Show X X 0 G Cie le I 1 sl e r I 1 10 X X story stor LT of the A E F 0 0 copyright all count rice by the north arnal by general 0 on an N PP Ail ailen ln world right fight r rard rt rd d X in including luding the scandinavian reproduction in whole jolla J us pershing X 0 in put part prohibited BI y X K CHAPTER continued As an the situation in which we found ourselves ourse hes regarding artillery ammini uon was approaching a crisis it became necessary to lay jay the whole ques tion before the munitions board after it a full investigation of their resources both the french anil and british concluded that they buld un berto iler take ke to meet our requirements with ft ath the distinct understanding that hint their plants must be greatly increased in if P and that we flamish rw materials promptly the late gen tusker tasker 11 bliss bites calel of the war ar department general staff represented us in the billed allied conference and reported results and agreements reached ue he had brought the latent data from home and his knowledge concerning steel and munitions enabled him to give ghe valuable assistance to my chief of ordnance in our efforts to find solution to the munitions problem A letter from secretary of war baker dated september 10 lud had only recently been received and gave rue me an idea of some of ills his problems in part lie he wrote as follows 1 I am especially concerned tint that our troops should nut not be engaged ang aged in belo al fighting in france until they are aie there in such numbers and have made such buch thorough preparation tint that their first appearance appeal ance will be encouraging both to their own morale and to the spirit of our people here I 1 think it goes without saying saving that the germans will malie make a very special effort to strike swiftly and strongly against any part of the line which we e undertake to defend in order to be able to report to their people encouragingly about our participation and also with the object of discouraging our soldiers and our people as much as possible in the matter of selecting corps and division commanders I 1 constantly feel that I 1 ought to have hae your advice and judgment irom froin all thit that you iou have said bald supplemented by all I 1 have learned elsewhere the need for young soung and physically strong men Is apparent and I 1 am perfectly willing to go any ani limit in meeting this requirement it will of course necessitate pass ing over a substantial number of our older generals who are very eager to go BO to france 1 ranee and who in their own ideas and that of the country have certain right to be preferred but their occupation here in the of troops Is of course a valuable con trib ution to the cause and whenever I 1 can call feel sure suie lu in the selection of the younger man that lie actually lly has bus the capacity to develop to a sufficient ex es tent to justify its his being preferred to a man of greater e eater I 1 shall not nol hesitate mobilizing of army delayed in view of the emergency that w was its so eo clearly set forth by the hie joffre aid balfour missions when they visited the united states and which was con firmed after tuy toy arrival in france nod and reported ported le with nil all emphasis I 1 have love never cover been able to understand the un on nc ne cesary delay caused ly by waiting six months for the construction of large cantonments canton ments before calling out men and assembling them tor for training of course couise it was particularly urgent that tile the specialists and laborers borers In need cd in france to build up our facilities should have been provided as fast ns as they could ile be i employed but nothing should liae have postponed the im am mediate mobilization of the combat units of the regular army and the no isa guard CHAPTER the units of the twenty sixth division afaf gen clarence Et edwards words commanding began to arrive the lot int ter part of september continued during october and the early part of N november 0 and were now assembled in the billeting area near I 1 inspected the division november 11 1917 and found the lie various organizations presented a very creditable appearance the officers secial alert and military and the personnel looked strong and vigorous their instruction st had been carried out under the direction of brigadier general traub one of the brigade commanders and seemed to be well advanced the probable situation as to man power in which the allies would find themselves in the spring was causing much solicitude the germans lind captured riga illga in september keren ekys power was nt at an end and the bolshevik government was established with lenin and in control the situation was such that russia had bad become entirely negligible as far as assistance to the allies was concerned an analysis of the possible strength of the contestants slON showed Ved that germany would be able to spare a considerable number of divisions from the Itus russian sian front careful study by my staff in operation cooperation co with the allied stairs had led to the conclusion that thai her total number in the west by spring would be na as many ns as not counting tile possibility of tile added strength of forty eight divisions from Aust austria riu alp mile greatest number the allies could er