OCR Text |
Show ludia. Caleutta, o. A southwest monoon I burst at Colombo, Ceylon. May 14lu. I and may be expected iu Bombay early in June. It it comes with raiir :t will prev-'nt a crisis of fimice. The commencement of r.r; cultural operations is reported in Bi-mb-y and Madra., where rain inn already; f.illen, a- wed as in Veisore. i The Turkish Army. j Loud:n, 5. Tho Times' correspondent corres-pondent with the Turkish army sends the following particulars of its organ-izition. organ-izition. The army of the Danube is rather delicient in artillery and very deficient in cavalry, the only reason being the want of money. Tne Turkish government have still more than 4iJ breech loading cannon lying idle at Constantinople for want of horsea and harness, and multitudes of well-qualified tiragoona, but no money to mount them. Tho ? rmament of the troops is all that ia perfect. Tho infantry havo Murtine Henry r tla and the cavalry Winchester rifies. According to the most trustworthy information tho present strength of the army, inclusive of reserves in the course of Balkans, is 2d0 battalions in Ian try, seventy -l wo squadrons horse, 300 cannon and about 8,000 fortress artillery and engineers. Of these forty-live battalions are stationed at Widden, thirty-nix at K.iUehuk, sixty -five at Suumla, iwcniy-eigiii at Vienna, and thirty-six at Siieslria. The remaining twenty battalions are divided betwcpn N iknpohs, Melon a, Turtukai, the Dudrud-chu and vanoi s places of more or less importance in Danubiun Bulgaria. E'ery battalion on the average may bo said to contain con-tain 7o0 men. Tne conti ibuliona from Nish are indeed considerably below this standard, but on the other baud numerous relief b.-ittalions have a thousand men, and even more; therefore the told number of infantry is about 172,500, and tho cavalry, reckoning 100 men to the squadron, 7, '200. Accordingly, tho army of the Danube, including fortress artillery j and engineers, ia close upon 200,0(10, , strong. As to the organization, there , J ia want of everything that is iudi-' iudi-' peusable in tactical unity and system, j Until within a lew wetks there were ino divisions, brigades or regiments. The Bolkaiifj lay scattered about without with-out often knowing from whom they had to rcceivo orders. It is true tiiat : after the declaration of wr, divisions and brigades were formed, but this is of little practical value when it is con sidered that troops and commandoia are changed about at the caprice of ono superioroflicer. The army ie virtually directed from Constantinople, where all movements are planned and ordeis issued by the so-called council of war, composed of a number of generals who are mero puppets in tho hands of a few ignorant upstarts. Abdul Ner min Pasha is the mere executor of the will of the body. Undeniably ho posaease3 military experience and a sharp judicious oye, but ia wholly wantiotr in enertry and power ol rapid action. To tho natural incapacity of ithe commander in chief in this respect re-spect must bo added the circumstance that be is seconded by no general stall. Aa regards fortresses in European Euro-pean Turkey incredible results have been accomplished. Widdiu, Ruts chuk, Siiestria, Bhumla and Varna, i especially tho last two, are now quite formidable fortifications, and almost entirely consist of independent works mostly of earth, but constructed in strict conformity with modern principles prin-ciples of armament, and leave noth ing to be desired. Very probably the Russinns will succeed soon in forcing the river, but, it ia equally certain in the face of tho tough, enduring qualities quali-ties of Turkish soldiers, they will only, after shedding much blood, force the barrier opposed to thoir onward pro gress, in the shape of fortresses of the Danube. |