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Show 7 C? )t-J North mcricaa i Newspaper Alliance. "y" I Steiry ml tffiae A Eo Fo s?i i or in part prohibited.) J . . t CHAPTER XIV Iji response to my request to Waxh-Itoglon Waxh-Itoglon f'" '"I experienced tniin to take jharge of rail transportation, V. V. 4Uterliury, general manager of tlie Pennsylvania nillro:i(l, arrived In Franco ami reported to Mie September Septem-ber 1, I III 7. At Alterliury's suggestion a rattle was sent requesting certain men to (111 Important positions In the organization. organiza-tion. I'll 3 li.it Included J. A. McRne general manager of the Long Island railroad, for general manager, will) ('. M. Hunting as business manager, U. C. liooz as engineer for construction, ad J. O. Rogers as deputy. The railway rail-way problem was far from easy, and Inany wete the ohstucles to he overcome, over-come, bolu In our own and In the French services. Successful management manage-ment would have been very doubtful as practicable and aviation was organized or-ganized and maintained as a distinct force. To co-ordinate our training with that at home ling. flen. William I,. Kenly was sent over the latter part of August and was appointed chief of aviation in the A. 10. F. Colonel Mitchell, who had succeeded Major l,iodd, the first chief of aviation, was given Jurisdiction over aviation In the zone of advance. Major Rolling was placed In charge of aviation In the zone of the Interior, and soon succeeded succeed-ed In securing a better co-operation through an Interallied aircraft board. The next essential step was the training of airplane pilots, and accordingly accord-ingly arrangements were made for our men to enter flying schools In England, France and Italy after they had passed l heir preliminary tests at home. Vacancies Va-cancies wer- held for us in the schools. F 4 if fr 'ZQ I I' f - ( " i I 1 , ' C , ; -t o ' i ; 1 -I, i - v x 4 gutlons, however, led to the conclusions conclu-sions that we should accept allied experience ex-perience and also adopt the tank as a weapon. CHAPTER XV I received many reminders September Septem-ber 13 that another birthday had come, including a surprise party by my staff that evening. As this was exactly three months after I had reached Paris, the time seemed to be passing very rapidly, rapid-ly, with little apparent progress against the day when an American army should be on the front line. The Importance of shipping for America was beginning to be considered consid-ered In allied circles. I received a letter from General Robertson. British chief of staff, who spoke" of their Increasing In-creasing losses and of his anxiety regarding re-garding the voyage of our troops across the Atlantic. As to tonnage for us, he said, It was entirely between Great Britain and ourselves, as none of the other allies could furnish any to speak of. On top of this, in conference a few days Inter with Lord Derby, the British Brit-ish minister of war, I was told that his government could not be counted on to furnish us with ships as transports. trans-ports. The substance of General Robertson's Robert-son's letter was cabled to Washington, suggesting the importance of taking advantage of the opportunity offered to obtain additional shipping. A few days later we were told that needful arrangements for transatlantic transports trans-ports were being made by the shipping ship-ping board. Gloomy Time for Allies. There was little in the general situation situ-ation to give comfort to the allies. Losses by the British through continuing continu-ing operations' were still growing. There no longer remained any doubt as to Russia's fate, and it was consequently conse-quently certain that German troops on that front would be released for service serv-ice in the west. Under the circumstances circum-stances the tired allied people were easily inlluenced by rumors. The pope's proposal, issued in August, Au-gust, started some talk of peace, but as It failed to condemn Germany's violation vio-lation of treaties and her inhuman submarine sub-marine warfare, :he note did not make a favorable impression on the allies. In fact, it was criticized in terms that were not' at all moderate. The various vari-ous replies from the different governments govern-ments did, however, arouse some hope, which was altogether unwarranted by the real attitude of the belligerent powers on either side. The discussion was unfortunate, because be-cause the French people, not realizing that peace was improbable, lost some of their courage, and the depression from tins and other factors caused uneasiness un-easiness among both civil and military leaders. Fron our sources of information, which included the intelligence bureaus bu-reaus of the allied armies, we got the impression that Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey would make peace on any reasonable reas-onable terms if they could do so. Visits Artillery School. The military post of Le Valdahon, near the Swiss border, used by us as a school for our field artillery, was one of several which had been kindly set apart for Americans in different parts enough material for the purpose to England and Trance. Tlie signal corps had, of course, to anticipate tlie communications necessary neces-sary in battle. Therefore definite decisions de-cisions wen required some time in advance ad-vance as to spheres of operations. Tons of material, most of which, except ex-cept wire, was obtained in France, and any amount of labor was uswd In the actual installation. The main telephone tele-phone and telegraph lines in proximity to the actual battle area were, when practicable, laid