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Show mm mom. fietili MMMH PLAN IF WM' iTrrt tin ; f QnJ l ridi tot PamiMdl of Vx Qf II i,lr9,1 004 ' tlw 1 fLg uithoriti J on military T . Europe wrota a boot ell4 KSwi lb. Nt War ' in, IkkToutljn! with, start line sxaet ?7, tk U 0 Germany and Aua ' i YAliu fullT into so ount tha 1 j .l priority of tha oombiied I 1 .nA T"oH arrmes over the ud Vostnaus ai well as the SXlSg dTat.M H r at Br ty u i 1" passionately exhorted Hountrvmen to a war of ae a. war of sudden arid : f.hloir f KT ould avert th jill of their native land as a world mt of elf preservation w-rota 'sSnhud Germany must make. JL.g count Neutrality i a Lbnlwari, he exclaimed con InoiulT statement -which in PS 'Germany disregard of treaties ! Jit, Lnxemhnrg Belgium and iXsho him to have bean a t -pew of those now directing Ger- - pnany's Naval Tactics I Germany must not be an as ft lt oa the sea against Great Br t ' m perfe tly clear to the German s He urged upon his eountry- ii tsval campaign of extreme ms. in conjunction with Tigoroua tan to landings of English L This policy apparently has " . leaded upon bv Germany She t a io he holding back her warships Hjrepaniig herself against British Jij on land by ruthlessly brushing the neutrality of small nations I. So frontiers a Berrhsrdi also oounseled the tr cnpplmg of tha Bussian fleet, wo it from helping Great Britain ! F"sBce -Here, too, ho seamed to f il w th a foreknowledge of tha I n ha countrymen in the Baltic l ut having stru k hard at tha 1 i raw and driven it into the st Finland, far from the fleets of r lies. r n Bernhardi s book created no end i stir On account of tha high po- i of t author it was looked upon k j-wbeallr an official foreshadow I ef the poker that would ba fol i ?b Germany in case of war Now the war is actually being waged i t3 is! nature of von Bernhardt s ; resects is evident on every page. "irtinila lv nteresting just now are 1 ! lfcas advanced in tha book on how tut hould meet England s great i purer and endeavor to offset its ,-suoied superiority to tha Ger-l Ger-l i es al forces. The author points ; that whereas on land German? ; jerpeet the help of Austria, she will throim on her own resources on inn and s not strong enough to ' l the offensive even in the form ' midden attack like that of Japan Prt Arthur He writes 1 Ifenave War at First. Is should at first carry on a def en t&t and would therefore have to soul blockade of our coasts, if saeteed m repelling the probable h attack. ieh a blockade ean be earned out in n s. England can blockade close h North sea coast, and at the same i bar the Dam h straits so as to tff communications w th our Baltic ! or she can seal up on the one I e the channel between England and L continent, on the other s da the I " sea between the north of Scotland i Nonray on the Peterhead Eker j id hae aid thus npple our oversea f aerce and also eontrol the Belgo-I Belgo-I 'i, Dam h and Swedish sh pping 1 elosa blockade in the first case H greatly tax the resources of the rh fleet According to the view to hsh experts, if a blockade is to Uiotained permanentlv the dis t between the base an i the block ' 1 ne most not exceed 0 naut cal S nee all the English na al ports ' eousiderablv further than th s from ' eoa-t, the d ff 1 ulties of carrying the blockade will be enormously in ai That ippears to be the reason " the estuary at Ilarw ch has re been transformel nto a strong J harbor It s ons dered the best "borage on the English coast and s "tdj 00 naut cal n les from the naa coast It offers good poss bill ef fortif cation and safe ingress fgre 3 n time of war The distance he German porta s not however 7 mtenal. f or purposes of blockade English if tney planned such a ""de. would doubtless count on ac hases on our own coast per "also on the Dutch coast ni ttk therefore is to prevent such 'pts bv o erv means Not only must "po nt wh ch s suitable for a base Hel goland BorKum and Sylt I rtifed n t me of peace but all at !Pt at landing mut be h ndered and fhrated b our fleet Th s task 1 uy be fulf lied bv the fleet in h submar nes by night tor boats mav co operate f the land ijoces are still on board clo e blockade offers var ons "toil es of damaging the enemj if ' roast fort f at ons are so con J ted with a v ew to the of fens ve !J f eet n aj rail under the r cnoo and thus ga n an opportu of advanc ng from the r stat ous ofreosive operat ons Such poss L exist on our north coast and ' erforts must be turned toward r nB the most var e 1 use of them ' I""1 e"deavor by renewed and un JW attacks espe ally by n ght w th submarines and torpedo partly with battiesh ps to g ve oockad ng fleet no breath