Show Win Will Germany Shorten Her Lines in n the West By FRANK H H. SIMONDS I Copyright 1916 by the New York Tribune York Tribune U UNLESS all signs signs' fail ail the moment is almost at t hand when the Germans must shorten their lines on on the After Atter nearly two years in which the tile long tren h lines ha have ve endured with little change from Switzerland from to the sea sea- the time has come when all ll allied a and d n. n neutral utra observers servers agree that change is is imminent And even In in German comment there has been plain evidence that th-at some change is expected This cl Ch change is is' viewed in different ways by various observers Roughly speaking there arc are two sets of views N Not t a few well informed military Y critics insist that tle ching will be bea a radical one i that it will mean mean the evacuation tion of of pr all aU of of- northern France a retreat reheat either to a line lInc run running from Verdun behind the Meuse as far as 15 and thence northwest to Lille along the Fr Franco Belgian frontier or else behind the the the-Meuse Meuse as far as Namur and thence northwestward lQ cov covering ring 8 Brussels and reaching the ScheIdt south of Antwerp The second view yi vi o is that the tile retirement nt will be wholly limited and will amount to the surrender of the territory in the famous Noyon elbow or salient If this l litte tt view is correct we shall presently present see the German front withdrawn inti the line passes southe southeast southeast south south- e east st from Ar Arras as or even Lens to Laon covering the cities of Douai Cambrai and St. St Quentin and resting on the old forts of La Here Pere ere from which point it will go southeast to meet the present line before Laon and east of Soissons Continued on on 1 page pace 4 4 t i Win Germany C Shorten w Her Longs Lines in the West Continued from page 1 To support their contention that the retreat will be to the Meuse and the the- French frontier or oven to the Namur Antwerp line the military observers who hold this opinion bring forward the following arguments First of all they point out that the Germans and their Austrian Austrian Aus Aus- Austrian trian allies have lost since February I no not less than r killed killed wounded t and prisoners the prisoners alo alone e eI I I amounting mounting to To replace this huge loss must strain their recruiting and training machinery to the utmost I even if there is still a plentiful supply I of men then This last assumption is disputed disputed disputed dis dis- dis- dis and evidence is is' produced tosho to sho show that the Germans in m some small degree and the Austrians to to a considerable considerable considerable con con- degree are revealing tl the e growing shortage of men which i ithe is isI I the first sign of inevitable defeat Men Needed Having to find to replace e casualties the Germans and their I i allies have also to find not less than to meet the new Rumanian thrust In other wo woods ds if Germany is merely to hold her ground she and her allies ames must find new soldiers must in fact have fou found d the major part of them already inthe m in the days since the attack on Verdun which cost casualties actually began This many believe to be impossible bl e. e In other words they assert that Germany Germany Germany Ger Ger- many is now holding all her lines with too few men that in doing this she is running very grave risks and that she will soon have to decide I wh whether ther she will retire to shorter lines or invite disaster where she stands Now if Germany is to shorten herline's her lines line's s 's there there can be no question as to the front that can be most safely sac sac- To retreat in the East would wold bring a lengthening not a shortening mg of the front unless Germany retired to her own East Prussian frontier and risked a new Cossack incursion This is due to the nature of the cou country try now occupied since the Pripet marshes supply a large area that can be lightly held and do not offer any opportunity for attack As to any sacrifice in the Balkans this is impossible because it means tl th elimination of Bulgaria whose statesmen would change sides at the first sign of German weakness it means the loss of off communication with the Turk the eventual collapse of I Turkish resistance and the freeing of the Straits When the Straits are opened Russia can be at once and the millions of Russians now waiting for guns equipped and motion on the road to Berlin Mackensen In Balkans Turning from theory to fact we have seen recently that the entrance r of Rumania had for an immediate e consequence the dispatch of Mackensen Macken i sen sea sento to the Balkans and arid a quick Turk-Bulgar Turk thrust up into the DoI DoI Do Do- I designed to reassure th the e I Turks and protect the Berlin Berlin- Constantinople railroad and threaten n Rumania No possibility exists o of nf f I shortening the line in the Balkans Balkan without losing Turkish and Bulgar assistance assistance as as- assistance and Germany cannot surrender sur sur- render reader either the military or political adT advantages s she has a acquired in in th the e Balkans except in ht the presence o of f perils greater than those yet in view But to go o back behind the Meuse Meus e and thence thence along the