underground to prevent pre-vent destruction. One of the crying needs when we once began to use our own lines was for experienced operators. Instead of trying to train men of the signal corps I requested that a number of experienced experi-enced telephone girls who could speak French be sent over, and eventually we had about 200 girls on this duty. No civil telephone service that ever came under my observation excelled the perfection of our system after it was well established. The telephone girls in tlie A. R. F. took great pains and pride in their work and did It with satisfaction to all. The Hospital Problem. The medical department's plans constantly con-stantly received my careful attention through frequent conferences with the chief surgeon, Colonel Bradley, and his assistant. Colonel Ireland. Our problem prob-lem of handling the sick and wounded was more difficult than that of any of the allies, as we iiad no civil hospitals of our own available. Full provision, therefore, had to be made for hospital accommodations in France, as only convalescents manifestly unfit for further fur-ther service could.be sent home. The early estimates submitted in August, based upon a small force of 300,000 men, called for 73,000 beds in permanent, perma-nent, semipermanent or temporary hospitals, hos-pitals, and plans for expansion were in hand to keep pace with the expect-1 expect-1 ed requirements of our armies once they should become engaged. While this beginning appeared quite liberal, yet It was calculated to meet further demands of the immediate future. All the facilities through France were available for the French, yet they had so many sick and wounded that their hospital resources were pretty well exhausted. As there seemed to be only a few suitable buildings build-ings that could be assigned to us we had to plan considerable new construction. construc-tion. This required additional labor and material, both of which were scarce, and although there was some delay we managed by persistent effort to keep pace with requirements. Danger of Coal Shortage. Tlie destruction by the German army of tlie mines of northern France had forced the importation from England Eng-land of a large proportion of tlie coal needed for various purposes in both France and Italy. Lack of cross-channel tonnage had produced a serious situation, and the danger of coal shortage short-age during the approaching winter gave us much concern. Italy was even worse off, due to tlie greater distance from the source of supply. The outcome of our efforts, with the very effective assistance of Admiral Mayo, was that some colliers, one of which was already at Brest, were ordered or-dered into service for immediate use, and these were supplemented later by Building in France Used as School for Officers of the A. E. F. onder a leader without Atterbury's patience, pa-tience, ability and force of character. Visits to our training areas by the French, odlcial and otherwise, had become be-come rather frequent. One of the visitors, vis-itors, M. Georges Clemenceau, who al ways remained a power even when not In any oilicial position (Clemenceau was not then prime minister), called nt the headquarters of the First division, divi-sion, accompanied by General de Cas-telnau, Cas-telnau, the commander of the group of armies with which it was serving. Clemenceau Urges Action. In tlie course of the conversation with General Siliert, the division commander, com-mander, M. Clemenceau, with considerable consid-erable emphasis, urged that our troops be put into tlie line without delay. It was explained to him by General de Castlenau that as soon as they were eufliciently advanced the Iroops of the division were to be placed by brigades with tlie French in a quiet sector near Luneville. M. Clemenceau went on to say that America had now been in the war several months and the French people were wondering when they expected to take an active part. lie said that the French army was exhausted by the war and that its morale was poor, lie insisted then, as lie did with even greater vehemence later on in an official offi-cial capacity, that it was not so much a question of troops being ready as it was of giving relief to tlie allies. Although tlie division was only partially par-tially trained it could have been used in an emergency, but there was nothing noth-ing threatening in tlie situation at that time and no suggestion hart been made that it should go into tlie Hue for serious work. Tlie failure of our aviation bureau to keep abreast of airplane development develop-ment in tlie contending armies cost us serious delay. With a lack of data in the beginning, begin-ning, little progress had been made at home on our aviation program at tlie end of five months. Fruitless efforts to describe mechanical construction . and give definite Information concerning concern-ing production and otherwise reaeli decisions de-cisions by cable prompted Washington Washing-ton to send a special mission to France, of which Maj. Ii. C. Colling was tlie head. Through his ability and expert knowledge he rendered exceptional service in co-operating with those in control of allied aviation and in furnishing fur-nishing the necessary technical Information Infor-mation upon which to base action at home. The Investigation made by bis mission continued the view that our manufacturers could not begin to furnish fur-nish planes before the summer of 191S. Pershing Orders Planes. After inquiry as to French capacity to turn out planes, I made a contract with the air ministry late in August committing us to an expenditure of SGO.tXiD.OOO for 5,(100 planes and 8.5U0 