ng t me J w cause it as much loss as possi J most not engage n a battle w th host le forces for it is hardly - e at Bea to discont nue a fight j there s no plaoe whither tha J 'an w thdraw from the effect of . J?' ay ' guns An engagement once m amt a fought out to the end Kapprec able damage can be n L',1 the enemy only if a bold at Via m 18 mai3e 11 " ouy P089 bls iaS"tePtionally favorable clrcum MrnTJ? toT example as the prox tjhl CortLf ea base t0 abandon once begun without very heavy i f5!lt certa uly be practicable bv I Sr,'lrei:ii'ioiterSg, to attack the llVkL''euly at alfme when he is ""kafl a me Place or another UrtjJ8 aemanda naturally a certa n iW.1l f?rces auo the battle fleet 1d i ,k,a? Party, which is sup J"tkS bh niJ the furthest lines of "ij, 1.1, ?d observat on cannot al 014 "e h gh seas in full strength In Remarkably Prophetic Book, Written Over Two Yeirs Ago, General von Bernhardt of Kaiser s Aimy, Declared That Her Only Hope Lay in Aggression on Land and Caution on the Sea Tha forces of the defend nj, party ho v e er 1 o in iaf an horaue ready to sally out and f ght English Strategy Foreshadowed Granting these object ous on Bern hardi f gures that England will dis ard the dose blockade and if she enooaes to blockade at all will attempt to seal up the English channel and the sea passage between North Scotland tand Norway Ha points out that only Jl small force is required to blockade the channel as the navigation route there is narrow and allhe great Eng ash naval depots Dover Portsmouth Portland and Plymouth are on the 1 ne of blockade or close behind it 1 ur thermore, tha line is covered on the north bv Sheernes ahd Harwich bo that a retreat of German 6h ps to th coast of Germany might effectually be cut off As for the northern line, if this scheme of blockade should be adopted by the Brit sh, on Behnhard declares that thev ara no less favorable since the blockaders would have a base in tha great naval harbor of Rosyth and a squadron of cruisers m ght 1 e n sup port of the Orknevs Under these cond t ona, he f gures that every attacking fleet from the Ger man north coast would ba v gorouslv at tacked itself from Rosyth and Sheor ness and its retreat cut off In view of all th s, ho thinks that the only wise course Ifor Germany in such an event would ba to advance from the Baltic against the northeastern part of the Br t sh blockading line e n e retreat m such an event would be tol erably safe. He wntes This accentuates ouca more the au prems importance to us of keeping open, at all costs, the passage thro gh the sound and the great belt. The command of these straits will not only I secure the Baltic basin for ns but also keep open the sally ports for our of fensive operations against the English blockading fleet But the German writer does not think that Great Britain will content herself with a mere blockade in any form In order to bring the war to & quick end he is convinced that the English will try to land troops. Of this eventu ality ne wntes They could not obtain a decisive iresult unless they attempted to capture our naval bases "Wilhelmshaven Heh goland, the mouth of the Elbe and Kiel and to annihilate our fleet in its at tempt to protect these places, and thus render it unposs ble for us to continue the war by aea. It is equally certain that our land forces would actively operate against the English- attempts at landing and that they would afford extraordinarily important ass stance to the defense or the coast by protecting it against at tacks from the rear and by keeping open the commuiucat ona with the bin terland. The success of the English attack will much depend on the strength and armament of the coast fortif cations. Such a war will clearly Bhow their value both as purely defensive and as offens ve works Our whole future history may turn upon the impregnability of tha fortif cations which in combination with the fleet are intended to guardi our coast and naval bases and should inflict such heavy losses on the enemy that the dif ference of strength between the two fleets would be gradually equalized. Our ships t must ba remembered, can only act effectively so long as our coast fortifications hold out In cons dering the various means by which such a method of warding off blows from England may best be strengthened von Bernhardi does not forget that still unknown quantity the a rsh p concerning which he saya No proof a required that a good In telbrence system is essent al to a de fennve wh eh s based on the policy of strik ng unexpected blows Such a sys tern alone can guarantee the right cho ce of favorable moments for attack, and can give us such early informat on of the operat ve