Show J TPA tTIGHTENS HER GRIP ON THE I COAST OF ASIA JaASIA pntinuefl Military Activity of the Japanese Shows an Especially Significant Feature Just Now in the Strong Naval Base Which Has Been Established at Makung Six Hundred Miles from Manila HOSE observers who have I made a study of Japans policy long ago became Impressed Im-pressed with her apparent determination to be the dominant nation of the L to control Asia and to enthrone ppon as mistress of the entire Orl t That the Pacific will be the eater of the great commercial wars the future If It Is not the scene of nfilct of some other nature has also en freely predicted hanks to the territory which she ung from the conquered In her two ent wars Japan has now an almost broken cordon strung along the eat eastern seaboard of China A once at the appended map will show r chain of Island possessions reach southward as far as Formosa and Pescadores a chain of Isles which reckoned as of vast Importance In 9 Piled States proceeds much more llMly In the future than It has in tho 1st with the building of a complete val l station In tho Philippines the Blanese will have superior reach ities at Makung Pn the case also of an attempt by llian to occupy tho Philippines with o1s l > Makung harbor would make an Dmlralile hiding place and protection transports which would be out of lrh of an American licet In case tho nibo warships were defeated In tile l and which could bo icadlly I1lght to Manila and other Philippine IB in the event of a Japanese naval ftory TS Is a possibility thnt naval olll s In Washington havo been quick to and appreciate There Is no actual let tint Japan intends wllrnt pros t Yet the existence of a powerful 111 base at Makuug 1 occupied by a L tlun of great naval efllclency and a F Ion which would also pioflt great I 1 possession of tho Philippines orally considered a matter of 1m fiance to this country span Is heavily jn debt and sho I certainly cannot afford to go to war now and her government knows this But it sees with equal clearness the necessity of looking forward and tho necessity of making provision for tho things that may happen or to put It differently the wisdom of taking measures to prevent what it is desired flhould not happen Makung harbor Is in the Pescadores islands which lie In the 100 mlle wWa waterway that separates Formosa from the Chinese mainland It Is nearly 1000 miles from the nearest naval base In the Japanese islands proper and is only about GOO miles from Manila Hitherto the Island of Formosa had been something of a burden bur-den upon Japan But her possession of that island together with her possession pos-session of Pescadores has made pos slblo to Japan a strategic advance which may fairly bo compared for 1m 1 r r r r IE i i Residence of Governor General Formosa a t pans struggle for dominion be that I Juggle for commercial supremacy or > military success hat Japan has been doing with ese outlying possessions becomes refore a I subject which at the pres ft moment must have a peculiar In lest Realizing this the New York mes has made an exhaustive Inquiry o the matter and herewith presents r results of Its investigations y I ESIDRS heavily fortifying tho 3 island of Formosa a part of tt > e r territory which she had wrested s from China after her triumph jer that nation Japan has now estab Jhed a strong naval base at Makung harbor In tho Pescadores Makung Is about COO miles distant from Ma pa and Japans purpose In establish a naval base at that place is the r st interesting feature of the work In nlch she has recently been engaged Against what nation will she make la of Making as a baseS base-S hat Could Be Done with Makung I a Base Against the Philippines IThe first suggestion and one that ems to be particularly natural InV In-V of our present relations with pallIs that Makung would serve an base of operations against the Jilllpiilnes The nearest American Ival base to the Philippines Is Ha fell 4800 miles away With Ma Ing only COO miles from Manila the Ipanese fleet would have obviously i Iiat advantage over an American it let supposing that tho operations > uld take place in tho neighborhood Manila And certainly unless the port an co to Japan with the advance made by Russia when sho reached Port Arthur Its Marked Strategic Advantages Advan-tages as a WellProtected Harbor From the point of view of protection by land fortifications Making bay is exceptionally well situated It has also an outpost at Ainping on the southwest south-west coast of Formosa with which it is connected by cable The practical value of this cable connection will be evident It it is assumed that a Japan ess fleet Is lying at Makung harbor in wait for an enemy In fact the situation situa-tion as it existed in the spring of 1905 when the Russian fleet under Rojest vensky was making its way toward Japan is an excellent example by which to test the question When the Russian fleet was approaching ap-proaching tho Strait of Malacca