Show Behind the War News Major Maior Eliot I I By Major GeorgE Georg Fielding Eliot Both the united nations and the Germans now appe appear r to be reluctant to invest more troops or more materiel on the Italian front Evidence continues to accumulate accumulate accumulate ac ac- ac- ac cumulate which suggests suggest that both sides have classified Italy as M an area of limited objective with limited means in other words one in which the respective respective respective tive commanders must get along with what they already have and cannot hope for extensive reinforcements From the united nations' nations viewpoint viewpoint viewpoint view view- point this Is probably occasioned occasioned occasioned occa occa- as already ady suggested in these articles by a up stepping-up of the date for a major offensive in western Europe Presuming such a a decision to have been taken at Moscow and confirmed at Teheran it would call for the concentration of every division every air squadron every landing landing landing land land- ing craft that could pOS possibly be made available for it The Italian campaign would from that time forward be considered merely in inthe inthe inthe the light of a diversion and the principle which applies to all diversions would become operative operative operative opera opera- tive That no diversion is justified justified justified justi justi- fied which does not draw off from the main front at least an equal hand nd and if possible a superior force of the enemy that which is used to create the diversion Applied Applied Applied Ap Ap- Ap- Ap plied to Italy the yardstick would be the number of German troops and planes which can be occupied and held fast in Italy So considered the Balkan peninsula peninsula peninsula pe pe- pe- pe perhaps offers better opportunities opportunities opportunities op op- for diversionary ry effort effort effort ef ef- ef- ef fort than Italy does After all the real diversion in Italy has already been effected the effected the whole Italian army navy and air force have been taken out of the war the German troops have ve had to tobe tobe tobe be used as replacements Thata That isa ts is tsa a real major diversion The Balkans may offer a similar similar sim similar sim- sim ilar opportunity opportunity-an an opportunity to force the Germans to expend disproportionate efforts on long lines of communications Of course one of the best kinds of diversion is one which is effected in whole or in part by forces which be used on the main front but which compels the enemy to divert forces which he could otherwise employ Certainly the Yugoslav and Greek patriot forces could not be used in west western rn Europe neither could the Turkish army neither could the fighting power of a revolting Bulgaria or a disillusioned disillusioned disillusioned Rumanian peasantry yet yeta a diversion in the Balkans might compel the Germans to di divert divert di vert good German troops to deal with some or all of th these e in far greater measure than would otherwise be necessary ary Remember that guerrilla warfare warfare warfare war war- fare is at its best when it is being used in connection with an organized military effort Guerillas Guerillas las whose operations operations' can be disregarded disregarded disregarded dis dis- dis- dis regarded or left to future at attention attention attention at- at in an area where there is no organized enemy force become become become be be- come an acute peril when they are operating in the communications communications zone of an army which is carrying on a distant and hard- hard fought Sought campaign Thus if the allies could open an offensive directed against the Aegean islands the sum total of the diversion of German fighting fighting fight fight- ing power from western Europe would amount not only to that necessary to defend the island strongholds but but I also to that necessary to deal with the Yugoslav Yugoslav Yugoslav Yugo Yugo- slav and Greek guerillas operating operating operating oper oper- on the German lines of communication plus that necessary necessary necessary sary to keep the Bulgarians from sliding out of the war under the impact of the allied blows in the near-by near Aegean plus that necessary necessary necessary sary to guard against the Turks suddenly switching to active bel bel- bel- bel plus that necessary to keep the r rest t of the Balkans In hand Whereas if it there were no allied threat in the middle east eMt the and the would be doing much of the Balkan Balkan Balkan Bal Bal- kan police pollee work the Turks would not be looking for trouble and only a minimum of German force would be required These are the reasons why the present time seems so favorable for a diversion in the direction of the Aegean sea the gateway to the Balkans and the Darda Darda- nelles The employment of half half- dozen a-dozen allied in such an effort would certainly have havethe havethe havethe the effect of diverting three times as many German divisions from other fronts vor or or in the alternative the Germans would have to give up a gr great at part of the Balkans altogether and retire retire retire re re- re- re tire to the line of the Danube and the Savo which would in turn mean the opening of a new southern front with the Turkish army in line beside the reconstituted reconstituted armies of Greece and Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Yu Yu- and the Germans even worse off as regards their effectives effectives tives for fol other fronts The decisive effort in the war against Germany will be made by an Anglo-American Anglo landing landingin in western Europe All military events In Europe must now be weighed in that balance considered considered considered consid consid- ered in the light of how they affect for good or ill the fortunes fortunes fortunes for for- tunes of that coming supreme effort for tor victory Here is thereal the thereal thereal real reason for the stalemate te In Italy here is the real reason for current talk of a Balkan diversion diver diver- sion |