Show WILSON ILSON SOUNDS r t IDEAS ON PEACE I President Appeals to Belligerents Belligerents Bel Bel- r events to State Their Ther r Terms S for or L I Ending dr Tr Far IVar are i i y qt Continued From Iao 1 do which he hc speaks and tho the objects which lie ho seeks will be understood b by nil concerned and he lie confidently hones hons for a n. response wh which h. h will will br bring brine g- g a t new nw light into me the aita ammo ra u or nO orld s I This latest development In the tho rapidly rap rl world events C toward a idly hll moving ln discussion of or peace was not permitted Ito to to become known until tonight when the notes were w.- w. well on their way to the American ambassadors in the tho bel bel- capitals and probably already In the hands of or some of or them It was a most distinct surprise to all all official Washington Wn which had heen led to o that t with the tho formal for for- formal mal transmittal of ot the tho proposals ls of or the central powers the thc officers of oC tho United States would await further imo t moves between the belligerents themselves them them- selves and that certainly In view of or ortho tho speech of Premier Llo Lloyd George c cAnd and the announcements In Russia Franco and Italy further action by hy neutrals would d depend pend upon the next careful and delicate moves of or tho bel bel- The whole tenor of official l opinion throughout Washington when tho action became known was that It Immeasurably improved the prospects for Cor omo sort of ot exchanges looking toward an approach to peace penco discussions between the tho belligerents without Impairing tho the position of or the 3 3 1 1 U J CU il Cd 1 o Mn 1 JU unable to find tind n a ground on which which to approach one another r At the White House no statement Whatever whatever could be obtained as to I whether an any of or the tho powers even en had how thc they would receive the noto and there wa was every ery Indication that tho the same careful secrecy which prevented any anything thins thins- whatever er becoming becoming becom becom- ing known about the Presidents President's ent's a ac- ac until It had been talon taken would surround surround any o of the succeeding moves mo Nowhere on the surface appears rs any indication of or the making history e which diplomatists generally tare are convinced must have O transpired since Inco the German allies brought brouCht forth their pr proposals to dispel the generally prevalent belief belle that such an nn net action Ion on the tho the part part of President Wilson l on would be unacceptable to the entente powers power British embassy officials declared they were utterly taken by surprise were wh wholly unable to e explain l n it and iero were is in n u u oi nat Do no exchanges whatever r had liati passe passed through the embassy here as ag a preliminary pre pre- M- M Mclean clean Note oc Sonic Time AKO There are arc indications that President Wilson began preparation of oC his note Home ome time ago probably even en before e the thc German proposals came out and of or the offer of the central powers pow pow- I ers rs and the succeeding ln developments de made lade a more favorable opportunity for lor its presentation The fact that the President asks first only onh a clarification of terms is taken as Indicating Indicating- that he is not expecting an Immediate conclusion In a a. war wa Involving tn so man many conflicting conflicting- Interests Inter cst ests not only between the tho two bellIg ire t groups but even en between nations nation s of or the same sarno group it is realized that tha t much time may maj be bo nee needed ed even en to bring hrin about tho the mere mer preliminaries of or a con con- ference It is desired therefore to clear aWa away as many of or those prelim prelim- preliminaries as possible so that when a solution Is near either by Ictor victory or exhaustion not a day a- a of or needless slaughter mo may be bo necessary Just when the note was finished has not been disclosed but hut it Is known n n that It went to the cables yesterday On Monday the tho hl higher officials of or the state department were taken into the Presidents President's Presidents President's dents dent's confidence an and the tho text was wa s sent Kent to the public printer to make mak e copies for the tho diplomatic corps Th The e fact that tho the note was completed n no I later than titan Monday and its no Tues Tuesday ay indicate that it Il was sent r re rc regardless of or an anything that Lloyd Lloy G Georg org I I ml might bt sa say Officials expect the lie note to bo ho re rc with general Jeneral favor in Gorman Germany I but many believe behave tho the real test wll wI come with its arrival In III the entente countries where many Influential per persons sons havo o feared and aud sought to prevent pre prevent vent an any American Intervention Inter until tho the mill military tan situation changed Fron Frol p the tho fact however cr that Lloyd George reply to the central powers was wa milde than generally had be been n expected anI an and d still loft the wn open for farther ne no negotiations It i Is believed that the allies 3 will meet tho pleS present note noto In at lens least leasta lensa t a friendly ll spirit Willie While German officials thoroughly understood i that President Wilson Nilson ma mad mado e It clear that ho he way was not In an any sons e offering me mediation to the warring gov so t It was declared that should shook 1 tho the negotiations reach rench that stage e Germany being anxious to have havo th tho 3 I peace of or Europe restored willingly f would agree to such procedure Neither r docs does it make an any difference to Germany Ger Gel Germany ml 1 many it was said whether the tho confer conCe conference once ence Is composed of ot representatives o of ot t all the belligerents or 01 Just the tile t Ion s So Sf far as Germany I is concerned th tho view held hold hero is 10 that she sho would b bo e perfectly willing that tha t a committee o othree of or f three formed of