French frontier or even behind the Verdun l Namur-Brussels-Antwerp Namur line would woul d give Germany at once a far more advantageous advantageous ad ad- position than she now no I ad-I holds over much of her Western front and acid a line upward of a hundred miles shorter than her present front from Verdun to Nieuport And on the political side while most Germans German s still expect to hold the Polish conquests conquests conquests con con- quests and keep the road Constantinople Constantinople Constan Constan- open the time tune has passed when many expect to keep any portion portion por por- tion of France or Belgium If Germany Germany Germany Ger Ger- many is running short of men if she feels the immediate ne need d of an army of men and c cannot find them in her own depots then it is clear that she can find the them only by shortening shortening short short- ening her Western front but that by I such a shortening she would release the requisite number of f men and strengthen her West Western rn front at the same time Allies Carry Noose This is the case of those who expect expect expect ex ex- ex- ex a general retreat in a short time before the first of the year at the latest Now on the other side the case for the far more restricted retreat re re- tr treat at is this First of all the recent allied advances have made the tion of the Germans in the Noyon elbow the whole German position from Peronne right around to Soissons Soissons Sois Sois- sons increasingly difficult without yet being actually perilous It will nc need d only a few more such advances as the last two of Foch to make the withdrawal from this salient impera tive om AS the French and British advance east from irom their present positions they ad advance advance ad- ad vance across the roads which feed the German positions at Chaulnes at Roye ROYA at l Noyon oyon and opposite Soissons The A Allies Al- Al lies are arc ar in effect carrying a noose around the neck of this salient narrowing the Ti k steadily and restricting the num ber her of roads and railroads by which the Germans can and provision their troops The objective of the French Is St. St Quentin tn some twenty miles east cast of get their to present St. St e l front But lon long before they Quentin their guns will cut the then Toads roads r T i PS leading south out of St. St Quentin and n It is upon these roads that the Germans Germans Ger- Ger mans pend for lor in Noyon R Roye ye and Chaulnes depend de depend de- de their existence Exa Exactly the same thing on a smaller s stale a ale 10 IS js taking place In the bulge between betwee n Arras and Peronne About Peronne the French are more than ten miles further e east st than lna the Germans before Bapaume and 1 he el British already have under their guns a all 1 the roads which lead out of Bapaume Ba Da- V troops and Lare are essential for for the supply o of holding the front west of this town Actually y- y the Allied operation I con con- lists in a process of f gnawIng the me he right nt ross cross rear real of the the German positions cutting on one after another of the roads roada and rail railroads rail rall- roa roads s upon which they depend One interesting and important consequence consequence conse conse- quence of this gnawing s process is that a as s it proceeds it lengthens the p Ge-p German an line Instead their a line of f a comparatively straight front takes the form Corm of a concave concave front deepening all the time as the Allies Allie s drive more and more into It This Thi s extension of the lines requires more me men n to defend them and the lines themselves in many cases emergency trenches are weaker than the original front Thus Thus are today today today to- to day the German lines in the Pet Peronne sector are probably a dozen or or- fifteen miles lies longer than they were at the start M that It l lV V Is the n necessary C to emphasize the fat fact Germans in the th No Noyon on elbow are ire not yet In any Immediate danger o of envelopment The neck of their salient t between Peronne and the Oise east of S St Quentin QUE is still twenty lye miles wide i h hr It wa was more than thirty a at the But start But Bu t I s m r re t Of f the roads have been actually cu cut ant T. T for FiT fIve y miles e beyond the present from the roads road arr T unter rio rio- nr or er A nr 1 gravy grave peril This means growing congestion congestion congestion tion in the neck of oC the salient It means mean s corresponding difficulty in handling munitions munitions munitions mu mu- and supplies and It forecasts a day when the further advance of the Allies Allies Al Al- lies an advance of not more than ten m miles iles at the most will matte make the evacuation evacuation evacuation of this Noyon elbow Inevitable The chances of an ultimate envelopment envelopment envelop envelop- envelopment ment of the Germans in the Noyon sal salient sal sal- tent unless there is an actual piercing o othe of the lines about Peronne and a sudden inrush inrush inrush in- in rush of a huge lingo French attacking force are not very great A year ago the Hussian Rusian Rus- Rus s sian ian retreat demonstrated the extreme difficulty of enveloping large largo forces b by y similar operations It t remains perfectly possible for the Germans to hang on an fo for r somo some weeks