engines, to be delivered as rapidly as possible at Intervals before tlie first of June, 1D1S, on condition that we should provide certain tools and raw materials. To make a contract to pay such uu amount appeared somewhat bold, but under tlie circumstances some one lvtd to take, the initiative Ln providing planes needed at once for the development of our air force. As aviation was in no sense a losl-cul losl-cul branch of the signal corps the two were separated in the A, IS. F. us soou but we were unable to take full advantage advan-tage of this opportunity for trainiug because of the delay In sending over flyers. However, we proceeded with the establishment of our own training centers, tlie first of which, located at Issoudun, was planned for a capacity of 900 pilots by spring. Use of Gas New Problem. The use of poisonous gases in warfare war-fare had been discussed at Tlie Hague conference in 1S!)9, with the result that several nations pledged themselves them-selves against the employment of projectiles pro-jectiles tlie only object of which was to give forth suffocating or poisonous gases. This action had created a feeling feel-ing of security regarding such a possibility. pos-sibility. Germany had subscribed to the agreement, and when her armies disregarded disre-garded this pledge and became the first to use gas shells, the impression was that they had now thrown every consideration of humanity to tlie winds. This action by the enemy forced the allies to adopt this weapon themselves as a matter of self-protection. From that time on the employment of gas became common to all combatants. The use of gas in warfare presented an entirely new problem to us, and the organization of a service to handle it demanded immediate attention. Tlie first plan of the War department provided pro-vided that the engineers should devise and handle the mechanical features and the medical department the chemical, chem-ical, but this soon proved to be imprac- ! tical and it became evident that, as we had maintained at tlie beginning, a separate service would be necessary. Meanwhile application -was made for a complete chemical laboratory to he shipped to France for use mainly in investigation as supplementary to similar sim-ilar work in the states. Gas Service Established. Considerable information concerning gases and tlie organization of gas troops had been, gathered by my staff and on August IS Lieut. Col. Amos A. Fries was designated as chief of the gas service. He made some further investigation of tlie subject in the British Brit-ish and French armies, and as. a result re-sult an order Issued September M established a department known at that time as the gas service. Experiments were at once begun to discover new gases and devise improvements im-provements in gas masks. To save tonnage and avoid the dangers of explosion ex-plosion in transit, it was decided, after consultation with the allied services, serv-ices, to request the shipment from the States of the basic elements and manufacture man-ufacture the chemical products in France. After thorough tests of different dif-ferent types of gas masks we adopted tlie box respirator used by the British, and a preliminary purchase of 100.000 was made to meet immediate demands for training. With the development of trench weapons and special tactical methods of defense, never had the offensive been more costly In human life than in tills war. The ingenuity of tlie allies was put to tlie test to devise new engines en-gines of war that would make the attack at-tack possible without excessive losses. While the tank, which was simply an armored caterpillar traction motor car, was favored by many otiicers as an aid to advancing infantry, this opinion was by no means unanimous. Our Investl- rrrT - s American Troop I rain Passing Through a French Town. of France. The others were at Cosr-quidan Cosr-quidan and Meucon, near St. Nazaire, and at Souge and La Corneau, near Bordeaux, and also at MontmoriUon, Saumur and Angers, with a school for heavy artillery at Mailly, southeast of Rheims. The school at Valdahon was then under the direction of Brigadier General Gen-eral March, an energetic nnd alert commander. At tlie time of my visit the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh regiments, regi-ments, comprising the field artillery brigade of the First division, were I there for training. As to the signal corps, and Its progress, prog-ress, Colonel Russell, hefore leaving Washington, had ordered n large consignment con-signment of materia! for both telegraph tele-graph and telephone services, but so far none had been received except what was sent with us on the Baltic. Finding it necessary to establish our own service in Paris, where the city system was almost useless, we were fortunately able at once to obtain i vessels from the shipping board. An organized cross-channel service was completed under the control of our quartermaster department and later transferred to the transportation department. de-partment. All hough the coal question became more or less critical at various vari-ous times, in the main we were ta-ly well supplied. CHAPTER XVI Having learned that, despite my recommendations, little or no atteniion was being given at home to the importance im-portance of teaching our men the use of the rifle, it seemed necessary again to emphasize my views, especially after further knowledge of its neglect in allied armies. The infantry soldier, well trained In stealthy approach and in the art of taking cover, makes a small target and, if an expert rifleman, there (s nothing that can take his place on the battleGeld. (TO BH CONTINUED.) |