according to estimates would lie be divisions counting two amerl run can italy could not be counted on to do more than barely told md her own even een with the help of the eleven allied divisions then on that front other american divisions might pos sibly be in europe by may 11 1 if they should arrive according to schedule which was doubtful but they would be too late to participate in the expected early spring campaign at the low rote rate of arrival we should not have more than halt of the twenty one dl visions promised by the war depart men mant ready tready for service sen ice by june outcome depended on america in this hits war nar where the battle lines extended across entire countries and in which the lie qualities of the appo cents were about equal the aspect largely resolved itself into a consideration of tile the number and loca tion of divisions on either side the situation was nas of such a character that it ins a question which side could provide the superiority of forces necessary to success in other words the outcome would depend upon tile the nuni num her ber of troops that america could send over oer all eyes ees were on the eastern front to allied statesmen the collapse of hussla meant possible grave grae political consequences to the alie allied command ers it forecast the release of divisions and the increase in the ranks in belgium und and northern france to a preponderance pic that could not be overcome to us its it indicated a race between americas best effort to pour our fighting men into france and Germ germanis anys best deter Blin atlon to crush tile the allies beffre our soldiers Bold leis could arrive arrhe in sufficient nuni num hers bors to dominate the battlelle bittle neld ld faced defeat with allies our estimates of the lie shipping tot foi troops and supplies as set forth in the plan by which a due proportion of combat and line of communication troops were ft ere to forni such increment of six divisions would require by june jaue 1 for tile the shipment of twenty four dl di visions it total of over oer tons no ko one seemed to know where wf u were to obtain tile tons of shipping in addition to the tons we vie were then supposed to be using it appeared almost certain then that should disaster befall the allied armies that under these conditions we would have to go down with them I 1 always felt certain ceita ln however that thai tonnage could be found for our pur pose it the necessary pressure were exerted to force it into use appeals were made continuously and persis 1 bently in an effort to get action on this vital question but several months elapsed before it really came taken as a whole the apparently slow progress of our preparation in europe also caused considerable all ad verse comment if not dismay among the allies inquiries were ft ere made directly by tile the military and civil cal as to ft why by we did not move more rapidly to which the reply was always lack of shipping new british offensive immobilized by the mud of flanders rian dei where attacks had continued intermittently front the end of july to the middle of november with rather excessive losses the british commander in chief turned to a more southerly sout lierly portion of his line for the final offensive of the year choosing the cam bral front on which to launch the effort careful preparations including the concentration of an unu anu ual number of tanks were made to insure a break through the edemia defenses the tanks and the infantry ft were ere to make inake nn an opening through which the cavalry cm airy was ft as to pass and attack the flanks of the enemy then french troops held field in readiness in the vicinity were to follow As to the question of command ot of these combined forces when both should barome engaged it was to be toft left to the senior general officer in the vicinity who might be either french or british in going over these plans it seemed to me that their idea of securing operation cooperation co after the french should potion pation was rather vague during tile the day we first went to visit general byng commanding the third army who explained further details of the lie attack and tile the progress already made lie and his chief of staff were busy busi receiving news from the chii front ano and felt that all was nas going well british victory spurs spun alllen alalea I 1 the attack was made on a six mlle front and the british hod had the advantage from the outset the sudden bouch ment of the long line of tanks closely clo iely followed by the infantry all without the usual warning of long preliminary ll artillery bombardment completely surprised the germans the tanks broke wide gaps in the wire and subdued the machine gun nests albl aliling na the infantry through the defenses with a minimum of loss the front was rather narrow considering si st the depth of the objectives A maxin juni gain of some four and a halt half miles was secured the first day and a greater result was prevented it was said by a serious check to tile the tanks at for some reason or other the french were not called into action but presumably it was because the british cavalry ca alry w nelch aich was to precede them could not go forward as planned tile the offensive olTen she continued for two or three days longer with varying success