| Show fATEFUL DEC DECSON S ON i Hitler Moved on Russia To To End Red Blackmail Editors Editor's s Note This Is another another an nn other In a a. series of exclusive 6 Salt Lake Telegram articles artIcle revealing the tho top secret correspondence correspondence correspondence cor cor- between Hitler Biller and Mussolini ROME ROME Benito Benito Mussolini long had pleaded with Adolf Adol Hitler to compromise in his war against England and France Francc and turn the armed might of ot of n nazi Germany against soviet Russia Russa instead In June 1911 Hitler took the step that marched him toward his end H Here re is his confidential letter to M Mussolini announcing the de deci decision Ision l- l sion non and his hl reasons for tor it Berlin BerHn June 21 1911 1941 Duce I am writing you ou this letter at ata a moment in which preoccupying meditations which have lasted for months and a L t terrific expectation have ave yielded ed the tho gravest decision dc of my life liCe I believe alter after having reviewed the Russian situation and numerous numerous numer numer numerous ous ous' ous other reports report I 1 could not longer assume the responsibility of or waiting and I am convinced that there is no other oilier way of at eliminating eliminating ing this danger excepting by further further further fur fur- ther procrastination which would however lead to ruin juin this year or at the latest next The situation England has lost his war With the tho desperation of a a. person she he la Is grasping at nt every straw which mi might ht appear ap dP pear like an anchor of or safety N Nonetheless actually some Ome hopes are not lacking in logic England has hn up to now always waged her wars with the help of ot the conti conti- nent The destruction of ot France and above all nil the elimination ataU of at all aU the positions in western Europe has hM caused the attention of or British war war- warmongers mongers to be turned ever evermore evermore more toward that point from which they had sought in vain yain to start rt the war soviet Russia Both nations nation soviet Russia and England arc are equally interested In Inthe Inthe inthe the collapse of Europe rendered Europe rendered Impotent by a long war Behind these two countries In hiding but buta a trouble maker nonetheless is the United States tates From the Uie liquidation of ot Poland onward soviet Russia has been gripped by a tendency which which- even though It IUs ItIs Is cloaked with abilIty ability ability abil abil- ity and caution can caution can easily be linked to the bolshevik tendency to export diffusely the soviet regime The h lengthening of the war necessary necessary necessary sary for this exportation should be achieved by keeping the German forces tied down in the cast to prevent prevent prevent pre pre- vent the German command from launching an assault en masse masse- especially from the air air in in the west westI I 1 told you duce recently how the experiment of or Crete Crete and and the success has success-has has l shown hown that for an anSee anSee See Boo Page 2 2 Column 1 Hitler Hifler Attacked Russia To Block Blackmail r Continued from Page On One undertaking as u huge a. a as M the Invasion Inva Inva- mon sion of oC England It ft would be ie necessary necessary sary nary to pit pt even cn the last Jat airplane In this decisive e struggle it m may maywell y well b be that at the end victory will wilt come only by having the advantage advantage advantage ad ad- vantage of a few squadrons I shall shan not hesitate a single Instant In assuming assuming as as- suming such nuch a responsibility If it regardless of other considerations I i can be certain that I will not be attacked attached suddenly or even cven menaced menaced men men- aced need from the cast east Russian It AcU Activity The lIThe deployment of ot Russian force forces I I had general Gustav Jodl JodI German chief of staff give your military the last es estimates es- es is is enormous One could say ay that all alI available Russian forces are on our frontier Besides since the beginning of warm weather they have been very busy constructing fortifications If circumstances should Induce me to employ the Germa German air arm against England the danger might arise of ot Russia blackmail us in the north north and and in the south south south- blackmail to td which I I would have to yield silently because of air in in- in Above all it t would then be Impossible for me me meto to launch my ground forces against the Russian fortifications without the necessary sary air preparation and cover Now if I am told to avoid exposing exposing ex cx- posing myself to this danger It is necessary that no Incidents occur throughout 1941 to materially change the general situation But Buton Buton Buton on the other hand England will vill not be r ready a y for or p peace acc because it still places its hopes on the Russian Russian Russian Rus Rus- sian partnership And this hope will be more and more strengthened strengthened strengthened strength strength- ened as ss Russian army array preparations preparations preparations progress Besides for 1042 there Is the hoped-for hoped massive delivery of war yar materiel from the United States Fighting Imminent Over and above these considerations considerations considerations consid consid- duce we cannot even be certain that we shall have all this length of at time at our disposal since with th a 11 massing of ot such uch gigantic forces on both sides on sides on my part I too have ha been forced to dispatch an increasing number of armored units to the eastern border and put Finland and Romania Romania Ro Ro- mania In a state tate of alarm alarm it It is very likely that at any Rny moment the guns will shoot by themselves And a a. retreat on my part would result of in a grave graye loss o of ot prestige This would be bep p particularly deplorable for its repercussions in Japan Therefore after alter much ton I have arrived at the decision to cut the noose before it becomes too the tight In this way I believe duce to render this year to our common conduct of ot war the greatest possible service I sum rum up the general situation m of the moment thus II 1 On France now as previously previously previously pre pre- one can place little trust There Is no guarantee that north Africa will vill not become from one minute to another dissident 2 As for or your colonies duce north Africa is out of ot all aU danger until autumn I believe that the English with