Show Marquis Marqus Childs Korea Blame Lies in Peace Hope V WASHINGTON ASHINGTON The fire ire firefighting firefighting irei fighting i operation in Korea tends from d day y to day and almost from hour to hour to get het out of hand Yet it is in that frame of oC reference reference putting putting out a local fire with the fire file apparatus readily available a that Pentagon Pentagon Pentagon Penta Penta- gon planners hoped to to keep the war The fire chief on the scene is General MacArthur He is re responding responding responding re- re to one alarm after another an an- other But for additional re resources re- re sources as they become necessary necessary necessary sary he must call on headquarters teis in Washington When MacArthur l decides that major additions to Americas America's troop strength in Korea are aie necessary necessary nee nee- essary some difficult decisions will have to be made here in Washington For For Forthe the additional forces cannot be found in Japan Military Unprepared In a series of articles article in the tile Philadelphia Evening Bulletin Carl Cail McCardle l just back from Korea and Tokyo makes males plain how unprepared military men inthe inthe in inthe the far Car east enst were for Cor the Communist Communist Communist Com Com- attack McCardle l an anable anable anable able and con conscientious reporter leporter says that in South Korea there was vas a determined complacence about the military menace of the Communists And this was true in spite of oC reports of oC the massing massing massing mass mass- ing of oC troops and tanks in North Korea Colonel Sterling Wright acting acting acting act act- ing commander of the American military advisory group roup of in South Korea said our Korean orean intelligence ence was so good that we knew 24 hours in advance ance every move the North Koreans had in mind He expressed the view that there would be sufficient warning of or an attack so that mines could be laid to stop any Communist tanks s which might get through So strong a was this confidence in the highest military quarters in Tokyo that the invasion m was considered to be no more moie than a raid In strength for the first fust 21 24 hours The North I Koreans or eans would retreat as soon as they met effective resistance All Don Doun n the Line It is easy far easy far too easy easy to to blame our professionals proCessionals and expel expel ex e pel pei ts for not warning us of oC the danger The fact is that we did not want to see the danger Something like a conspiracy of oC optimism existed from Crom the top with President Truman talking about how peace was nearer than at any time in the past five fhe years ears all down the line linc In this space at the end of ofay May ay I pointed out the danger of our becoming preoccupied with witha a quarrel over who lio was responsible responsible responsible sible for the mistakes of or the past I quoted the words spoken by Winston Churchill in England's England's England's Eng Eng- lands land's gravest hour in m June of or 1940 If the past undertakes cs to sit in judgment on the present present present pres pres- ent then the future will be lost 1051 It seemed to me as I said then that the present is a time of danger at least as great as June Jurie of oC 1940 when a totalitarian enemy had overwhelmed so much of the free world Even E inside the government to say nothing of oC public opinion there was too little agreement on the course to tobe tobe tobe be followed And optimistic and sometimes boasting boasting- statements were a substitute for vital decisions decisions decisions' deci deci- sioM and action urgently re re- re Surface A t The attack brought a aMM MM surface face agi agreement cement just as did the sneak attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor But there is still a deep division o er our goals foals and how to achieve e them Evidence of or this is seen inthe inthe in the action of the senate appropriations appropriations pi lations committee cutting down the point 1 4 program almost to zero The logic of or Senators Taft and Wherry is that if it we wc need more money for guns and planes then obviously we cant can't spare any for technical aid to Industrially in industrially industrially in- in backward peoples But if we are to tom win m in the struggle gre with Communism one is almost as important as the other To r resist the alm armed aimed d Communist Communist Com Com- enemy i is obviously iou vital It is nearly neaily a as important to win the loyalty loyally of ot Asian peoples who have lived so lon long at a R. submerged submerged submerged sub sub- merged level le If they once get the idea that we are interested solely in force then no amount of oC force lorce that we can bring bring- to bear will be sufficient to hold the line for a civilization based on the freedoms of- of of oC the west It is late as the Korean war has shown But perhaps It is not too late to try to understand understand understand under under- stand the meaning of what is happening in Asia Ala Copyright 1950 by United Feature Syndicate Inc Although war has ceased al almost almost almost al- al most er e everywhere nevertheless ne the desired peace has not arri ar ar- ar- ar ri rived ried ed Many na nations place obstacles obstacles obstacles ob ob- ob- ob in each others other's path and andas andas andas as trust fades there is a race lace to rearm leaving leaving- the souls of all fearful and suspended Pope Pius XII |