the belief that I 1 bad long since held that real teamwork between the two armies was almost totally absent scarcely anything more strikingly impressed upon me our unprepared ness than what I 1 saw during a few hours spent with general trenchard at the british flying field where we witnessed flyers doing every able stunt and saw planes of all classes bombing pursuit and observe alon motors of different types and the thoroughly equipped repair shops the outstanding thing however which it was gratifying to note later on in our own aviation personnel was the incomparable spirit and alertness of the young officers and the enlisted personnel every man seemed to be disappointed when a flight of planes departed for the front without him this visit to british headquarters was most instructive as every was given us to study intimately the details of their wartime after similar studies of the french system we selected from each those features best suited to perfect a well balanced staff tor our own army the cordial relations and good un ferstanding der established between sir douglas and myself and between the corresponding members of our staffs and with a number of the lead ing british officers with whom we wen later to have official dealings proved very advantageous in london long after the armistice sir douglas in an after dinner speech referred to visit which happened during a period of depression and said that our appearance at his headquarters hail aroused in them a strong feeling of hopefulness for the future meets other leaders my diary at this time notes the following carls thursday july 20 1017 had breakfast yesterday at the cryllon with lloyd george lie ts alert and energetic and has a clear conception of allied lems took lunch with mr bal four who thinks we have reason to feel easier regarding alnes representatives of the various allies met for conference on general situation in the evening M albot the prime minister gave a state dinner to officials attend ing conference today attended luncheon to al lied representatives given by the president and ame mme at the el see palace in conference this afternoon with petain cadorna Ko bertson and foch at batters lat office als cussed military plans talked about tonnage possibilities and shortage of personnel all and reserved james stallman just returned from a tour of france confirms reports of serious depression situation not hopeful the meeting of the allied military leaders july 20 which was my first brought out little that was hopeful the political relations of the allies were touched upon in a general way but only so far as they might affect the military situation tl e most alg recent event of course had been the crisis in hussla with reference to american assist nce I 1 gave in detail the situation as to our man power immediate and prospect especially in the light of the latest plans of the department anil laid particular emphasis on the ne cessley of additional shipping A cablegram had just been received in response to mine of july 6 in which I 1 had requested that at least a million men reach france by the following spring athla message indicating that the war department foresaw small chance of securing the necessary tonnage was rad to the conference in part as fol lows by using all shipping which Is now in sight tor the purpose and which will be available after month of november the plan proposes to transport to france by june 15 1018 twenty one divisions comprising about men together with auxiliary troops and replacement troops line of corn troops and others amount ing to men leaking a total of men more tonnage needed although short of my recommend a bons even this schedule could be car na out only by a ver large increase of tonnage the other members of the conference were of the opinion that if new adjustments could be made there might be shipping for nine or ten of our divisions before spring so for the moment there did not seem to he the slightest chance of transporting a million men to france by the follow ing june after canvassing the whole situa alon the conference expressed the unanimous opinion that a defensive role should be adopted on all second ary fronts the british and french representatives hoped that the sur plus troops resulting from this course might be available to strengthen their armies in france and general cador na of course thought the italian armies should have their share CHAPTER X about this time tuly 1917 disturb ing reports were submitted to me con by one of our naval officers sent by admiral sims from london calculations based upon tonnage losses for slay june arid tuly seemed to confirm the conclusions of a month previous that there would soon be jn sufficient allied shipping left to bring over an american army of required strength and that the allies would find it difficult to beep up their food sup ply from overseas the data presented by the naval officer proved that if this rate of destruction st could not be reduced the war would be lost before we could fire a shot this report was certainly most pes but it did not dispel my con floence in the success of the plan that had been tested and was about to be inaugurated of ending ships over in convoys under the protection of naval vessels additional destroyers requested by admiral sims had by this val del Ec near chaumont domicile of the american commander in france time largely increased such craft in european waters and as a result alia activities ot submarines had been somewhat diminished tor july as corn pared with april need of speed evident ret for the time being ship construe alon in british yards continued below losses and our shipping at home had scarcely stopped wrangling over materials and bipes alt these facts caused everybody to realize the ex urgency of speed and that in turn gave some hope that alie pros pacts might soon become brighter it was my belief even in the ace of the heavy losses that with corn operation cooperation co under expert man and the shipping would be ample for all purposes this would require of course that it be placed under some central authority but the governments especially the british that controlled most of it while apparently desirous of helping did not seem inclined to think aliey could make any concessions they hafa entered into arrangements to assist each other with shipping for foodstuffs but there was no such thing as of allied tonnage for general purposes however the discouraging reports on the situation did make such an ini pres slon on the military leaders thai they suggested the possibility of pool ing all available shipping and accord angly recommended a commission to consider the question with especial reference to the transportation of the american army spies get sailing dates the success of submarine warfare bad been largely dependent upon ad vance knowledge concerning movements of vessels As there was no doubt that the sailing dates of much of our shipping reached germany through spies one way to reduce tbt danger would be to close such sources of information in the beginning the practice by our war department of transmitting secret information was extremely loose the data regarding sailing was of course sent to my headquarters but at the same time or often before it was also given to both I 1 and british mill tary and naval attaches and mission in washington they immediately transmitted the information by cable to their respective governments with the result that it usually became al most common knowledge but there were other sources