Show Behind the W War News F Major Malor i Eliot Says Ys By MAJOR GEORGE FIELDING ELLIOTT After an heroic defense lastIng lastIng lasting last- last Ing 27 days subsequent to the fall of Bataan the little garrison garrison garrison garri garri- son of Corregidor has been over over- whelmed The enemy's principal gain in a strategic sense is the fact that the Japanese fleet can now use Manila bay with its docks and other resources This is the best harbor in the Philippines Philippines Philip Philip- Philippines pines and its use will be considerable considerable considerable con con- advantage to the Japanese Japanese Japanese Jap Jap- anese both as a point of support along their lines of communications communications communications to Malaya and Burma andas and andas andas as a possible central position for their fleet as operations develop in the southern and southwestern southwest southwest- I ern era Pacific area In the latter sense Manila is far less exposed than any of the various lagoon of the mandated mandated mandated man man- dated islands The fleet stationed stationed stationed sta sta- sta- sta at Manila has the strategic strategic strategic stra stra- advantage of two exits into the Pacific one north of Luzon and the other by way ofSan of ofSan ofSan San Bernardino strait The northern exit is covered by Formosa Formosa Formosa For For- mosa and the southern by the Japanese positions in the Palau Palau Palau Pa- Pa lau islands From the moral poi point t of view the Japanese have gained nothing nothing nothing noth noth- ing from the fall of Corregidor The very fact that men were able to hold out so long coming after the revelation to the world of the small size of the garrison of Bataan makes it clear enough that given anything anything any any- thing like equal odds the Japanese Japanese Japanese Jap Jap- anese are no match for American Amen Ameri can or Filipino troops are realists and the frantic outburst of the Japanese propaganda after Bataan shows clearly how much the Japanese fear the drawing of the correct conclusions in this respect by the peoples of Asia whom they hope to over The Japanese 1 themselves know well how t 1 ly and thinly their limited f fo to are spread out and they ar area are ginning to understand that which they are arel countering at the ends of t th th far flung lines of tion are increasingly for them to deal with It is Is' thing to smash the resist of a small and isolated gar like that of Luzon it i is S another to go four or five q J ti th tho- tho and miles from ones one's h ho- ho 1 bases and there to build to maintain enough fight power to defeat an enemy o 0 of perlor total resources in a o Cc area like India or or orI A A I 1 As to Corregidor itself f Japanese methods were w V wi might have been expected soon as they had posses themselves of Bataan Ih objective was then to enough heavy guns within r raj of the island fortress to b down and silence the defend batteries and particularly th of lighter caliber covering t beaches and water approach Certainly the Japanese sui very heavy losses in this p pr press pit ess because of the fact that t I heavy guns of the fortress J the range and exact location every possible battery posit on either shore j i J JAs As soon as the Japanese w tv wable vu able to get enough guns i position to put the beach beah and the light and 1 American batteries out oct action a water-borne water ass assa t became possible No do shortages of food and ammu tion were contributing fact r rand and the physical condition conditio the garrison must h have ve bi be steadily deteriorating on rations and under the stra strain constant bombardment j Copyright 1942 N N. Y Tribur Inc I |