their last attack t wanted to free from its siege I do not believe that they will be in position to repeat this attempt in the near future 3 Spain is afraid and will take active part part part-I I fear Lear only when the war is won 4 In Syria on the long run French resistance with or without our help cannot last without enormous enormous enor enor- difficulty Egypt Attack Out 5 Before autumn an attack against Egypt is out of the ques ques- tion I consider it necessary however however however how how- ever in view of the general sItuation situation situation situa situa- tion to begin thinking about forming forming form form- ing in Tripoli Itself a concentration tion of maneuverable forces which can be launched if it necessary even toward the tho west It goes gocs without saying duce that on these plans absolute secrecy must be maintained maintained main main- tamed otherwise we cannot expect France to continue giving us its consent to the transportation of at arms and munitions through Its ports 6 Whether America enters Into the war or not Is indifferent since it is already helping our enemy nemy will all the forces it can muster 7 The situation In England itself Is bad The supply of foodstuffs foodstuffs food rood stuffs stutts and raw materials becomes ever more difficult The will to keep on fighting is based exclusively ex ex- on hopes These hopes arc are founded on two presuppositions Russia and America We Ve have no way of ot eliminating Amer Amer- ica The elimination of Russia will mean too an enormous lessening les Ics Ics- of pressure against Japan in the far east and with it comes i ithe the possibility that American in intentions intentions in- in may be strongly menaced by a Japanese intervention I have decided as I said before under the circumstances to put an end to the hypocritical game of the Kremlin I presume that presume that is I Iam Iam Iam am convinced that convinced that in this war which will free Europe's future t from a great danger Finland and Romania will take tnie part Accepts With Gratitude Gen Marras Marra your has hW informed me mc that you Duce will also place at my disposal at least t tone one corps If It this be your Intention duce duce which which I lac- lac ac accept accept ac- ac ept naturally with a heart filled tilled with gratitude there gratitude there Is time enough Ch for its realization since In such a v vast t theater of war thep the p push h cannot come cone everywhere at once You can however duce make a a. really reany decisive contribution by reinforcing your armies in North Africa and possibly also turning your attention from Tripoli to the west by forming a a. contingent even small now which In iii case ofa of ofa ofa a treaty violation by the French can march into France And finally finally finally final final- ly by intensifying the air war and wherever possible that of the sub sub- submarines marines in the Mediterranean As far as aa the thc security of western western west west- ern era territories from Norway all the way to and including France we are sufficiently strong to be beable beable beable able to face any eventuality with lightning rapidity As for the air war against England we shall shaH for a time as assume assume as as- sume Burne the defensive This does not mean naturally that we are not in position to match British attacks attacks attacks at at- tacks against Germany On the contrary We Ve can if it need be continue continue continue con con- aa M we have to date violent bombing of metropolitan Britain Our defense of fighters will also be sufficient It is formed by the best squadrons we possess Expect Tough Battle The war in the east cast duce will certainly b be tough but I do donot donot donot not doubt for one minute its complete complete com corn success I hope above all aU that it will be p possible to procure in the Ukraine for tor a long time a common common cornmon com corn mon base of ot food supply capable of providing what wh-at we may have need for in the future I must add at once however that that according according to present indications the indications the German German Ger Ger- man harv harvst st this year will be very plentiful If I duce am sending you this communication only at nt this moment moment mo mo- ment it is because the definite decision was made only at 7 7 to to- to night I warmly urge you above all aU not to make any mention of it to your ambassador In Moscow because because because be be- cause we are not absolutely certain certain tam tain that our coded messages s are bein being decoded I myself will have the decision c communicated to my ambassador at the v very ry l last st moment The material I propose to have published little by little is so voluminous voluminous vol vol- that the world world that that wl which ch does not belong to the part which is our enemy for reasons reasons rea rca sons of principle and for far which every argument is in vain will vain will have the opportunity to marvel rather at our patience than our decision Now come what may duce our situation will ilI not be In the least compromised by this in tia- tia live five It can only improve Even if at the end of this year I should hould be bo forced to still leave in Russia 60 or 70 divisions they would represent represent represent rep rep- resent but a part of the forces which I have permanently been employing on the eastern front If It England however should not learn a lesson from this hard reality then with our rear free we can dedicate ourselves with increased forces to the liquidation of at this adversary In conclusion I can tell teU you one other thing duce From the moment I took this decision I feel my spirit again free Despite all the sincerity of my efforts to achieve a distension a delay or extension of events it was often very embarrassing to march sIdeby side sideby sideby by side with Russia because in a a. certain sense I felt that I was repudiating my own past my ideas and previous promises I am happy now to have freed myself from this torment t. t With cordial greetings of ot comradeship com corn your Adolph Hitler After an Interval of at some Borne months the correspondence is resumed resumed resumed re re- re- re with reports from Mussolini Mussolini Mussolini Musso Musso- lini to Hitler on Italy's falling failing military operations in North Africa Alrica Af At- rica and elsewhere Copyright 1945 by King Features Features Fea Fea- tures Lures Syndicate 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