movements of the hostile fleet that we can take the requasite measures for defense and al ways retreat before an attack in su perior numbers The numerical super orlty oi tne Enelish cruisers is so great that we shall probably only be able to guarantee rapid and trustworthy scouting by the) help of the air fleet The importance of the air fleet must not therefore be undervalued and steps must be taken to repel the enemv s a rsh ps either by employing specially contrived cannon or by at tackm" them directly If it is poss ble to employ airships for offens ve purposes also they would suooort our own fleet m their contest with the super or English force by dropp ng evplos ves on the enemy s "hps and mght thus contribute toward to-ward gradually restoring the equillb num of the opposing forces These poss bil t es are however vague The sh ds are protected to some extent by the r armor against such explosives as could be dropped from airships and it 8 not easy to aim correctly from a balloon But the poss bility of auch methods of attack) must be kept in mlDSo far as av at on goes the defend de-fend ne party has the advantage for tartuie from the German coast our I'SES? a fly tnc&7rsh aV able to operate against the Engl sn at tackne fleet more successfully than tbe English airships against our forts and vessels s nee they would have as a base either the (fleet itself or the die tant English coast Such possbillties of superiority must be carefully watched for and ?otbJng must be neglected wh ch could mors the enemy wh le the boldest B?nt oi attack and the most reckless Edacity must go hand in hand with the T employment of every means which Wnical skill and the science of navuToTstrucUon and fortification can raoolv This is the only way by which we may hope so to weaken our proud ilit that we may in the end chal Slit,, decisive engagement on the open sea In th a war we ronst conquer or at any rate not allow ourselves to be de Seated for it w H de dc whether we 2! Stain a potation as a world power by the side of and in spite of Eng land A.b to the nrobnb ht es as regards the "ronch. and Russian fleets tlio German & neral wr tes If the Irench fleet as vo may ex pe t combines w th the English and takes part in the war t w II be much more d ffltmlt for ua to wage war than a war v, th England alone Franco s blue vater fleet would hold o r all es in the Med terranean n check and England could bring all ner forces to bear upon us It vould be possible that combined fleets of the two rowers m ght appear both in the Medi lerranean and m the Isorth soa b nee England could bardly leave tne proteo-t proteo-t on of her Med terranean nter ata to France a one The prospect of any ultimately s ccessful issue would thus shrink into the background But we must not even then despair On the contrary, we must fight the French fleet so to speak on land 1 e we must defeat France so dec snely that she would be compolled to renounce her alliance w th Fngland and withdraw her fleet to sae herself from total de etruction Just as in 1870 71 we marohed to the shores of the Atlant c so th s time again we must resolve on an absolute conquest in order to cap ture the French naval ports and destroy the French naval depots It would ibe war to the knife with France one which wquld f victor ons ann h late once for all the French posi tion as a great power If France with her falling birthrate, determines on such a war it is at the r sk of losing her place in the first rank of European nations and s nking into permanent po litical subservience Those are the stakes r The participation of Euasia In the naval war must also be contemplated That is the less dangerous since the Russian Baltic fleet is at present still weak, and cannot combine so easily as the English with the French. "We could operate against it on the inner line that s we could use the opportunity of un ting rapidly our vessels in the Bait c by means of tbe Kaiser Wilhelm canal We could at tack the Russian sh ps in vastly su penor force and having struck our' Blow we could return to the North sea. For these operat ons it is of the first importance that the Dan sh straits should not be occupied by the enemy If they fell nto the hands of the Eng lish all free operat ons in the Baltic would be almost unposs ble and our Baltic coast would then be abandoned to the pass ve protection of our coast batteries. German Campaign on Land General von Bernhardi fully realizes that Germany s pos tion on land is also full of danger Hemmed in between France and llussia she can count only on the help of Auetria, whose unques tioned loyalty aa an ally is fatally weakened by the large felavio element in her population