Show CUBAN RECIPROCITY BY TREATY I If the Senate undertakes to settle Cuban reciprocity by a treaty as the telegrams Indicate that It mtty do Ihcre will bo trouble with the House There has from the first been friction between the two branches of Congress whenever the Senate 1ms led by a treaty siny question which the House considered should have been settled by law Kspc daily has this contention been warm at Limes when the treaty has required an appropriation of money or when It interfered In-terfered with statutes which affect the revenues There Is a good deal of strength to to the House position In logic and practical sense but on the other hand t hamper the Senate In Its treatymaking power would practically place that body In the leadingstrings of the House fnd the Fathers took the view that on the whole It wan better to leave the Senatorial power as to treaties unlimited Some day no doubt there will he a serious conflict and the Suptle Court will be called upon to I interpret the Ircatymaklng clause of the Constitution But the House will yield Its claim with great reluctance As to the main question In this Cuban reciprocity there can be no doubt that the Presidents position has been much strengthened by the elections Some of the I members of the House who were the most uncompromising against any concession con-cession to Cuba especially we note those from Michigan are not returned we believe their retirement Is laid to other grounds than their position on this question but whether or not the result tallies for the President Then In the West and here at home the beet sugnr people pay openly that a concession conces-sion to Cuba of twenty to twentyfive t per cent would not in any way affect hclr operations And the sugar producers pro-ducers and refiners In this country are f In mUch closer alliance this year thnn they were last t So that the opposition to Cuban reciprocity which sprang up from the beetsugar producers when thnt reciprocity was first proposed has In large measure died down But It had the permanent effect of modifying the extent of the probable concession which Is not likely now to exceed twcnlyflve per cent whereas the first claim was that nothing less than forty per cent would do |