of in formation by the enemy one message intercepted by the french sent from some wireless sta alon in spain to the german general staff announced the arrival of several american vessels at nantes and of american soldiers at st na zaire and also gave the routes taken by our transports another evidently intended tor sub marines reported the departure of a convoy of transports from bew york these and similar facts were cabled at once to admiral sims and to wash ington leadership big problem probably the most important factor in building up an aggressive army Is the selection of leaders without suf leadership the finest of troops may suiter defeat by inferior forces skillfully led the following was my recommends a alon to secretary of war baker sly observation of british and french armies and most exacting ous service conditions at the front fully convince me that only officers in full mental and physical vigor should be sent here contrary course means certain inefficiency in our service and possible later humiliation of officers concerned general officers must un dergo extreme effort in personal super vision of operations in trenches very few british or french division corn manders over forty five or brigadiers over forty we have too much at stake to risk inefficiency through mental or physical defects strongly recommend condl alons be fully considered in making high appointments and suggest tha no officer of whatever rank be sent here for active service nho Is not strong and robust in every particular officers selected for appointment gen eral officer of line should be those with experience in actively command ing troops officers not fulfilling above conditions can be usefully employed at home training troops little effort at selection these recommendations were not al together followed at home in tact very little effort seems to have been made at selection so that some officers without ambition or initiative whisp inefficiency should have been well known and others whose age and physical condition were such as to disqualify them for strenuous service were given important assignments most of them were known to me and not a few who under the rule of seniority were commanders of hegt heuts and departments had tacked the energy even to train com manda or themselves n bittle exercises where favorable opportunity had been offered the policy of the atar department from beginning to end seemed to be to appoint officers to the higher grade at cording to seniority with the anten alon of weeding out the inefficient later on this appears to have been the department part ment s idea of selection and the result was practically no selection at all after the appointment of such officers it was a slow process to nate them in the training area the first division wa now well settled in its training area in the region of Gond south of bar ie due the troops of the division had already established friendly relations with the trench peasantry peasi and had quickly adapted themselves to thel new mode of life As the natural consequence of the financial condition of the frugal french provincial he was wont to profit by the presence of the british and ourselves and the open handed payday habits of the americans served to give some encouragement to this As a result home coolness grew up later between our men and their early friends in all history I 1 do not believe there has ever been an army on foreign soil so considerate and observant of the rights and interests of the people the peasant class made a strong appeal to eiery roan in the army their alm their love of the soil and the long hours of work in the fields by the old men and women and young boy and girls remained the constant adal ration of our soldiers I 1 am inclined to think however that the excellent behavior of the men in the first contingent their rather nil military appearance in fitting forms and their apparent lack of tor roal discipline created the impression in the minds of the french officials that they were too kind hearted to be come aggressive fighting troops at the conclusion of my inspection of various places chaumont was se lecter as the best bite for our general headquarters it was on our line 0 communications to the front and centrally placed as to probable sectors of our operations the fine stone mental barracks became our headquarters and we were able to obtain ample billeting accommodations in houses for all except the enlisted men who were provided with temporary barracks CHAPTER XI in the organization of our armies for the world war it was evident that if any considerable numbers were to be sent abroad an additional force would be needed over and above the regular army and the national guard the ar department therefore lashed what was called the national army to be composed principally of men who were to come into service through the draft most of the dl visions of the national army were organized in august and september 1917 As the time approached to begin the training of the smaller units it was found that after equipping the special troops urgently needed in france there was little equipment left even for the additional men required to fill up the national guard unfortunately this made it necessary to delay calling out men for the units of the national army however considerable numbers were called into service and proceeded with nary instruction but the lack of equip ment seriously delayed their progress visiting billeting areas my diary notes the following paris tuesday august 21 1917 visited billeting areas of seventh french and our first dl vision with general petain on sunday inspected st cizler regulating station and witnessed attack near verdun yesterday visited french hospital at returned this morning with M minister of war on his train As I 1 had accepted general invitation to see the french offensive that was to take place auguet 20 I 1 motored to french general head on the accompanied by col onel palmer and captain boyd and after dinner left with general retain and two or three members of his start on his train for an inspection of french and american troops the following day we reached Gond the next morning and began the day with a review of the french forty sey anth infantry division which was paraded on a prominent plateau near this division had been in every serl ous engagement of the war and its losses had been very heavy as could be easily surmised from the youthful appearance of the officers most of whom had risen from the ranks to replace casualties among their seniors general told them that because ahne record the division had been given the special honor of assist ing in the instruction of the american first division visit our troops in training accompanied by brigadier general bundy colonel cruikshank and others I 1 took general retain to see some of our troops being trained in throwing grenades and in the use of the french automatic rifle an amusing story was told us in connection with grenade instruction one of the men insisted on throwing his greide immediately after setting the fuse instead of calr ing till he slowly counted seven which was necessary so the explosion would occur as the grenade reached its destination after being cautioned several times by his officer the man said captain I 1 just can t hold these grenades any longer because I 1 can feel them swelling in my hand we visited several villages occupied by trench and american troops As we passed through our billets and in specter the kitchens retain barly inquired about the |