Jievertheless, there must be no flinching Since the struggle is as appears on a thorough investigation of the inter nat onal question, necessary and inev itable we must fight it out cost what it may To be or not to be is the question which s pnt to us today d sgnised, in deed by the apparent equilibrium of th opposing forces and interests by the dece tful shifts of d ploxnacr and the offic al peace aspirations of all the stateB but by the logic of history, in exorably demanding an answer if we look with clear gaze beyond the narrow horizon of the day and the mere surface of things into the region of realities There is no standing still in the world b history All s growth and de velopment It is obviously unposs ble to keep things in the status quo as diplomacy has so often attempted. iSo true statesman will ever ser ously count on such a possibility he will only make the outward and temporary maintenance of exiBtmg cond tions a duty when he wishes to ga n time and deceive an opponent op-ponent or when he cannot Bee what is the trend of events He will use such diplomat o means only as inferior tools n reality he will only reckon with ac tual forces and with the powers of a icont nuous development A frank statement that worthy of B smarck himself Having thus dis missed peace as a purely temporary matter more or less forced upon a progress ve nation by c rcumstances the German general turns his attention again to his favorite top c war and rev ews the probabilities of a European Armageddon thus If we look at France first we are entlt ed to assume that s ne e-handed she la not a matcb for us but can on y be dangerous to ua as a member or a coaitlon. The tact cal value of the French troops is of course very high, nume leal y the army of our neighbor on the west la almost equa and in leome direct ons there may be a superiority in organ zat on and equ pment In other directions we have a dlst net advantage The French army acka the subor d nat on under a b ng e commander the un ted spir t which character zes the German army the tenacious strength of the German race, and the esprit de ! corpa of the off cers France too has i not those national reserves avatlab e t which would alow us almost to doub e !our forces ! These are the conditions now existing I But If tbe French succeed In raak ng a arge African army avallab e for a i European theater the est mate of strength of the French army a.s com : pared with ours wl 1 be quite different ; Thla poss bi ty must be borne In mind , for aacordlug to the who e previous de ve opment of affa ra we may safe y assume that France will leave no stone unturned to acquire If on y for a time a military superiority over Germany She knows we that she cannot reach her pol tical goal except by a comp ete defeat of her eastern neighbor and hat such a reeu t can only be obta ned by the exerc Be of extraord nary effo ts It Is certa n that France w 1 not only try to deve op her o n mi ltary power with the utmost energy but that she wl 1 defend herse f desperatelv if at tacked by Germany on the other hand ahe win probab y not act on the of fensive against Germany unless she has ncreased her own eff ciency to the ut most limit and believes that she has se cured the m itary supremacy by e he p of nctlve a es The stakes are too : h gh to p ay under unfa orab e condi t ons But f France th nks she has a he trumps er hands she w not eh k , from an offensive war and will atake j everything in order to Htrike un a mortal blow We must expo t o most b ter hosti ity from thia antaonls Should the tr p e allian o b k up as seems probab e now th b ho wl 1 soon hav struck. If the war n do ola ed be waged aga nat ua In otnb na on w th ICng and n ay bo usumod tha tho a ed great owe s wou d at enpt to turn our Btra efc ca r ght flank rough Be glum and Ho an 1 aril pe e tra o Into he heart of Ge niany , tl ough the great gap in e to ressea be ween Wesel and V ush ng T s op erat on wou d 1 ave the cons derab e ad vantage of avo ding the strong 1 ne of he Rh ne and threa enlng our naval bases from the land b de From he s per or y of t e comb ned Ang o i F ench fieo the a mv of nvas on cou d I w a t d ( cut) la e U base on our oaB s S a opo a o wou d o or n ous y fa tate e f on a a a k on o ves f ont er an i would enab e the Fionch to push a v c or ous advance on vard to 1 e R ine after Investing Me 8 and D edenhofen Dng and with vhose ost ty as we 1 as wl h that of the Frenc we must reckon could only underta a a and war against ua wit the eupport of an a y who oud lead the man attack Eng and s troops would on y serve as re n forcements they are too weak for an independent campa gn Engl sh interests 1 also le In a