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Show The wintry weather chilling the gala inauguration of President Presi-dent Kennedy is nothing compared com-pared to the icy Siberian blasts his Administration faces in the Cold War. But at the same time, the celebrated, tarditional congressional congres-sional honeymoon the President is enjoying is also nothing compared com-pared to the comparative honey moon he is enjoying with "Uncle Nikita" and the Soviet Union. If these two estimates of the world Communist challenge appear ap-pear contradictory it is only a matter of timing. Virtually every Cold War observer ob-server believes that Moscow now is probing, testing, appraising the new President and his policies poli-cies in the hope that Kennedy will, indeed, offer the "new" have any value. But he also does not want to give Kennedy too much time to stall, rebuild U. S. military power, strengthen its position in Laos, the Congo, etc., before any new round of East-West East-West summitry begins. For his part, Kennedy realizes that he must also strengthen the West, not militarily, but diplo-mtically, diplo-mtically, before there can be any thought of face-to-face Kennedy Khrushchev negotiations. Despite some scare reports, Kennedy is neither about to dissolve dis-solve our military alliances nor are these about to collapse. However, our military alliances, alli-ances, which should strengthen our negotiating position with the Communist world, are in deep trouble. Kennedy, in seking to solve start in world affairs Moscow has sought since the U-2 episode and collapse of the Summit conference, con-ference, and which Kennedy spoke of in his "New Frontiers" inaugural address. In a sense, Moscow is conducting a U-2 reconnaissance rec-onnaissance of Kennedy. If Kennedy is found to be weak, vascillatine or uncertain many 01 me prooiems involving NATO and SEATO, is now enjoying en-joying a honeymoon with our Allies. But soon he is going to have : to become deply involved in such i tangled problems as colonialism, ; a resurgance of West German 1 ecoonmic power on the Conti- 1 nent, De Gaulle's independent NATO role, economic conflict i between the European Common t Market and the British oriented a European economies, trade, tar- iffs, cuts in U.S. aid at the same s time we demand that Europe c share most of the costs of western defense and economic aid and E restrict its own prosperity to f help the U.S. stem the flow of f its gold to Europe, are all some l of the problems demanding ac- c tion. r Dwight Eisenhower, with his a great prestige as World War II leader and postwar NATO Com- s mander, was unable to solve the c top priority problems in Western a Europe and NATO involving the United States. The task is likely to prove i in his dealings with, or policies toward the Soviet Union, which frankly is unlikely, the Soviets are certain to attempt to take advantage of him. Moscow is even now pouring heavy flattery upon Kennedy by seeing in him a "new image of FDR," whom Moscow hopes will lead East and West back to the "wartime cooperation of Teheran and Yalta," to quote a recent Radio Moscow broadcast. Doubtless, the current, com-partive com-partive "honeymoon" with Moscow Mos-cow is bound to continue so long as Moscow either sees profit in it, or the U. S. does, or when Americans become far more mindful of the dangers as well as the opportunities in "coexist- even more difficult for Kennedy who has not Ike's great war time prestige, European contacts, experience ex-perience in the quagmire of politics poli-tics or even great foreign policy background. Worse, however, is the way the crisis in Laos has been dramatiz-Jing dramatiz-Jing a serious weakness in U.S. Asian defenses. The Reds have slipped behind U.S. defenses in Laos and South Vienam. Thailand, Thai-land, strongest U.S. ally in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Organiza-tion, is wavering toward "Neutral "Neu-tral Burma and Cambodia are slipping into the Red Chinese net. Pakistan and even Philippines Philip-pines are increasing trade, cultural cul-tural and diplomatic activity with Moscow. Japan is stepping up trade with Peiping as are Canada and Australia. And Indonesia, Indo-nesia, threatening open war with the Netherlands over West New Guinea, is suddenly getting more military aid from Moscow, for no good reason, than the Soviets are now giving to any other single country, posing a new threat in an unstable, strategic area of the world. It does little good to wonder why, in the face of these problems. prob-lems. Kennedy has sought the Presidency and appears to relish its headaches. He now has them and this columnist also believes he also has the sincere support of all Americans in seeking to solve at least a few of our more "ressing problems. But n" nany of Kennedy's pressing vorld or domestic problems will vde their time before demand g his attention? ence diplomacy." It is precisely because Kennedy Ken-nedy is expected to be alert to the danger that Moscow will try to take him for a sleigh ride that at one time or another, he, like Eisenhower, is certain to call upon Moscow to prove "with deeds as well sa words" its propaganda prop-aganda about seeking peace. It is then, whether it takes months or years, that any new thaw in our relations with the Soviet Union will be put to the test. Meantime, crises in the Congo, Laos and over Cuba continue. Moscow's present role in these has been viewed as probing actions ac-tions to test the Kennedy mettle, make quick gains during the administration ad-ministration transition and to pressure, or persuade the new administration into a new round of East-West summitry to negotiate nego-tiate an end to crises the Communists Com-munists themselves, cause. Most observers believe that Khrushchev has tentatively set March or April as a deadline for really putting pressure on Kennedy to step up a round of East-West summitry. Khrushchev realizes that Kennedy Ken-nedy needs some time to take over the reins of government from the outgoing Eisenhower Administration, to familiarize himself with the unimaginable problems no one outside of Government Gov-ernment can ever really appreciate, appre-ciate, and to round out his Ad-1 ministrative team. Khrushchev, I who knows it took him three i years to complete the transition between Stalin-Malenkov- Bul-l Bul-l ganin and his own dictatorship, realizes Kennedy needs somr time before summitry would |