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Show several successful operations ha' inflicted such losses upon the enemy en-emy as to be willing to assume the offensive and invite a show-down battle under adverse circumstances. circumstan-ces. ' Hitler Unable To Win War In 1942 . . . Despite German successes in the Caucasus and the battle for Stalingrad, Sta-lingrad, we are inclined to the opinion that August, 1942, will, in a retrospective view, be considered the definite turning point of the great struggle. This view takes into consideration the probability of additional ad-ditional Russian reverses, the possibility pos-sibility of surprising developments in Africa where Gen. Rommel may deliver new blows, and even repeated re-peated rumors that Franco may plunge Spain into war on the side of the Axis. The past month has shown the power of the United States being thrown into battle, with evidence of our strength increasing rapidly in critical areas. It has revealed, we think, the failure of Hitler's plan to crush the Russians, which means another winter campaign and that the Nazis will have to maintain millions of men in the Eost. The steady aerial bombardment bombard-ment of the industrial plants of the Reich is gradually weakening the Nazis' producing power, which is as vital a part of Hitler's war machine ma-chine as the army itself. Some Serious Defeats Slay Come ... Readers should not misinterpret the war situation. It is grave and serious but nothing has happened to indicate that; the Axis can win the war in 1942. Smashing victories in Russia and Africa in the next four months would not bring about a defeat of the United Nations, unless accomplished by the abject surrender of Great Britain and the United States, which is beyond possibility. j i i i i i 1 1 1 11 FORWARD MARCH By II. S. Sims, Jr. TMAR HIGH TO TROVE JicciSlVE FACTOR Lre fi&Min6 n the Solomon area emphasizes the vital Ki-?.nce of the seizure of some STSid- by forces under 0f fdmiral Robert Lee Ghorm- filiating our first definite 4isive against the Japanese T he "turn" of the war in the fl may become decisive if the Sd States can hold, and then Z its breach in the defensive "fit the Japanese are de, r: Llv attempting to consolidate F order to make certain their fre of the vast domain seized the first six months of the war. seeks To Hold Cains The Tokyo war lords are wag-ine wag-ine an intelligent war. They have Already secured rich sources of Lntial raw materials, the devel-Lent devel-Lent of which will immensely then Japan's war potential. depends, however, upon the Lection of the far-flung supply Irtes which are threatened by our attack in the Solomons. When Japan started the war, the Japanese offensives clicked be-cause be-cause of well-laid plans, excellently executed by overwhelming forces. This combination of naval, aerial and land forces was irresistible when opposed by inferior forces, widely scattered and considerably Lhus opens the way for an attack from Australia. This explains, we believe, the strong Japanese reaction to the successful Marine occupation of certain of the Solomon Islands. In this area the U. S. fleet operates at a disadvantage, being much further fur-ther from its base than the Japanese Japan-ese warships. Our lines of supply are five or six times as long as those of Japan. The encouraging factor is that the navy, after about nine months of warfare, has recovered from the Pearl Harbor attack and through disorganized. 4 Jap Strategy Mainly Defensivo ... There is no reason to suspect that Japan has accomplished her ambitious program, which probably prob-ably includes the occupation of Hawaii and Alaska, but it is obvious ob-vious that, for the present, the Japanese desire a breathing spell. This would permit the consolidation consolida-tion of gains, the replacement of expended materiel and an opportunity oppor-tunity to await the outcome of the fighting in Russia before undertaking under-taking another move. In the meantime Japanese strategy stra-tegy continued offensively in the Coral Sea and Midway engagements, engage-ments, as well as in operations against the Aleutians. The first was intended to threaten Australia and to bar just what the Navy attempted at-tempted in the Solomon Islands. The Midway and Aleutian attacks were designed to eliminate our capacity ca-pacity for launching offensives against Japan from these Pacific bases. Solomon Islands Important Base . . . Japan is anxious (1) to cut our supply lines to Australia and (2) to block every avenue of attack. Behind a ring of fortified island bases, she hopes to develop an empire em-pire that will include Burma, Ma-' laya, the Dutch and other islands, as well as China and, eventually, Siberia, India and Australia. This will be impossible if the United States breaks through the defensive defen-sive ring, via the Solomons, and |