qu te d fferent fle d and are not coincident with those of France The ma n Issue for Eng and is to an n hi ate our navy and oversea com merce In order to prevent from reasons a ready expla ned any further expan ao of our power But It a not her Interest to destroy our pos t on aa a continental power or to he p France to a tain the supremacy in Europe Eng Bh Interests demand a certa n equ fbrium between the cont nental states Eng and on y wishes to use; Prance in order wi h her he p to at tain her own special ends but she wi 1 never Impose on herself sacr flees which are not absolute y necessa y for the p 1 ate advantage of 1 er ay These prlnc plea v 1 character ze her p an of campaign, f she Bees erse f com pe ed by the pol tical pos t on and the in e rests of her naval supremacy to take part In a war against us If Eng and aa must be regarded probable determines sooner or ater on this step It la c early to her advantage to win a rapid victory In the first place her own trade will not bo injured longer than necessary by the war In the second p ace the centrifuga forces of her loose y compacted wor d em pire might be eet in movement and the co onfes mjght consu t their own separate interests 6hou d England have her hands tied by a great war It is not unlikely that revo ut ona m ght break out in India and Egypt If Eng and a forces were long occup ed with a European war Again the state not orlglnaDv tak tng part in the war m ght interfere in our favor If the decls on were much de ayed It was important for ua In 1870 71 to take Paris qu ckly In order to forestall any Interference of neutra a. S mllar conditions might arise In the case of England Wo must therefore, make up our mlnda that the attack by aea wl I be made with the greatest and most per h h VU,or vih t n n rafttirve to : d h y counplc ty ou Unfit and our k. aa nnmniej ia oenlmrm. IX la alno ml only poua Am bui )iriiba.bl uui HmCland will hrcrw troop on th, cam-mat cam-mat ba order a tuscssm the aocrparxr-tiam aocrparxr-tiam off nta alDti. wlia mlghtr. flrwyiTnt ila gniaxaolB of the Kbnnmrlty Exrg ah padlcy and alaa te aaajort tbe naval attack on the coast. On the thar band, he land wax wi 1 display the same kind of desperate energy only ao far as It pursues tho object of oon queiing and dea roy ng our naval bases Tho Eng sh wou d be the less disposed to do mo e than s because the Ger man aux aries who have so often fought Eng and a battles would not be for h om ng T e g ua s eve ons of the nation wl L be rr d o he nava war The and wa e vage 1 w h a defln ey e od ob on wh ch Its ha a er w I epe d I a ery ques onab e wee e g s a my s capab o of effect vo y ac g on the offens ve aga st con a Europea troops In So h Af a he Ent sh reg men a for he most part fo gh very brave y and s oo g ea osses on the otbe hand they comp ete y fa ed In the offens ve n tac les as n operat on and with few except ona o generalsh p was equa y de cient If we now turn our at ent on to the west n order to forecast Rues a s prob ab e behav o we must begin by almt ng t f dm a Runs an a andpo nt a ar n ho wee o ds out bette pros p cts of s cpsh n a renewed wa w th Japan and poss by w th C na The empire of t e czar finds In t e west powerfu al es wo are impatlen y waiting to Jo n in an attack on Germany The geo?!iphlcal cond t ona and means of commun cation there a ow a far more rapid and sys ematlc development of power than in Manchuria Tub Io opinion In which hatred of Ger many Is as persistent as ever would be in favor of such a war and a victory over Germany and Austr a wou d not on y open the road to Constantlnop e but would great y improve the po tical and economic nfluence of Russ a In western Europe Euch a success would afford a sp endld compensation for the defeats n Asia and wou d offer advantages auch aa never could be expected on the far d atant eastern front ers of the emp re Shou d Russia then after weigh ng these chances launch out into an offen s ve war In the west the atrugg e wou d probab y assume a qu te d fferent char acter from that, for example of a Franco German war Russ a owing to her vast extent la In the first p ace secure agalnet complete subjugat on In case of defeat her center of gravlts is not shifted A Rue s an war can hard y ever therefore be come a stn ggle for po Itlca existence and cause that stra ning of every nerve wh h such a atrugg e entails The inhab tants will hardly ever show self devot on in wars whose objects can not be clear to them Throughout the vast empire the social and a so po Itlca educat on especla y among the peasants s so poor that any grasp of the prob ems of a fore gn po Icy seems quite out of the quest on The sections of the peo-p