Show WHA A CEVERRA MAY DO O I Naval Operations Reviewed By the London Times I SPANIARDS WAY ESCAPE SANTIAGO ATTACK WOULD BE A RISKY OPERATION Speed of Spanish Cruisers May E able Them t G Away Nothing t Prevent Them From Gig to San Juan For Coal United States Handicapped London May 23The Times this morning ing In a article reviewing the war takes it for granted that Admiral Cer veras squadron coaled In Venezuelan water from four British colliers I suggests sug-gests that the cruisers Vlzcaya and In fanta Maria Teresa risked a disadvantage In being reported there In consideration of their ability to send dispatches to General Blanco and to have rejoined the flagship at a prearranged rendezvous and to have arrived at Santiago de Cuba on the 19th The Times says Even If It took a longer route to escape es-cape observation I Admiral Cerveras force has been excessively deliberate in its movements and his fast cruisers have not yet shown grdat speed His strategy 5 much boasted at Madrid Is not yet apparent ap-parent Possibly his movements are tampered Pbs ll torpedo rn but the extreme slowness of his ocean steaming destroys his chances of dealing an effective fective blow at Key West Tampa or at a blockading force denuded of its most efficient force by Admiral f Sampsons abortive abor-tive raid on San Juan de Porto Rico The high speed of the Spanish cruiser squadron so far has not been turned totally to account and although its arrival ar-rival at Santiago do Cuba may have some moral value In assuring the Cuban garrisons gar-risons that they are not abandoned no naval objects seem to have been attained at-tained The United States commanders now know where the enemy is and has had time to concentrate a superior force ando and-o cover their vulnerable points CHANCE TO ESCAPE Discussing the problem of blockade of Admiral Cervera at Santiago de Cuba or an attempt to force him to give battle the Times article says The United States commanders possesses sesses ample forces but night and the speed of the Spanish cruisers will give wi them chances to escape The result will be watched with much interest The de fences of Santiago are probably no more effective than those of Manila To take the United States cruisers into his harbor In the face of a powerful Ire from Cerveras force uf3w be tui risk operation but a torpedo flotilla If It existed in either fleet might find op portunities for effective employment I Admiral Cervera succeeds In getting gettng osea and sea obtaining coal he will unquestionably un-questionably hamper the Cuban blockade block-ade although he can obtain no direct advantage ad-vantage FAST SQUADRON NEEDED I is evident that the monitors greatly I delay Admiral Sampsons squadron Such an Incumbrance possesses heavy disabilities dis-abilities on the American fleet and a fast I squadron capable of pursuing the Span lards if they leave the port Is urgently I needed Falling such a force there ap pear to be no reasop why Admiral Convene should not steam to San Juan de Porto Rico coal and go to sea again be tore he could be overtaken A recent report re-port confirms the existence of a large quantity of coal at San Juan and if I Admiral Cervera can avail himself of this supply and leave behind his torpedo craft he would be able to reach Charles ton or Savannah without difficulty difcul A raid on either of these points would rg dl oef fe Cginf I i have no Important results but it would I gravely Interfere with the operations of opertons the blockade Reviewing the whole field of operations the most Important lesson is the effect produced by the presence ota ot-a small compact high speeu squadron which however hitherto has been somewhat some-what aimlessly employed From the moment when it was known that this squadron had arrived off Martinique all the plans of the United I States board of strategy were disarranged disar-ranged By undertaking a bombardment i of the fortifications at San Juan nothing I was gained The United States has been handlcaped by the lact of a fast homogeneous homo-geneous squadron i It would be wise in future to leave I the direction of the operations to naval commanders Councils have never proved capable directors of war Their proper function Is to obtain information and prper to forward it to the admirals who must be as Nelson claimed the right to be free to act when the titling opportunity arrived ar-rived I I |