Show A I L TAKES ISSUE WITH S 1 M M. S I Atlantic Fleet Chief CI Differ Differs on Several al Points With Wit ith Former Testimony Offered I Senate Nav Naval l GOIl Committee tee j I V V ASHING O March la adi 30 F Faul Faulty ul t ty negotiation in the naval de dc department and anti abs absence rice o of ofa a n. definite foreign policy ex except eI l. l c that J of strict stile neutrality op ope operated r rated te I to to pr prevent preparation of tb the navy for lor forthe fo fob tile the b war l Rear ear Admiral Mayo iy com corn com commander mander of the Atlantic il fleet t. t durin during the Limo war declared today ra o-ra h Wore tb the senate naval l nv The active fl fleet ct i elf l however vcr wa was was was' cr c better I dl 1 d than than- war nr was wa rr d t I I h n t biral al S sm Sims Sims' im L 1 1 1 JJ t cally at least during during- tho the war took toot I Issue with some of the statements made by that officer in his indictment I of oC f the thc departments department's conduct of or tin the war car To 10 the charge char e that no adequate plan lan for operation co-operation with ith allied nalea na navies he lit vies lea had been ma made mado o In advance answered that the office ot or chief of or operations ha had been Leen created onic In Ir i and was aa im not t comprehensive enough nough to secure the b best beat possible re results re- re I but hut that without It con conditions chaotic would have ha been I Navy Navy- Sn Wn n ns Prepared 11 for tor forwar Th The navy y w was a as 38 well prepared war car in 1917 as were vero tb the British French LuLl and Italian navies In 1911 IllS Admiral Mayo fao asserted adding that It would have hae been better prepared had th time oPerations operations op oP- op- op rations bureau Lureau bc be been n 11 created sooner Admiral Mayo Iao dirt did not agree urco with Admiral Sims Sims' contention that lint every available destroyer cr and antisubmarine rine me craft should have be been n t sent He lit abroad broad when war was declared said aid that It was imperative that some som destroyers be kept with the Atlantic Atlantie bet for a n Pointing out the necessity sharply defined l foreign n policy polley Admiral Mayo layo foo said that th the armed armell forces of or a n to te merely merel the Iho instruments nation were support national policies The navy department he ar argued wa was responsible service ble hie mb for tor the efficiency of or the congressional cons only to the extent of or provisions pro and he atI added that thal it tool took 1 Continued on lae 3 n NEUTRAliTY N HElD BACK NAVY WORK Continued Continue from Pago 1 1 more than a year car or or two to build up a a. a t navy adequate to a a. wrest emergency cAt m r enc The Tho differences ot of op m as DS to what constitutes an nn adequate Y can canha be ha traced to our lack Jack of a definite campaign policy polley he ho said Tho The remedy remedy rem rem- cd edy for tor this condition lies ou outside tho the navy department but it Is vital Ital to tho the question at issue Tho ho organization of or tho the navy do- do de department before and anel during tho the war and no now Is unsatisfactory Admiral Mayo Iao said So lon long as the present organization or exists he ha continued the maximum efficiency either In prep ra- ra tion lion for war In hi the tho conduct or of war or orIn orIn r rIn In economical dev development of the navy In peace cann cannot t be Attained In the present org organization n re responsibility for tor forthe tho the r readiness of f. f tho then vy navy for tor wa war n. cannot cannot can can- no not bo be placed anywhere but with t the e secretary of ot alto Jho ho navy who mus must co coordinate coordinate co co- ordinate thirteen offices boards and bureaus Tho ch chief c o of ot naval navall Ad o miral Mayo Mao said sad should bo be given more authority and wider Ider latitude and then hen bo held to a account count for tor lack of Effi 1 j Sot Not Informed Informed of Changes Chance Admiral Mayo said ho was not 1 I t informed of or changes lehane-cs In policies policies' t as fleet commander nor properly c cn on- on n- n with r regard gard to developments do Inho in inthe the tho western Atlantic during the iwar war that units o of his command de detached detached do- do and directed from the tho department department department depart depart- ment Instead d of being left leU und under f his direction t that tat at authority was so 90 cent cen- cen t In Jn tho the department thai that the principle o of subdivision of or res responsibility responsibility was neglected hes that ho was not sont abroad abroad I to direct operations operations' there thereas as he recommended and that tho the de department de- de refused to send all a ba battleships abroad d in the spring sprig and summer of ot 1918 to prepare fo forr tor nIt art eXpected ex expected expected eX- eX last hope drive by t the e German German Ger Ger- man fleet leot operation w was ordered by the enemy high command ho he said but tho the l low oR w morale of or tho German crows made it impossible of ot accomplishment |