peo-p e who have acqu ed a little superflc al learning in the defect ve Russian schoo s have sworn to the evolutionary colors or fo ow a blind ant progressive po cy which seems to them best to meet the r Interests Tbe former at least, would only make use of a war to promote the r j own revo ut onary schemes as they d d , in the crisis of the Russo-Japanese war Under the Circumstances there can be , little idea of a united outburst of the ; national spirit which would enab e an offensive war to be carried on with pers stent vigor There has been an , extraordinary change In the conditions ; since 1812 when the people showed j some unanimity in repelling the lnva ; slon . Should Russia today be Involved tn a 1 western war with Germany and Austria she could never bring her whole for es nto v ay In the fl st pla e the revo u tionary e ements In the 1 eart of the ta e wou d ava themse ves of every weak en ng of the nationa sources of power to effect a revo utlon in nterna politics w thout any rega d for tl e interests of the commun ty Second y in the far east Japan or Ch na would ae ze t e moment when Russia a forces In the wes were ful y occup ed to ca y out the r po t cal n ent ona towa d the emp e of the czar by force of arms. Fo ces must alwaya be kept in reserve for th s eventua ty Although Russ a under he p esent con dltiona cannot bring her who e power to bear againBt Germany and Austria and must a ao alwaya leave a certain force on her European southern frontier she is leBS affected by defeats than other states Neither the Crimean war nor the 'greater exert ona and sacrifices exacted by her hard won victory over the Turks nor the heavy defeats by the Japanese have ser ous y shaken Russ a a po t cal prestige Beaten in the east or south, flhe turns to another aphene of enterprise and endeavors to recoup herself there for her osseB on another frontier Such conditions must obviously affect the character of the war Russ a wl 1 certa n y put huge armies Into the field against us In the wars against Turkey and Japan tne Interna affa s of he em pire prevented the employmen of ts full strength in the latter campaign revolu tionary agitation in the array tself in fluencd the operations and bat les and in a European war the same conditions would in a 1 probabll ty make themse ves emphatic! y felt especial y if defeats fa vored or encouraged revolutionary propa ganda. In a war against Russia more than In any other war c est le premier pas qui coute Tf the first operations are unsuccessful tbe r effect on the who e position will be wider than in any other war s nee they will excite In the country itself not sym pathetic feelings only but also hostile forces which would cripp e the conduct of the war How von Bernhardi would have Germany Ger-many guard against an unsuccessful re BUlt In her first warlike operations Is summed up In a phrase the beet de fensive strategy la to take the offensive. To prevent invasions of her widely threat ened territory she must carry the war quickly and suddenly into the territory of her antagonists. The commander M be writes "who can carry out all operations quicker than the enemy arid can concentrate and em ploy greater masses in a narrow space than they can win always be In a posi tion to collect a numerically superior force In the decisive direction If be controls the more effective troops he will gain dec s ve successes aga nst one part of the host e army and wi 1 be able to explo t tl e n aga nst other divis ons of t before the enemy can ga n equivalent advan ages in other parts of the fle L He adds S nee the tactical efficiency and the mora e of the troops axe chiefly shown n the offensive and are the most need ful the necessary conclusion la that safe ty I es on y in offensive warfare We arrive then at the conclu8ion that in order to secure the superiority In a war of the future under otherwise equal conditions It Is Incumbent on us First Puring the period of prepara tion to raise the tactlpal value and capa b 1 ties of the troops as much aa possi b e and especially to develop the means of concealing the attacking movements and damaging the enemy's tactical pow ers Secondly In the war Itself to act on the offensive and strike tbe first blow and to exploit the maneuvering capacity of the troops as much as possible, in or der to be superior In the decisive d rec tlona. Above all, a state which has objects to attain that cannot be relinquished, and Is expo ed to a tacks by enemies more powerful than itself la bound to act in thla sense. It must, before all things de ve op the attacking powers of its army s nee a strateglo defensive must often adopt offensive methods. New York Times |