Show Behind the War News Major Maior Eliot Says I 11 By MAJOR GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT The military situation in Burma remains somewhat confused confused confused con con- fused but certain points about it ar are becoming clarified The British forces have almost entirely entirely entirely en en- withdrawn from Burma into India outnumbered and with insufficient equipment they have done all they could The defense of Burma is now in inthe inthe inthe the hands of the Chinese aided by British and American air support The Japanese are scattered scattered scattered scat scat- all over the country in small detachments apparently being in no great force at any anyone anyone anyone one point There are several sizable Chinese detachments well within Burma in positions which endangers the communications communications communications of the Japanese forces I but their own communications are likewise not too safe The Japanese are dependent for their main supplies and reinforcements reinforcements reinforcements rein rein- on sea transport through the port of Rangoon There are no existing roads or railways from Thailand into Burma save one mountain road in the north From Rangoon the Japanese must use the railways railways railways rail rail- ways for the most part though river transport on the dy river and others is available In the monsoon season the roads will be difficult and cross coun try movement in lower Burma and along the coast impossible But the use of rail transport raises the problem of coal Formerly Formerly Formerly For For- merly coal for the Burmese railways railways rail ran ways was imported from Bengal Bengal Bengal Ben Ben- gal now the Japanese will have to bring it to Rangoon by sea Altogether therefore the dependence of the Japanese on the port of Rangoon is almost complete a fact which must be considered in connection with the growing number of united nations range long-range aircraft in India Moreover the Japanese must if they are to enjoy free use of Rangoon maintain full command command command com com- mand of its sea approaches which means that they must al always always always al- al ways have a certain amount of na naval val strength in the Bay of Bengal a permanent detachment detachment detachment detach detach- ment from their fleet in the Pacific All of these considerations affect affect affect af af- the ability of the Japanese to use Burma as a springboard for an invasion of India or of China It seems unlikely that they can under present conditions conditions conditions condi condi- build up in Burma a sufficiently sufficiently sufficiently powerful effort to in in- in vade India As for first China ft the attempt in that direction seems to have failed bu but be renewed There are ma also some other signs of also activity in China which sIgnify signify a Japanese at attempt tn ma to knock out the Chinese S Japanese annie troops are report reported concentrating at Ha south of Shanghai A and ad series ot cf concentric efforts from s Bu from French from Indo-China Indo and from Shanghai seems to be within th the Hies of the immediate future p China But f Japanese operations operations in h might have less far fu reaching objectives The Jap i anese high command may be looking forward to a day When its sea communications With Indo-China Indo Thailand Malaya a and Burma may be Imperiled bi b American naval pressure in the Ih Pacific Should this Ceci occur i would then be imperative f from the Japanese point of view S y to I have land communication ith th those areas which areas which does not now exist Their purpose in China Slay may therefore be primarily to clear the Canton railway the the V I middle portion of which ii Is ti In Chinese hands at present If this line can be cleared there should f be no insurmountable difficulty difficulty in connecting Canton with N Nan ning and thus with th the Indo Info Chinese railway system and the Japanese are already repotted reported to be engaged in constructor constructing two short rail lines in which will have the effect of ot linking up the Indo-Chinese Indo sy tern tem with that of Thailand With unlimited forced labor available there is no reason why the comparatively com ce small amount of construction con coo for these purposes cannot can not be accomplished this summer sum sum- mer men and it would then be possible pos sible for the Japanese to more mOTe troops and goods by rail all aU the tie way from and Korea Ko lio rea to Singapore always provided proVided provid provid- ed they can push the Chine Chines back from the vital link betty betwee and Canton These are some of the co con considerations which must be in th minds of the Japanese high co comand comand com command mand as they survey their con can continental continental position with one eye eji on the Russians in the nor norand and another on the Chinese li lithe Is Ii the south Their problems a are neither simple nor easy but bu they are problems which mus must mut be solved and solved quickly Like Germany Japan has a toe tine limit for victory |