Japanese Japa-nese scouts went far south through tho China sea to keep watch of tho enemys movements but the main fleet was of necessity kept In strictly home waters both because of tho existence ex-istence of several avenues by which the Russians might approach Vladivostok Vladi-vostok and of tho extreme undesira blllty of attempting to fight a battle many hundreds of miles from a naval base where necessary repairs could bo made or where tho fleet could go Into retreat In case of defeat 1 It Is quite likely that Admiral Togo would not have chosen to fight the Russian fleet In the north of the China sea even had Mnkung been a fully developed baso at that time Hut If Makung had been so developed in 1003 It would have been entirely practicable for Togo to have met the enemy far from Japanese waters Watching Straits of Formosa an Easy Matter from Makung Any European fleet moving against Japan would almost of necessity take the course followed bj tho Russians from tho tlmo they left the Indian ocean and from Makung as a 1 base Japan would be In a position to keep Formosa straits Pes close watch over cadoies channel and tho passages to Formosa and the between the east Philippines In the case of a German fleet there would bo an obvious advantage ad-vantage In giving battle In this region because the German fleet would Won he still far distant Irons Its only home e easlKlao Chow German in the port wlrshJ1s which might have to take as some of the Russian cruisers flight oattlo of the Sea of the after dill In Japan would have to take refuse Stnl ports where they would bo Interned In-terned during the lost of the Will From another point of view Mnkung baso would give Japan a naval I a ns value In relation position of Peculiar routes Of to the great commmcial the lines from North America to eastern east-ern Chinese ports along the Hong Sons Ho either between the Japanese Simula ut tho north or through the 3alllngtnn channel between Formosa and Luzon Tho trado routes from Europe Eu-rope to all Chinese ports along the longKong tie In tho space between Formosa anti China A fleet at Ma kung would therefore have at Its mercy practically all the trade with China north of llong Kong Commerce Com-merce destruction Is charitably supposed sup-posed to bo a thing 6f tho past Yet It commerce destruction ever showed that It would turn the scale In a great naval warfare It Is not to be doubted that belligerents would adopt It But even short of commerce destruction tho Japanese position at Makung would glvo Japanese warships a peculiarly pe-culiarly good chance to embarrass commerce by search for contraband Formosa Treated Differently In Japans Plans for Supremacy while It appears that Japan has directed her chief energies toward thee the-e of a strong naval baso at Makung her efforts In Formosa have been on an equal though somewhat some-what different scale This was her first effort at colonization and shows what the little brown men are capable of When China after the stress oCher oC-her war with Japan ceded Formosa to her conquerors tho Island was ono of the wildest of all In that region savage headhunters occupying most 1 of Its territory and the few seacoast towns the embodiment of the worst i I features of Chinese occupancy squalid filthy out of touch with civilization civili-zation unprogressive A recent visitor vis-itor to the Island who had been made familiar with It prior to Japanese occupancy oc-cupancy testifies that there was little or no machinery to carry out the work of civil government Tho treasury was depleted the records were in a state of hopeless confusion there had been I no attempt at sanitation and tho filth and squalor of the towns were appalling appal-ling The natives had grown accustomed accus-tomed to this state of affairs and were ill sulted for tho system and order which their new rulers seemed determined deter-mined to bring about Effects of Japanese Rule as Seen In Better Regulations Baron Shlmpel Goto a physician by profession and formerly president of the bureau of hygiene in Tokyo Is now the civil governor of Formosa He recently re-cently made an extended report of his administration of the Islands affairs In this ho said that when Formosa was placed under the sovereignty of Japan a feeling of anxiety was entertained enter-tained as to the effects of the new regime The recurring outbreaks of Insurgents was one of tho greatest difficulties encountered Attempts to suppress them by superior force were resorted to and then conciliatory measures were adopted Prior to the Japanese occupancy there were no public schools In Formosa For-mosa Now primary schools for Japanese Japa-nese children have been established In all of the important towns There are also auxiliary schools those being for the benefit of the native youim Ono year after tho cession of tho Island a central language school was established for the double purpose of teaching Japanese to tho natives and tho native dialects to the