Show Behind the War News Major Maior Eliot By Major George Fielding Eliot To the average American no doubt the J Japanese campaign In Honan province directed toward obtaining possession of the railway seems pretty remote and hardly at all connected with any part of the war in which Americans are vitally interested We had better take a long look at this operation and see what the consequences consequences con con- sequences of Japanese success are likely to berVe be We are all familiar with Admiral Admiral Admiral Ad Ad- miral NImitz's frank statement that he Is on his way to China and that only through the es establishment establishment establishment es- es of ot powerful united nations air and land forces on the continent of Asia can the final reckoning with Japan be commenced We all realize by this time that this cannot be accomplished ed overland from India India In In- dia the going is too tough When we come to China in real fighting strength we must come comeby comeby comeby by sea Likewise when at long last we are able to bring real aid and comfort to our Chinese allies in quantities sufficient for forthe forthe forthe the enormous need we can do doso doso doso so only by sea I But it will not be sufficient to establish command of ot the waters off oft the Chinese coast The way will then be open it Is true for forthe forthe forthe the passage of ships the English English English Eng Eng- lish channel Is open In like man man- ner ncr But how about the transfer transfer transfer trans trans- fer of men and stores from ship to shore Are we going to have to fight our way ashore in China as presen presently Uy we shall have to fight our way ashore In Europe If so it is going to be a tre tremendously tremendously tre- tre costly and bloody operation operation op op- op- op oration especially considering the distances from our own cen cen- of or power and from any possible possible possible pos pos- sible advance base we may get There are two favorable factors factors factors fac fac- tors In the present situation which make a great deal of dif dif- dif dif- ference First the Chinese al already already already al- al ready hold considerable stretches of ot coastline Including at least one very good port and one second rate port Wen- Wen chow It is true that these ports do not have rail connection connection connection tion with the interior nor very good road connections but they would be a beginning Second I Ithe the Japanese in the area of or Canton and the thc the tw two major ports of south China which do have excellent rail connections connections connections con con- with the interior interior are are isolated from the main Japanese Japanese Japanese Japa Japa- nese armies and thus are susceptible susceptible susceptible sus sus- to attack by the Chinese if we can give the latter enough air support It is for this purpose purpose purpose pur pur- pose in all likelihood that Genera General General Gen Gen- era eral Stilwell is now fighting to open the Ledo road to a connection connection con con- with the Chinese road system The additional supplies available by this road might give us enough air power in south China to tip the balance in the I area of ot Canton The Japanese have a chance to change the situation in their favor If they can Improve their communications between north China and south China As long longas as these communications are by sea as they now are the Japanese Japanese Japanese Japa Japa- nese cannot hope to do very much But if they can open di direct direct direct di- di rail communications then they may be able to forestall Stilwell and Nimitz by getting possession of the south Chinese railways by taking and by defeating the Chi Chi- nese armies and by converting the thc Chinese coastline into a fortified forti forU- fied fled Japanese defensive position In order orde to do this they must be able to bring to bear concentric concentric concen concen- efforts from and from Shanghai with some additional additional addi add push northward from Can Can- ton So far all their efforts south of the Yangtze have failed because they have never been able to concentrate enough strength in the area for fora a really powerful sustained of of- of The Chinese holding central positions on the railroad have been able to defeat Japanese columns in detail If the present gap on the Pel ping Hank ow line is closed if it trains can run directly into from north China Man- Man and the ports on the Sea of Japan then Japan then the military position of will be a avery avery avery very different one and then we shall almost certainly see the beginning of the really crucial struggle for the military control of south China In that struggle we Americans have an enormous stake as already explained For Japan the control of ot south China has now become a vital and compelling necessity |