ot a representative of ot ti tho u l central powers power a representative 0 of oC f the tho entente and a representative o of or ortho f tho till United d States should hold preliminary preliminary prelim prelim- Inar inary discussions The main Idea of Germany and her allies aUlAs Is 11 to get het each set st of oC belligerents Into direct personal communication with tho the other The Tho mot method hod Is considered ered of or secondary Importance Importance Im Im- Tho The view prevails In G Gorman quarters tors that all nil tho belligerents will malte malc some sonio definite statement in reply to the United states t tg The Thc very phraseology of oC tho American communication it is felt Celt calls for 01 replies far more moro definite than mere mero t acknowledgments of ot receipt Count Counton von on Bernstorff mo may discuss tho situation with Secretary Lansing some time tomorrow Tho The wish and hope of or tho the German powers tl that at President ent Wilson lIson would intercede in some wa way hns lon long noon hoon well weB known an and has been convoyed oye in different nt ways wars to the White House HouBe The attitude of oC the allies aUles as expressed by their statesmen an and certainly certainly cor- cor until recently In official advices nd to the tho American go t has hap been beon that a R. peace penco offer h by the United States would be bo almost the next thing thin to unfriendly All that however was waR before the German allies of or their own accor accord brought forward their proposals for tor discussion of or peace President Wilson specifically says sars in tho the notes ho is 15 somewhat embarrassed In making the tho suggestion flUg at this tills particular time time be because be cause It ma may now seem to have been prompted by hy a desire to tC pIa play piny a part In connection with the recent overtures of the central powers To the central powers powel'S tho the President says his Ills action was In no way suggested sug suJ by the Teutonic proposals while to the tho entente allies he says SI his note noto Is in no wa way ay associated with thorn thom To both sets of or belligerents he ho says 8 ho lin w uld have ha n in l It If un un til those O overtures had f e b-e- been bell ll answered r- r rd d but for tho the fact that it also concerns the question of or peace and may thus thUR bo ho considered in connection with other proposals which havo o the tho same end In InIe view Ie Diplomatists Diplomatist consider er It incredible that the President would bring bring- forward for for- ward such a proposal al at such suh a n time timo unless he had reason to tl believe bellove It would receive respectful consi consideration at tho the hands of or all the b belligerents and above all nil would not prejudice the tho position of or the United States as a n possible media media- tor tr The German embassy view consistently consist consist- consistently hopeful that proposals of or tho the central cen cen- allies would lead to a discussion tf cf r peace was expressed in this authorized authorized author author- statement by Count Bernstorff the German ambassador No said he he I am perfectly conIner convinced con con- vinced Iner that there will be a confer conter enc care The Tho nearest parallel in world history for tor President Wilsons Wilson's action was Pros Pres ident Roosevelt's move In 1005 to en end the war ai between Russia and Japan But in that case the President had been n assured his proposal would net t he disagreeable disagreeable dis dis- agreeable to either cither of or the belll belligerents and curiously enough h it was through h Emperor William Ullam of or Germany that the preliminary soundings into the sU suggestion that President Roosevelt take tako the steps Dc Before fore that time President Roosevelt Roose had conferred with Count the nu Russian ambassador amb here and with Mr Tal the Japanese minister In the Russian capital the Am American n am am- bassa or George von on L. L had conversations on with Count the Russian minister for foreign n af af- a C fairs In Tol Tokio io American minister had hall conversations with Count Olin hr fc mum th the Japanese JaI A minister for foreign foreign for for- eign affairs The ThA outcome of all th these preliminaries wa was that PJ President Roosevelt Roose was assured that h its hA would not be bo humiliated b by a n rejection of oC hl his action Those In 11 official who would discuss the notes thought thou it Il worthy 01 of attention that President Wilson niter 1 saying s his action had long been In Ir mind added The President can an only nog neg hat bat hl his suggestion be considered l cred entirely c rn II n nits Its own merits and as al if it had been made mude in Iii other circumstances s The President nt looks forward In the tho noes to the part the neutrals shall take In assuring tho future peace of If tho the world lie Hc expresses justification In suggesting sug an Immediate opportunity It ity Ry for tor a A. comparison of or views us Ilg to tho terms tonus which must prece precede e those ultimate arrangements for tho the of or the world which h all nil desire and in which the neutral nations as ns well as those at war are ready to play their full rull responsible part The objects which the tho belligerents lave have in mind the tho President points out lut are arc virtually the same game as stated slated lat in n general t terms to their people and to tho the world hut but yet ct the concrete ob oh- oh- oh of ot tho the war wal have never been lleen definitely definitely def def- stated Never er e yet he sa says s 's o lu tho the au nu- au- au e statesmen of or either side owe R. avowed the precise objects which would woul if attained satisfy them an and their people that the tho war waI had been fought hl out The world has been left ert to conjecture with definitive c Tf rf what actual exchange c of or guarantees what political or territorial chan changes os or 01 readjustments what stage of or military success even would bring the war toan to toan toan an cn end |