Japanese For the savages a large number of schools have been opened In the outlying out-lying districts In order that all the schools bo equipped In accordance with modern ideas educators were recently re-cently bent to Europe and to this country to make a study of educational educa-tional matters The Island has an area approximately approx-imately as large as that of Long Island I Is-land Tho population Is estimated at about 3000000 Seljl Hlshlda of Columbia Col-umbia university Is authority for tho statement that In the first your of thel Japanese administration China con I timed to enjoy tile lions share of tho Formosan trado Ten years later I Japans trado with Formosa exceeded ho total trado of Formosa with alt foreign countries The foreign exports ex-ports In 1904 were 12301124 yon tits imports for the same year being 11 838443 yen With Formosa and the Pescadores already In her possession Japan now only needs tho Philippines to complete the chain of Islands guarding tho entire eastern seaboard of Japan In tho entirely Irely unlikely event of tho United States giving up the Philippines and trusting them to the tender mercies of native government It Is certain that Philippine Independence would bo of exceedingly brief duration Few seriously seri-ously believe that tho Filipinos are capable of managing their own affairs without falling Into a stato of anarchy that would early In tho game demand the forcible Intervention of foreign powers for tho protection of their citizens citi-zens in tho Islands Awaiting a Filipino Republic Before Completing Program As tho history of tho Samoan Islands Illustrates very vividly protection of interests is exceedingly prompt when there Is anything to be gained by it and In tho event of tho coming of a wholly Independent Filipino republic I It is safe to assume that Japanese interest in-terest In tho islands would suddenly 1 reach a degree of Importance of which I there Is no present sign Germany and in a lesser degree Franco havo shown an active disposition to accept such Southern Pacific trifles In tho way of Islands as wore open to occupation and American abandonment of tho Philippines Philip-pines would seem to promise tho probability prob-ability of a struggle between Germany and Japan for the possession of them Iirlll l the-m 1 hues w Ono obvious motive for Japans wanting tho Philippines Is the outlet they would glvo for her emigration and tho resources they would give her Manchuria and Korea It Is true are now absorbing a great portion of Japanese energy but no ono Is so rich or so busy that ho would refuse to pick up money that he finds In tho street And tho Japanese development of Mnkung may well be taken as proof that Japan Is not unwilling to assume such further enrichment as tho prog gross of events may thrust upon her Controlling Chinese Commerce Com-merce a Possibility for Japan The relation of Japan and China as regards strategic questions Is curiously curious-ly like that of western Europe to tho British islands The position of the British islands The the British fleet uuuu 1 L vrla 0 i 1 t Ij r il Y t i tl II a Q d i t o r raa 10 > O N tJAhf t ta Y 11 YiJW NIh U1 n > 0 I Wj JJfW f fY 1 y i Z tl f < w tllllll I rri irII 1 l irlmx b d ji ir lt gtt fjt fS c l ti c i > iif i ij f Nf 1i1 o < < > r fj d < If a a r < i co < S l rY 1t o 4 a ft t fl j 1 t1 o gG 1ii0 it li tfI ff It t o r 9 f 0i xJi + H ft > ktIir j f t oj tJ < il > I B 1 q 1 ri < jJ h rt r t pt hWZ i f l N 1 7 > IJ t lfu W i4iNgikJm t f e ra y npyP rro LIMp M Tili rr 1aiiy c r t To Clune etlorttlr Ji t 0 i 1 I j i i n aa1 1 n r t 11 i itflrj2ftY J F i o i i iM J III fA If i tJ > i i f i iPliW r + Y 1 t f rti ft gWJ 1 fli i r C q t1 O > tI > J 1 1t itl W Map Showing Japanese Islands Which Have Been Intrenched and How These Outlying Possessions Dom mate the Trade Routes to China and the East able to threaten the commerce of a large part of western Europe Just ash It now practically holds the club over the whole foreign trade of Germany and Hussla and tho Low countries Inn I In-n precisely similar way the Japanese with naval stations stretching from Korea to Makung have it In their power in case of need practically to stop the foreign trado of China and In tho event of war this would prove a weapon of the very highest Importance Impor-tance In tho event of such a struggle strug-gle It Is highly improbable that Japan would consent to lot pass unharmed merchant ships bound for Chinese ports The question would not ho ono of contraband of war It would bo the wider question of Japans allowing the IJa sage of cargoes to her enemys ports there to pay customs duties Into her enemys treasury and thus to Increase In-crease her enemys capacity for waging war Unless she resorted to commerce destruction Japan would not make u positive gain in wealth by this stoppageof commerce to Chinese ports But she would make a precisely pre-cisely equivalent gain by crlppllu hor enemys resources N Y Times |