it was however a decided victory find and while not as great as the british expected it gave gae encouragement to the allies on the western front and no doubt helped to offset temporarily the depressing effect of the serious defeat recen sustained by the italian army CHAPTER an american Ameil can mission headed by col n E M X ho house ll 11 se arr arrived IV ed I 1 in n france toward the end of november nm ember for an conference other members of tile the mission were admiral W S benson gen tasker 11 II bliss chief of staff oscar T crosby for the treasury department part ment vance mccormick chairman of tile war trade board gain bridge colby shipping board alonzo I 1 n taylor thomas N perkins pel kins war industries dus tries and paul cravath As the representatives u ui different nationalities gathered in paris recent reports of decreasing losses of ocean tonnage and greater destruction ot of german submarines clith prospects of still further improvement seemed to give more of hopefulness in the general situation and allied spirits were somewhat revived the british had won at Carn bral and were making satisfactory progress in their advance on jerusalem which it was said would he facilitated by tile the use of their new base at jaffa the italians seemed to have recovered their morale to a limited extent with etli the stiffening of their lines by british and french divisions and hall had successfully held their own against the austrian attack on the lie piave not the least hopeful tiling thing was the step just taken toward unity of command mandan in the creation of the supreme war council but the decisive factor in tile whole situation if it could he be utilized in time was the tremendous economical and physical power of the united states to make that envall able before it was too late ans the problem upon the solution of willell depended tile the success of kllc allied cause would the allies see it t and would they work together to solve it when all were seated around the table in the assembly room at the lilan aln astry of foreign affairs prime minis ter clemenceau who presided spoke briefly getting forth the importance ot of tile the gathele gat 1 heln and the necessity of 01 translating tile the noble spirit of the alliance allire re into ii action tion N no 0 attempts a nt at oratory were in eviden evidence ce nor was there prolonged N naturally dually tu ally questions discourse on any subject concerning available and mail rower power mull munitions irions SUP supplies PIles were mentioned mention in a general ed but only way the conference did little more of the various that than agree ahn hint t the study subjects gh should ou id be left to committees committee compo hed of representatives it was very clear that everybody was looking to america to aro provide v ade the additional man power needed to give the miles allies superiority none was more eager to increase our forces than ourselves SO ives but on my part every possible argument to procure shipping had been presented to the allies and to our war department so when the conference urged tile the expedition of our forces it made tile the strongest kind of a case in favor of immediate increase of allied aid in tonnage for some time reliance upon the allies for tiny any con considerable demable amount of tonnage had seemed almost in vain and it look looked ed as though we should have to depend upon our own limited resources for most of it tile the british were some assistance in the transportation of men american ships had carried up to november 1 and the british the results rei alts of the british success at Cani bral were not to be permanent as the germans quickly retaliated general von marwitz hastily assembled it a force of some fifteen divisions and november 30 suddenly launched a violent counterattack the british were short of reserves and before von marwitz was stopped his troops had regained most of the lost ground it was in this operation that a detachment tach ment of our eleventh regiment of engineers became engaged while serving with the british the men to the number of were at work in the Gauz acourt railway yard when the germans attacked one officer and nine men were wounded and the d detachment e tach ment withdrew they were then given arms and fought with the british war council meets again the second conference of the supreme pre 11 e war council was held itt at versailles december 1 our represents tives political and military at this meeting were sir bouse and general bliss respectively at the opening session M clemenceau drew attention to the general situation referring espe chally to the collapse of russia tile the probable release of enemy troops from that front the adverse situation in italy the depletion of allied man power and the reliance of the allies on american assistance the premier enjoined the military to bear in mind that their function Is to advise the supreme war council as a whole and not merely as representatives of their respective spec tive nations on the council and that they should view the problems confronting them not from a national 4 11 1 t T 0 A y I 1 N X 24 general pershing visits the king and queen of belgium standpoint but from that of the allies as a whole tile the military representatives at this conference were instructed to |