Show I Behind the War News Major Maior Eliot By Major George Fielding Eliot Occasionally it is a good idea to review facts which we all an know perfectly well but which tend to be lost in the shuffle of daily dally events Such a review of the German defensive system along their western frontier may maybe maybe maybe be useful just at this time The basic natural features upon which the German defenses are arc based is the river Rhine from the Swiss frontier to the North sea The Rhine runs generally generally gen gen- generally from south to north from the Swiss frontier to the vicinity of Duisburg then swings round westward in a long curve As it enters the Netherlands it divides di di- di divides I vides into two parallel branches I The southern branch and the larger is called callea by the Dutch the Waal Vaal the northern is called either the Lek or Neder Rijn Both flow into the North sea The river Maas Meuse ro roughly parallels parallels' this is curving course of the Rhine to the west and south The ista dista ce between the two rivers ten tends s to grow less as they approach the sea finally the Maas and Waal Vaal join to form the Hollandsch Diep From the point of view of the German high command the Maas may be said to for form an outlying defense position to the Rhine These river systems are the basis for the German plan of defense on the northern half of ot the front Forests inundations and fortified towns are used as part of the system of defense but it is fair to say that if it the final barrier of the Rhine is breached the Germans cannot thereafter prevent a deep allied penetration of Germany The situation at the moment is as follows On On the extreme German right the Hollandsch Diep and the Maas form the dividing line between between be be- tween the two armies An al allied al- al lied advance here would still have before it the barrier of the Neder Rijn and widespread inundations inundations in inundations in- in as well From the area area of to tl the e edge of the Reichswald forest just inside the German frontier the allies alUes hold a wide wade and deep bridgehead on the north side sido of the Maas The allies hold bridges over the Maas at Grave and Mook At Nijmegen on the the thet Waal the allies also hold a a abridge bridge over the Waal Vaal and a bridgehead extending up to the south bank of ot the Neder Rijn The Germans hold areas on the f south bank of the Neder Rijn both east and west of this allied bridgehead The allied bridgehead over the Maas is a constant threat to the Germans especially toward the southeast because its western western western west west- ern flank as well as as its communications communications com communications com com- are secure The allied bridgehead over the Waal Vaal is a threat but of less potential potential potential poten poten- danger because neither of its flanks can be described as secure I From the vicinity of Mook to the southeast and south the Maas Maa again forms the front line all the way to M where whereas as at Venlo there is a German bridgehead on the west bank of the Maas Between Venlo and the Maas is joined by the river Roer flowing northwesterly northwesterly northwesterly north north- westerly into it The corner between the the- Maas the Roer Hoer and the allied front in this arca area is 18 held by the Germans It is an anarea anarea anarea area of considerable interest for if it were cleared out the allies could come up to the Roer all along this front greatly increasing in increasing in- in creasing their pressure on that subsidiary river line At a point near Julich the Roer becomes the frone line and with its affluent the Inde hide which has been crossed extends extends ex ex- extends tends the line south to the edge of the great Hurtgen forest through which the American First army has been advancing painfully for weeks and from the eastern fringes of which its advance elements are but now emerging South of this forest difficult terrain extends right down to the Lorraine hills All this geographic description description tion may seem difficult to fol fol- fol- fol low But if you will reflect on I Ithe the situation aided by a map you will see that that If the main German concentration along the Roer and in front of the Hurtgen Hurtgen Hurtgen Hurt- Hurt gen forest is to be forced to extend extend extend ex ex- tend Its front and eventually outflanked this must be done in one of several ways but the most promising is by a forcing of the Maas Maas' somewhere between between be be- tween Mook and Roermond so as to turn the line of the Roer If it were successful It would almost certainly force a German retirement right back to the Rhine and might succeed in cutting cutting cutting cut cut- ting off and destroying a considerable considerable considerable con con- part of the relatively immobile German armies It Is in this area that the allied forces dispose of the most consid considerable number of divisions not at present present present pres pres- ent heavily engaged the First Canadian army and a part of f the British Second army under the very able and experienced command of Field M Mar Marshal a r s h a 1 Montgomery |