yet if iC the Allies do not great groat- greatly IlY ly y Increase t their rate of advance But Bu t even their pr present sent rate of advance canot can- can n ot t fail all to make malce the Noyon salient untenable untenable untenable un un- tenable b before Core winter Counterattacks Lessen The same is true of or the smaller Bapaume Bapaume Bapaume Ba Ba- salient north of Peronne Thiis This Thi s is a much worse situation now than th the e southern position of Noyon Bapaume e is under British fire and if the British Brills are pro able presently to tape take Combles and n bring their front east on a level with the French it will no longer be possible forthe for forthe forthe the Germans to use Bapaume as a center for supplying their troops between Arras and Peronne Now the advances of the British an anthe and d the French In the past few days the diminishing di diminIshing diminishing di- di intensity of German counterattacks counter counter- a attacks and the growing frankness of Berlin Berlin Bertin Ber Ber- lin tin official statements in to conceding conceding- th the e loss of villages not tardily as at first but promptly all ail point toward a decision on the part of German high command t to o cut their losses in this sector to to- hold holdon on to the last possible moment take false a as large a toll as is possible of their opponents opponents n but to retire at the final moment momen t rather than to counter attack as the French did in the critical hours before Verdun It is not possible to forecast the extent exten t of a probable German retreat There never never never nev nev- er may be anything like a general retreat We Ve may continue to see sea changes o of f themselves slight for many days o or r fr weeks Yet it is clear that il iii certain certai n sectors even this limited retreating will wilt ultimately compel retirements in adjoining adjoining adjoining adjoin adjoin- ing sectors to keep the alignment This is why so many writers have already de decided decided de- de c that the Germans will stand on Ut tile the St. Arras Quentin-La Quentin Fere Laon n line lne Such a retirement would again give the Germans a line substantially straight it would abolish all perils to their communications communications com corn and it would shorten th the e front which has been lengthened and Will Villi be still more lengthened if iP the Allied Allie d gnawing goes on for a few more weeps weeks If they are not exceedingly short o omen of men the Germans will not make a general genera l retreat aL They will win not do this because the moral effect at home would be considerable considerable con con- s and in France it would be tre tre- tre- tre It would be the assurance 01 Of final victory for it would he be practically practical y the liberation of France and Germany German y would no longer have a single hold upon n the French which might serve as th the e basis boats for bargaining when the time es cometo comes come s to discuss peace Reserves Exhausted But in a addition if the Germans retire e fighting over every mile th the result will b be bethe e the total destruction of the country over eve r which they retreat and the German commanders commanders commanders com com- manders plainly reckon that the French Frenc people will presently weary of having al altheir all their n northern n country turned d into a rrt re nw i desert and a w waste and the sa same rul rum n overtake Lille Roubaix Tourcoing St St. Quentin and Laon which has overtaken overtake n Arras Soissons Rheims and Verdun If you are arc to believe one school of commentators commentators com corn and they have a strong appeal to credence the Germans Germane have actually actual reached the point where their reserves ar are e exhausted Mr Hilaire Belloc is the best bes t exponent of this view and he presents present e 3 weekly interesting evidence V yo support it This is the French view the view of th the e French officers from Joffre down th the e view that Joffre JoHre has recently expressed d both publicly and in private talks with wit h Americans who have repeated his wor word hd d to me i In the opinion of these men men Germany German y has no more men immediately available e and will have few men before next spring when the class of 1918 1913 will be available Now if this view of the French staff i is S correct and it is rs naturally based upon a avery avery very wide range of information and evidence evidence evi eve dence dente there will be a shortening of tit the e German lines in the West Vest before winter and it will not be a minor change it will wit willbe willbe I be a retirement far behind the present presen t front and the evacuation of all of France Again if the Germans are as short o of f men as the French general staff believes then there may be an actual disaster when whet I Ithe t the tho hI retreat begins hEg This Thi is what happened d to Lee Leo before Richmond lie held on with Insufficient numbers long after his military military military mili mili- tary Judgment counselled a retreat because because be because be- be cause political considerations prevented the abandonment of the Confederate capi capi- tal One of the best informed of my correspondents correspondents cor cor- correspondents respondents recently expressed the belief belle that a |